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RÉSUMÉ
VCette dissertation étudie les diverses configurations de la problématique du
deuil dans une sélection de textes littéraires, psychanalytiques, et déconstructives.
Les auteurs sur lesquels je travaille sont James Joyce, Sigmund Freud, Jamaïca
Kincaid, et Jacques Derrida. L’introduction examine le contexte psychanalytique
qui constitue le cadre initial dans lequel la question du deuil est posée, et trace les
grandes lignes de la rhétorique du reste de la dissertation.
Dans mon premier chapitre sur Dubliners de Joyce, j’essaie de repenser la
question du deuil, pas comme étant une réaction à la perte (Freud), mais comme
corrélation au commencement du désir. Une telle perspective permet non
seulement une critique de Freud, mais également une vision plus compréhensive
de certains personnages dans Dubliners, particulièrement James Duffi et Gabriel
Conroy. La sensibilité de ces personnages à la mortalité des objets de leurs désirs
et à la nécessité d’extraire leurs substances à partir de ces objets—dans lesquels
elles seraient autrement emprisonnées—a été en grande partie interprétée comme
symptomatique de la paralysie. En explorant les gains thérapoétiques de la figure
de prosopopée en relation à la question du deuil, ce chapitre essaie de tracer les
grandes lignes de la poétique du deuil.
Adoptant une approche comparative, le deuxième chapitre examine les
vicissitudes de la mélancolie dans Freud et Joyce. Le but ici n’est pas d’appliquer
le travail métapsychologique de Freud à la fiction de Joyce mais de signaler plutôt
un air familiale dans les représentations psychanalytiques et littéraires de la
problématique du deuil au début de la première guerre mondiale. Les chapitres
qui suivent tâchent d’articuler les configurations poétiques de l’affect
mélancolique et les implications éthiques de l’écriture du deuil.
vi
Le chapitre trois évalue l’effet de la problématique de la mémoire et de
l’histoire de l’esclavage dans la fiction de Jamaïca Kincaid. En exposant les
faits et
méfaits de la pratique du souvenir, ce chapitre discerne les contou
rs de la
contrainte de la répétition sous la pratique triomphante du souvenir. Le b
ut de ce
chapitre est d’expliquer les composants poétiques et affectifs de la question
de la
représentation du trauma historique.
Le dernier chapitre établi le lien entre les récits du deuil de Kincaid et de
Derrida. Le but principal de ce chapitre est d’évaluer les vertus thérape
utiques
ainsi que les limites éthiques de l’écriture du deuil après la mort de l’autre. E
n
essayant de déconstruire la loi du deuil et de la replacer dans une théorie plus
perfectible de justice, le chapitre explore les possibilités entretenues par l’affect
du deuil en vue d’une théorie de connectivité avec les perdus, le passé, et surtout
l’histoire.
MoTs-cLÉs: deuil; mélancolie; trope; prosopopée; catachrèse; éthique; écriture;
Joyce; Freud; Kincaid; Derrida.
ABSTRACT
VIII
This dissertation investigates the various configurations of the problematic of
mouming in a selection of literary, psychoanalytic, and deconstructive texts. The
authors on whom I concentrate are James Joyce, Sigmund Freud, Jamaica Kincaid,
and Jacques Derrida. The introductory chapter examines the psychoanalytic
contexture in which the question of mouming is initially posed and traces some ofthe
important threads that make up the rhetorical fabric ofthe rest ofthe dissertation.
My first chapter on Joyce’s Dubliners attempts to rethink the work of
mouming, not as a reaction to loss (Freud), but as a correlate to the inception of
desire. Such a perspective allows flot only for a critique of Freud, but also for a more
sympathetic approach to some characters in Dubliners (especially James Duffy and
Gabriel Conroy) whose sensitivity to the mortality of the objects of their desires and
to the necessity of extracting their substances from those objects in which they would
otherwise be trapped have largely been interpreted as symptomatic of paralysis. By
exploring the therapoetic purchases of the trope of prosopopoeia as to the fulfihiment
of the work of mouming, this chapter means to paint the broad strokes of a poetics of
mourning.
Adopting a comparative approach, the second chapter lays bare the
vicissitudes of melancholia in Freud and Joyce. The aim here is not to apply Freud’ s
metapsychological papers to a selected number of Joyce’s stories but rather to signal
a familial air in the psychoanalytic and literary representations of the complex of
mouming on the threshold of the Great War. The chapters that follow strive to
articulate the poetic configurations of the melancholic affect and the ethical
implications of narrative mouming.
ix
Chapter tbree assesses the effect of the problematic of remembering and the
history of sÏavery on the fictional work of Jamaica Kincaid. By exposing the uses and
abuses of the cuit of remembering, this chapter discems the contours of repetition
compulsion undemeath the triumphant practice of remembering. The aim of this
chapter is to account for the poetic (i.e., catachrestic) and affective (i.e., melancholic)
components ofthe question ofthe representation of historical trauma.
The last chapter brings together the narratives of mouming of Kincaid and
Derrida. The main purpose of this chapter is to assess the therapeutic virtues as weIl
as the ethical limits of writing foilowing the death of the other. By allempting to
deconstruct the law of mouming and to ground it in an ever more perfectible theory
of justice, the chapter explores the possibilities opened up by the affect of mouming
in view of a theory of connectivity with lost others, the past, and history writ large.
KEYWORDS: mouming; melancholia; trope; prosopopoeia; catachresis; narrative;
ethics; writing; Joyce; Freud; Kincaid; Derrida.
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INTRODUCTION The Scope of Mouruing
2Go ont ofmourningfirst.
—Joyce, UÏysses
Thus spake James Joyce—in the imperative! The order is simple. It asks of us
to go out ofmouming, to move out ofmouming and into something else that it holds
in reserve or keeps in store for us until we have met the demandfirst. Preparatory to
anything else, we are required to go out of mouming. What follows, what is about to
unfold—really, its very unfolding—hinges on the fulfiulment of the task to which we
are assigned. Joyce’s categorical imperative, we begin to realize, is also a promise of
something else, of something better that is about to happen to us. A world of
possibility seems to be awaiting us provided that we go out of mouming. Joyce’ s
injunction is quite explicit about this world of possibility awaiting us, since we are
asked, flot to go out of mouming as such, but precisely to go out of mouming first.
Here lies the kemel of the promise—in the primacy of the categorical imperative over
any other suchuike imperatives.
Whether there are other imperatives or not, going out of mouming is
preeminent among them. In the beginning, there is mouming, and there is mouming
to begin with. Mouming is the condition of beginning yet going out of it is the
condition of what will follow, of the very unfolding of what will follow. The promise
of what will follow is identical with the condition of its unfolding. Going out of
mourning, we begin to grasp also, is both the promise and the condition of what will
follow. In fact, what will follow—the promise of which going out of mouming is the
3condition—is nothing but the state of being out ofmourning. Going out of mouming
is then the condition and the promise ofbeing out ofmouming.
However, because it is essentially aphoristic, Joyce’s sententious imperative
exceeds hermeneutic mastery, if by hermeneutic mastery we mean the establishment
of an essential or core meaning. It exceeds hermeneutic mastery while it preaches
affective mastery. For, were going out of mouming a naturally occurring
phenomenon, it would have hardly become an imperative. In other words, the logic
of the imperative itself is inhabited by the suspicion of its unobtainability. Joyce’s
imperative is, moreover, uttered by Leopold Bloom in the bosom of Rades, and, more
accurately, at Glasnevin Cemetery, at Paddy Dignam’s fiineral—the axis around
which revolves The “Hades” episode of Ulysses. Set thus, within an ostensibly
charged site of mouming, the imperative becomes doubtiessly ail the more urgent.
Yet the more urgent the imperative becomes, the more uncertain its implementation
appears to be. It is this fear of unfeasibility—really, the fear of the failure of
implementation—that lurks behind, at the very back, of the intransigent nature of the
command. The command is therefore preceded, if flot conditioned, by the possibility,
if not the expectancy, of failure.
The amount of emphasis laid on the command implies, however, something
else, something that has to do with the nature or “business” of mouming itself:
particularly, that “mouming” is a stumbling block, a cmcible—a trial of the utmost
difficuity. For, so powerfiil a commandment—Go out ofmourningfirst—can only be
directed toward an equaily powerful challenge. No longer are we here mereiy
ordered to go out of mouming, but we are precisely challenged to do so. If going out
4of mouming is to be ftamed as a challenge, does this mean that it is beyond our
means to meet that challenge?
b the extent that Go out of mourning first is understood as an order or
imperative, it implies that it is within our capacity to act upon or accomplish it with a
certain amount of success; to the extent that it is understood as a challenge. however,
it implies that it is both within and beyond our capacity to realize. It can be argued, I
suppose, that whether going out of mouming is an order or a challenge, the promise
remains the same—the state of being out of mouming. I wiIl concede that, at first
glance, one might react to a challenge in the same fashion one might react to an
order, yet it is oftentimes the case that to meet a challenge one lias to push to the
limits of one’s means; moreover, one is, more ofien that not, deprived ofthe means to
meet the challenge. One is, perhaps, deprived of the means of going out of mouming
as soon as one enters (into) mourning. In other words, the very fact of being in
mouming might imply that one is unable to go out of it, that ail one’s psychic
resources are engaged in mouming such tliat there is no energy lefi to brace the
passage out of mouming; were one able to go out of mouming, one would not
probably have entered (into) it in the first place. Can one then stop at the threshold,
refuse or decide not to enter (into) mouming? for why should one, afier ail, enter into
something out of which one is soon required or challenged to go? How do we enter
(into) mouming? What is mouming?
5The Subject of Mourning
I wasn ‘t even sure that Ifully understood my own central concept of
‘mourning. ‘I was taking itfrom freud but he didn ‘t understand ii’
either.
—Geoffrey Gait Harpham, “The Business of Mouming”
In his epochal metapsychological essay, “Mouming and Melancholia” (1917),
Freud contends that mouming is, like melancholia, a reaction to loss. I will corne to
the question of melancholia’s oppositional distinction to mouming in due course;
suffice it now to stress that Freud associates it with the obstruction or sabotage of the
“normal affect” of mourning (251). But, let us first examine the conditions of
possibility ofmouming itself, that is, the ways in which the loss of an object-cathexis
becomes amenable to mouming. The loss does flot solely involve the death of a
beloved person, but it can also involve the demise of a number of abstract ideas or
principles such as liberty or dernocracy, as well as the loss of an era, a political
regime, an economic system, a historical movement, if flot history itself Whatever
the loss, the appropriate emotional response is, Freud argues, mouming. Depending
on the scale or magnitude of each suffered loss as well as on the psychic wherewithal
of each mourner, the duration of mouming varies, sometimes significantly, but it is
flot expected, on the whole, to go beyond “a certain lapse of time” (252). hie
processive, “bit by bit,” progress of mouming toward its end is in keeping with the
movement in time. Mouming is then an economy of emotional response to loss that
depends on the passage of time in order for it to carry out its internai work. It is flot
6for nothing that Freud refers to this emotionai economy as a Tranerarbeit, a work of
mouming. Yet what is exactly the kind of task that the work of mouming performs?
To make some headway into this difficuit question, let us first examine
Freud’ s answer:
Reality-testing has shown that the ioved object no longer exists, and it
proceeds to demand that ail libido shah be withdrawn from its
attachment to that object. This demand arouses understandable
opposition—it is a matter ofgenerai observation that people neyer
wilhingly abandon a libidinal position, flot even, indeed, when a
substitute is already beckoning at them. This opposition can be so
intense that a tuming away from reahity takes place and a clinging to
the object through a medium of hallucinatory wishfui psychosis.
Normahly, respect for reahity gains the day. Nevertheless its orders
cannot be obeyed at once. They are carried out bit by bit, at great
expense of time and cathectic energy, and in the meantime the
existence ofthe lost object is psychically prolonged. Each single one
of the memories and expectations in which the libido is bound to the
object is brought up and hypercathected, and detachment of the libido
is accomphished in respect of it. Why this compromise by which the
command of reality is carried out piecemeal should be so
extraordinarily painful is not at ail easy to explain in terms of
economics. It is remarkable that this painful unpleasure is taken as a
matter of course by us. The fact is, however, that when the work of
mourning is completed the ego becomes free and uninhibited again.
(253; italics mine)
Perhaps it is too premature to concur with Geoffrey Galt Harpham, in the above
epigraph, that Freud did not really understand (what) mouming (is): afier ail, I make
no daim to understanding (what) it (is) either.1 Let us willingly suspend our
judgment in an attempt to host—in accordance with the laws of hospitality relevant to
critical thought (J. Hillis Miller, “The Critic as Host”)—Freud’s elaborate definition.
To begin with, I would point out that Freud’s argument is predicated upon the
reconciliatoiy process that the work of mourning initiates (and presumably fulfihis),
not oniy with regard to the lost object but also with regard to the decrees ofreahity—
7the “hard rock” against which the moumer’s fantasies of recovering the object are
shattered. Here, the conciliatory is consolatory. $ince Stephen Dedalus insists that
“Where there is a reconciliation. . .there must have been first a sundering” (Ulysses
247), what kind of sundering, one rnight ask, does the loss of the object result in?
It is generally agreed within psychoanalytic theory—and object relations
theory,2 in particular—that subjectivity is a relational enterprise. I shah treat this
point in sorne detail later when I speak about the problem of identification; suffice it
for the moment to stress that love objects serve to accommodate libidinal investrnents
and to maintain psychic balance. Once a love object is lost, it becomes obvious that it
can no longer fulfill its former function—the mediation of libido. Unless the
(mouming) subject proceeds to withdraw and reinvest its libido in a new object, lis
or her ego is lefi in the lurch. Lost, the object can, however, be compromised in the
service of acquiring new objects; the ego becomes, once the withdrawal and
displacement of libido is accomphished, no longer debihitated by the loss ofthe object
but quite invigorated. The loss of the object cornes, in point of fact, to sunder an
otherwise originary capacity or fteedorn of choosing and picking up objects. The
regaining of this freedom of attaching to other objects must corne then, at least
theoretically, at the expense of the loyalty to lost objects. In this respect, the
reconciliatory work of mouming can be understood as nothing less than an
incitement to and a naturalization ofthe praxis ofdisloyalty.
Furthermore, the reconcihiation with reality—or the exercise of reality-testing
about which Freud speaks—is, as it were, an attempt at exorcising the “estrangement
effect” produced by the loss of the object. In other words, the rnoumer attempts to
$make reality his own again afier having been alienated from it by the loss of his or
lier love object. In this sense, the work of mourning becomes a “genuinely
hermeneutical” (Ricœur “What is a Text?” 344) process of refamiliarization with an
unchanging but repressed reality—unchanging because it has aiways involved death
and loss; repressed because the reality of death and loss would hardly have been
painted by the libidinal adventurer at the time ofthe adventure.3 The refamiliarization
with reality implies, perhaps inherently, the refamiliarization with the technique of
repression of the knowledge of death and mortality involved in the search of new
objects. In other words, while loss (of a love object) and mouming miglit culminate
in an illuminating and epiphanic experience—in that they open up the survivor, for
instance, to the utter othemess ofthe object ofdesire—the completion ofthe work of
mouming implies a (deliberate) forgetting or nescience of the harsh knowledge
eamed via the experience of mouming; it involves precisely the rebirth of the illusion
of life and the repression of death.4
There is one additional feature of the reconciliatory feat that the work of
mouming performs which I should like to address here. One of the aims of the work
of mouming, as described by Freud, is the severance of the libidinal relations from
the lost object. While it is flot clear whether the work of severance leads to the
acquisition of a new object or whether the acquisition of a new object leads to the
completion of the work of severance, “There are,” as Freud argues elsewhere, “nearly
aiways residual phenomena, a partial hanging-back” to earlier libidinal fixations and
to lost love objects (“Analysis Terminable and Interminable” 22$). In order for the
work of severance to be thorough and complete, it has to be founded on a sound
9basis. This sound basis is nothing other than the comerstone of psychoanalytic
treatment writ large—remembering. Accordingly, “Each single one of the memories
and expectations in which the libido is bound to the object is brought up and
hypercathected, and detachment of the libido is accomplished in respect of it.” I
cannot here illustrate sufficiently the incommensurable activities of hypercathecting
and detaching, but I shah demonstrate throughout the main chapters of the
dissertation the constant siippage of hypercathecting-detacbment into re-cathecting
attachment: far from being a means of completing the work of severance and
mouming, hypercathecting and remembering become the conservational forces ofthe
work of mourning beyond a certain lapse oftime.
By and large, freud’s work of mouming does flot seem to me to work at
anything except its own dissolution. The work of mouming is the means and the end
of the completion of the work of mouming. It defines that which must be
accomplished yet it is the means of accomplishing it. Going out of mouming
necessitates going through mouming, yet going through mouming caimot be
experienced unless it is a going out of mouming. The end of mourning is the end of
mourning. Nothing else can cail for the dissolution of a work for its completion. In
Freud’s conception, mouming cannot be experienced as such, let alone maintained or
sustained. It is a work that is always at work in view of its own work. In short, it is
conjured up only to be conjured away and posited only to be deposited. At the end of
the “Hades” episode, while leaving the cemetery, Bloom heaves a sigh of relief:
“Back to the world again. Enough of this place” (Ulysses 145; italics mine). It is
prohibited to be stationed in mouming. The temporality of mouming itself is
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delimited and calculated: “Good Hamiet, cast thy nightly color off,” Gertrude urges
her son (Hamiet 1.2 36). Between a sense of getting at it or goïng out of it and a
feeling of having had enough ofit, mouming, as a form of being in the world, is lost
to us, if not largely left unexplored.
One aim of this dissertation is to offer a corrective to Freud’s insistence—at
least, insofar as “Mourning and Melancholia” is concerned—on the temporal
constraints of mouming. A more spatial conception of mouming seems to me
congenial flot only to relating to lost others, to the past, to history writ large, but also
to the present and to the future. Another aim of this dissertation is to loosen the
therapeutic grip of freudian psychoanalysis on the concept of mourning. Relations
are built in mouming, flot in response to it. Only when mouming has been repressed
does its retum become unbearable. The imperative Go oui’ ofmourningfirst seems to
me therefore nothing less than a further repression of an otherwise indispensable
constituent of relations at large. By urging the mourner to reinvest in a new object,
Freud does not, in my view, proffer us with more than a momentary solution to the
inevitable recurrence of mouming. For as soon as one reinvests one’s cathectic
energy in a new object, one simply paves the way to another outbreak of mouming.
We begin to grasp that mouming lias less to do with the loss of the object than with
the structure of desire itself.
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Mourning and the Circle of Desire
Now that my iadder is gone
I must lie down where ail the ladders start
In the foui rag and bone shop ofthe heart.
—W. B. Yeats, “The Circus Animais’ Desertion”
In “Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through” (1914), Freud teils us
how precarious the work of remembering is, flot because it preys on flashes of
memory, on slips of forgetting, as it were, but because remembering what had
hitherto been kept in abeyance may lead only to the intensification of the iliness
rather than to its graduai cure. On this score, it ought to be observed that the “bit by
bit” tempo of remembering and hypercathecting can lead to the intensification and
conservation of mouming rather than to its dissipation. It is flot that Freud is unaware
of the fauit unes of his postulations, but, perhaps, he is oniy too aware. In fact,
Freud’s awareness of the precarious nature of the analytics of remembering is such
that he has recourse to Gerede, to idie talk in order to overstep the coliapse of his
theoretical premises: “one can easily console the patient,” Freud observes, “by
pointing out that [the intensifications of his iuinessJ are only necessary and temporary
aggravations and that one cannot overcome an enemy who is absent or not within
range” (152). Only pure sophistry can reside comfortably in such conspicuous
contradictions. On the one hand, Freud would comfort lis patient by insisting on the
temporallly of the aggravations and, on the other, he would point out the precise
opposite: that the perpetrator of his sufferings had lefi the field of battie before he
could wrestle it to the ground. It is in this light that I shah attempt to understand
Freud’s insistence on the temporality of mourning, on the one hand, and his parallel
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prescription of libidinal reinvestment, on the other. It seems to me that the
temporality of mouming becomes untenable as soon as it becomes an impetus for
new libidinal expeditions. for, no sooner does desire take foot in a mortal object than
eros is agitated by the anticipation of loss.
In Eros in Mourning, Henry Staten argues that “As soon as desire is
something felt by a mortal being for a mortal being, eros (as desire-in-general) will
always be to some degree agitated by the anticipation of loss” (xi). far from being a
reaction to objectal loss, mouming runs the gamut from libidinal approach and
aftachment to loss. Mouming is the unconscious of desire; it is wired into the circuit
of desire but does not become manifest—at least culturally and ritualistically so—
only following the loss of the object of desire.5 In the spirit of deconstruction, Staten
understands mouming, flot as a reaction to loss or as a process of healing from loss,
as Freud would have it, but as a dialectic which structures every move in the
formation of object-relations. furthermore, at the core of this “dialectic of mouming”
are not only the moments of libidinal approach, attachment, and loss, but also the
very concomitant “strategies of deferral, avoidance, or transcendence that arise in
response to the threat of loss—strategies by which the self is ‘economized’ against
the libidinal expenditure involved in mouming” (xi).
Anchored in desire, mouming cannot possibly overcome the ruptures of
libidina1 relations, much less by inciting the moumer to strike into yet another
libidinal adventure. Here lies the ultimate irony of freud’s economy of libidinal
exchange, of withdrawal and reinvestment of libido, of which mourning is the driving
force. What Freud offers us, in other words, is flot a radical and grassroots re-solution
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of the problem of mourriing but a blueprint for its perpetuation. In “Mouming and
Melancholia,” Freud does flot explicitly communicate his otherwise strongly held
belief that libido is the problem, that whether or flot one divests bis libido from a lost
object-cathexis and reinvests it in another is flot the heart of the matter, but a
derivative or secondary solution to a permanent problem that has to do with the
inextricably bound relationship between desire and mouming. The movement of
desire is structured by mouming; the movement out of mourning is predicated upon
the redistribution of desire. Here lies the circle of desire and mourning: the road out
of mouming is precisely the road leading back into mourning. Insofar as going out of
mouming is keyed to desire—to the transferat of libidinal energy into yet another
mortal object—it is a perpetual referral back to mouming. The ultimate irony of
Freud’ s conception of going out of mourning through the exit doors of desire is that it
turns into a mise en abîme, begetting the very problem it seeks to solve. Instead of
overcoming mourning, it multiplies and therefore perpetuates it.
Attentive to the reiterative circularity of eros and mourning and wearied of
scenes of unseasonable grief, Platonism, Stoicism, and Christianity, among others,
joined forces to create and disseminate a prophylactic theory ofmanaging mortal eros
via the implementation of an economics of idealization and transcendence. This is
squarely, according to Henry Staten, the gist of the trajectory that the whole Western
tradition has followed in its hitherto contested relation to eros. If ah desire has
mourning at its horizon, the more radical solution than the one with which Freud
proffers us would proceed by the management of desire rather than by the
management of mouming. for, it is aiways too late to work at mouming once desire
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had found route to the object. Since desire for a mortal object is, by definition, tipped
toward mouming, only by winnowing out desire or nipping eros in the bud can the
possibility of transcending grief be concretized.
Lacan’s contention—”That the one unbearable dimension of possible human
experience is flot the experience of one’s death, which no one has, but the experience
of the death of another” (“Desire in Hamiet” 37)—can be located in
reference/contradistinction to the Stoic tradition of philosophical wisdom. In Lacan,
this unbearable dimension of death refers to the “hole in the real” lefi by the loss of
the object—a hole that, while it “sets the signifier in motion,” cannot possibly be
fihled, since the signifier that designates it can be “purchased only with your own
flesh and your own blood,” that is, only through (the moumer’s) bodily dissolution
(38). In the Roman $toic tradition ofphilosophy, it is precisely this eventuality ofthe
moumer’s bodily dissolution, this memento mon effect, so to speak, that motivates
the very project of transcendence, “of leaming how to extract one’s libidinal
substance from the mortal or losable objects in which it could be trapped” (Staten 5).
This practice of anticipatory withdrawal of libido from the mortal objects is a diumal
askesis among the Roman Stoics. In Enchiridion, Epictetus describes this askesis
with remarkable clarity:
In every thing which pleases the soul, or supplies a want, or is loved,
remember to add this to the (description, notion); what is the nature of
each thing, beginning from the smallest? If you love an earthen vessel,
say it is an earthen vessel which you love; for when it has been
broken, you will flot be disturbed. If you are kissing your child or
wife, say that it is a human being whom you are kissing, for when the
wife or child dies, you will not be disturbed. (qtd in Staten 5)
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This might seem, of course, easier said than done, yet the inevitable mortality of the
object is thought to be made less of a shock if diurnally painted. While there are
obvious differences between, for instance, the Stoic emphasis on auto-sufficiency and
seif-regulation and the Christian insistence on God’s grace, the fuicrum of the
Platonic-$toic-Cbristian argument is, according to Staten, the mastery or attenuation
of the otherwise runaway force of eros prior to object loss. for, it is vigorously
ordained that “no object that may be lost is to be loved in an unmeasured fashion—
that only a limited or conditional libidinal flow toward such objects is to be aÏlowed,
such that the self remains ready and able to retract its substance from the obj ect
before the unmasterable violence ofmouming might assail it” (10).
By means of an “economized” engagement of several variations on two
“arche-texts,” Homer’s Iliad and the Gospel of John, Staten’s Eros in Mourning
delivers a compelling remapping of the idealizing-transcendentalizing and religious
philosophical Western tradition of policing and controlling desire. The subsequent
chapters of the book—which range from studies of the troubadour song,
Shakespeare’s Hamiet, Milton’s Paradise Lost, Conrad’s Heart of Darkness to
Lacan’ s Seminars—lay bare the sedimentations and residues of this tradition of
regulating desire in the Western literary and philosophical tradition from Shakespeare
through to Lacan.
Taking my lead from Staten, I shah trace—in the first chapter of my
dissertation, “Horizons of Desire, Horizons of Mouming: Joyce’s Dubliners”—the
sedimentations of this idealizing-transcendentahizing tradition in such early modem
texts as “A Painful Case” and “The Dead.” While Staten manages successfully to
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delineate the vestiges of this tradition in an early modem text, Heart ofDarkness—
and while there are dregs of this tradition in other texts of narrative modemism—I do
flot intend in the space of this work to arrive at generic conclusions about the
reverberations of the ideology of transcendence of desire and mouming in modemist
texts. My intention, however, is to get a better grasp upon the problematic of desire
and mouming, flot by engaging it solely on a thematic level, but by disceming
undemeath the thematic interest in mouming the contours of its narrative and poetic
inscription. While Staten’s Eros in Mourning offers the groundwork for a new
poetics, which we can confidently cail a poetics of mourning, it does not articulate
the tropological architecture of narrative mourning. Parallel to my exploration of the
problematic of mouming in Joyce’s Dubtiners, for instance, I delve into the
construction of the tropics of the rhetoric of mouming. In this vein, I shah
demonstrate the ways in which prosopopoeia, for instance, serves as a trope of
narrative mouming. On this score, prosopopoeia proves a very helpful deconstructive
tool, in that it calis for its own deconstruction in the very process of its application.
In contradistinction to the ideology of transcendence, the tropologic of
prosopopoeia forces on the (mouming) subject both the acknowledgment of desire
(as is the case, for instance, with James Duffy in “A Painful Case”) and the
acknowledgment of mourning tas in the case of both James Duffy and Gabriel
Conroy in “The Dead”). Prosopopoeia—understood as a dialectic of personification
and reification (Paul de Man)—results flot only in the collapse of the ideology of
transcendence of mortal eros, but also in the face-to-face rendezvous with the Other
(the Iost object, death). which I deem of epiphanic, if not “empiphanic,” proportions,
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in that it opens up the (mouming) subject flot only to the radical alterity of the
deceased but also to the reaÏity of death, of loss and of mouming. Yet the
reconciliatory force of prosopopoeia with mortal eros is by no means consolatory. It
leaves the moumer with the same old demand for mouming which he can neither
fulfihi nor disregard. On this score, it becomes more and more clear that neither the
strategy of transcendence of eros nor the freudian strategy of redistribution of eros is
commensurate with the Joycean imperative—Go out ofmourningfirst. It seems that
the desire for the mortal object outwits the ideoiogy of anticipatory transcendence
and finds, albeit through detours, route to the object even in a postmortem fashion, as
is the case with James Duffy in relation to Emily Sinico; by the same token, the
desire for a lost object might persist not only in the face ofthe loss ofthat object but
also despite the acquisition of a new object, as is the case with Gretta in relation to
Michael Furey (iost love object) and Gabriel Conroy (new love object).
The outcome of the transcendence or embrace of mortal eros is the same:
desire persists afier the loss of the object. In this respect, the contribution ofFreud’s
conception of mouming consists, I think, in opening up the possibility for the
mouming subject to hijack this lingering desire for the lost object and lavish it on a
new object. Freud’s economics of mouming is, afier ail, an economics of managing
surplus libido, libido that cannot presumably be directed any longer toward the lost
object. To moum is to tame a desire that has not been sated but interrupted. It is not
for nothing that Freud deems the withdrawai of libido from the iost object as key to
the success of the work of mouming. Yet this is the cmx of the problem: not that the
withdrawai of libido from the lost object is ofientimes thwarted but that such
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withdrawal does flot indeed seem to be possible. for, a love object is flot external but
internai to the structure of the ego. Disregarding the entrapments of desire of which
we have hitherto spoken, the withdrawal of libido would have been possible were the
(lost) object situated outside the ego. The further afield we look, the more cognizant
we become of the challenging nature of Joyce’s imperative—Go out of mourning
first. Now, after having seen the ways in which this challenge has to do witli the
circular logic of desire and mourning, it becomes necessary to address the topography
ofthe (lost) object in relation to the architecture ofthe ego. It will become clear, once
I have rounded out my argument, that the (lost) object caimot be objectified (i.e.,
distanced from the ego), since it must have always—and as soon as it lias been
approached and cathected—assumed a place in the geography of the ego. The (lost)
object is no longer, to put it in a more Derridean fashion, that of which the ego can
speak, but precisely that from out of which the ego speaks.
The Quandary of Identification
Some ofthe things that one is unwilÏing to give up, because they give
pieasure, are nevertheless flot ego but object; and some sufferings that
one seeks to expel turn out to be inseparablefrom the ego in virtue of
their internai origin.
—freud, Civiiization and its Discontents
In Civiiization and its Discontents, Freud pursues a nowadays much discussed
Hegelian theme—happiness. Disenchanted and pessimistic, as he generally is, Freud
contends that “Unhappiness is much less difficult to experience.” Freud singles out
three hurdles in front of happiness: bodily decay, the extemal world, arid, most
importantly, “relations to other men” (264). While I do flot intend to pursue this
theme of happiness, there is nothing contradictory in considering the movement out
ofmouming as a function ofthe pursuit ofhappiness in general. Yet, as characteristic
of his overail philosophical logic, Fieud always starts by training psychoanalytic
solutions prior to showing how untenable they are. The fuffihiment of the work of
mouming is Freud’s solution to the outbreak of grief following the loss of a love
object. Yet this solution is, as I shall demonstrate fiirther, most oflen unsuccessflil,
not solely because of individual incompetence, but because of the structure of the
psyche itself. One can reproduce verbatim Freud’s view of the impossibility of
happiness and locate it in reference to the impossibility of mouming: “when we
consider how unsuccessful we have been in precisely this field of prevention of
suffering, a suspicion dawns on us that here, too, a piece of unconquerable nature
may lie behind—this time a piece of our own psychical constitution” (274; italics
mine).
How is it that, when one is asked to moum, one is in point of fact asked to
expel something that is nevertheless interior to the ego? An answer to this question
will have to lead to the discussion of the perplexing nature of identification.
Throughout his work, Freud continually reformulated his theory of identification;
whether by invoking the formation or the dissolution of the Oedipus complex, Freud
aiways tried to inventory a new language to articulate the enigma of identification
more fully and more thoroughly. In “On Narcissism” (1914), for instance, he traces
back the development of the process of identification to the emergence of
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“autoeroticism,” which he later dubs as “ego-libido” or “primary narcissism” ($4).
The first form of identification appears in the veneer of a primary narcissism, of an
ego-libido, part of which is later transfened into an “object-libido”——the mother.
Freud had not produced a full account of the transition from ego-libido to object
libido, but, in “Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety” (1926), such a transition is
described in terms of a different experience of pain. In a passage that is reminiscent
of Beyond the Pleasure Principie, Freud states that this transition is first initiated by
the intermittent absences of the mother—absences that are not experienced on a
physical plane but on a mental one. “The transition from physical pain to mental pain
corresponds,” Freud concludes, “to a change from narcissistic cathexis to object
cathexis” (332). This distinction between the two experiences of pain is important
insofar as it reaffirms the psychogenic—and therefore more problematic—nature of
mouming.
Identification can therefore be first defined as the expression of an “emotional
tie” with another person—most commonly, one of the parents or both (Group
Psychology 134). This identification soon sparks the emergence of the Oedipus
complex—a confused state of identification and libidinal attachment, in which the
boy confounds libidinal object-cathexis (directed toward the mother) with
desexualized object-cathexis (directed normally toward the father) and finds himself
therefore locked with his father in an oedipal struggle that ends with an intensified
identification with his oedipal rival and a regressive identification with his mother. It
is beyond the scope of this inquiry to delve into the “gender trouble” that the oedipal
struggle creates; it suffices to stress, however, the wedge that the dissolution of the
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oedipal complex instalis between two types of identification: the one with the father
(mimetic) and the one with the mother (identificatory).6
In other words, what is important for us here to bear in mmd is that
identification is at the origin of the Oedipus complex and, at the same time, the only
means of dissolving it through an intensified identification with the parent of the
same gender and a correlative abandonment of identification with the parent of the
different gender. We should flot fail to note here also that identification, insofar as it
serves to dissolve the (originary) identificatory ambivalence of the Oedipus complex,
acts in an analogous manner to the work of mouming. In fact, in The Ego and the Id,
identification is understood as afunction of the work of mouming, in that it becomes
“the sole condition under which the id can give up its objects” (368). If the work of
mouming consists in the work of severance with the object, identification permits this
severance to occur by enabling the interiorization of the lost object. Insofar as
identification is—as is the case in “Mouming and Melancholia”7—a function of
melancholia and insofar as it is now translated as a function of the work of severance,
melancholia revolves in the orbit of mourning. In fact, it is, as Freud also suggests,
“typical” of the work of mouming.
In this respect, Freud explains how his exploration of the concept of
identification—and, especially, its annexation to the formation and dissolution of the
Oedipus complex—allows him to correct his earlier theory of melancholia:
We succeeded in explaining the painful disorder of melancholia by
supposing that [in those suffering from itJ an object which was lost
has been set up again in the ego—that is, that an object-cathexis has
been replaced by an identification. At that time, however, we did flot
appreciate the full signficance of this process and did flot know how
common and how typical it is. (367; italics mine)
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While in “Mouming and Melancholia,” Freud suspected melancholia of a
pathological disposition, he seems here to rectify that attitude by demonstrating “how
common and how typical” is the melancholic procedure of setting up objects inside
the ego. What is even more striking than the alleged typicality of melancholic
identification is Freud’s discovery of its indispensability for any envisaged work of
mouming:
When it happens that a person has to give up a sexual object, there
quite ofien ensues an alteration of his ego which can only be described
as a setting up ofthe object inside the ego, as it occurs in melancholia;
the exact nature ofthis substitution is as yet unknown to us. It may be
that by this introjection, which is a kind of regression to the
mechanism of the oral phase, the ego makes it easier for the object to
be given up or renders that process possible. It may be that this
identification is the sole condition under which the Id can give up its
objects. (36$; italics mine)
While Freud is here concemed with the theorization of the dissolution of the Oedipus
complex, his argument is in fact haunted by the concept of mouming for which he
had previously been proud to offer a commensurate and readable account. Now, it
seems that the reverse is possible—that only melancholia can be accounted for with a
measure ofease. Yet there is no reason flot to believe that Freud’s original conception
of mouming is stiil at work here. The transition from the identification with the father
and the abandonment of identification with the mother corresponds to the transition
that the work of mourning is expected to effect—the identification with a new object
and the abandonment of the lost one—except that in the case of the child the mother
is not totally lost.8
Only on the condition of the interiorization of the mother—by way of a
regression to an oral and cannibalistic phase—can the resolution of the Oedipus
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complex become possible. In the same vein, the work of mouming cannot be
accomplished unless through a melancholic identification with—or intemalization
and incorporation of—the lost object. Such a strategic identificatory readjustment lias
warranted Judith Butier to conclude that “melancholic identification permits the loss
of the object in the external world precisely because it provides a way to preserve the
object as part ofthe ego and, hence, to avert the Ioss as a complete loss” (Psychic Lfe
of Power 134). 0f course, Butier is here adumbrating her “neyer-neyer” theory of
“melancholy gender” (138), in which a “double disavowal, a neyer having loved, and
a neyer having lost” is superimposed on, for instance, an otherwise originary
childhood desire for the parent of the different sex (137-8). Among other things—
namely, the deconstruction of normative heterosexuality as a “foreclosure of
homosexuality”—Butler deconstructs the cultural prohibition against incest by
inscribing it in a site of “repudiation,” “refusai,” or “sacrifice of desire” for the parent
of the different sex—a desire that remains “ungrieved and ungrievable” (137-8).
While the deconstruction of normative heterosexuality is better theorized than the
deconstruction of the cultural prohibition against incest, Butler’ s argument enables
nonetheless my reflection on a broader conception of subjectivity in relation to
ungrievable losses, losses that can neither be avowed nor grieved.
Rather than dwelling on the prohibition against incest, I mean to explore—in
the second chapter of my dissertation titled, “The Vicissitudes of Melancholia in
Freud and Joyce”—whether an adulterous desire, for instance, can be nurtured as
well as grieved (when it is lost or frustrated) in a culture that proscribes it. In “A
Painful Case,” Mrs. Sinico, a married and frustrated wife, pursues a romantic
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adventure with James Duffy, a loner. When their bond grew strong, and Mrs. Sinico’s
horizon of desire fused with his, Duffy suddenly broke the relationship, arguing that
“every bond is a bond to sorrow.” Mrs. Sinico is lefi with the impossible task of
mourning a loss that cannot be accommodated in a Catholic Irish culture that
proscribes its inaugurating or originating adulterous desire. That sucli a ioss must
remain unspeakable—”ungrieved and ungrievable”—leaves the mouming subject
with the uneasy recourse to silence or, as is the case with Mrs. Sinico, to suicide.
Reading Butier reading Freud, I investigate the ways in which an ungrievable loss
can achieve suicidai proportions if rejoined by the guilt of having nurtured an
aduiterous desire. On a sliglitiy different plane than that of Mrs. Sinico, Fr. Flynn, a
priest absorbed in the diumal askesis of the transcendence of mortal eros, is rebom—
afier the breaking of his holy vase, his ladder of transcendence, to use Yeats’s
metaphor—into the loss of a desire for grief lie had long forsaken and repudiated.
Fleshing out and nuancing Freud’s theory of melanchoiic identification by means of
Abraham and Torok’s distinction between introjection and incorporation, I speculate
on the affective vicissitudes of melancholia into suicide (Mrs. Sinico) as well as into
madness (Fr. F lynn). That a melancholic identification should suddenly swerve into
suicide or into madness signais the persistence of the violence and ambivalence
cliaracteristic of the oedipai rivalry on whose pyre melancholic identification is
established.
The virtue of freud’s theory of melancholic identification is that it not only
enables the ego to work through the Oedipus complex and interiorize the object
cathexis it lias to abandon, but also prepares the ego to apply the same procedure to
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subsequent libidinal attachments. The ego evolves on the wreckage of its object
cathexes. Melancholic identification seems to offer the proverbial formula for the
success of the work of mouming, that is, for going out of mouming without being
inhibited by the fear of having to reenter it again in every attacbment to a new object.
An exploration of this voracious emotion in relation to consumerist society may offer
laudable insights into the affective mechanics of consumption. Unfortunately, there
will be no space for this kind of exploration in the context of this dissertation. In fact,
my aim here is flot to pursue a consumerist notion of identification but a rather
consuming and transformational notion of melancholic identification. The fact that
melancholic identification is key to the conservation and the abandonment of the
object-cathexis——that is, to the resolution, in the case of a boy, of the Oedipus
complex and to what I cali the mournfufihling reconciliation (i.e., reconciliation that
fiilfiils the task of mouming) to the loss of the mother as a pursuable libidinal
object—leads to the striking supposition that “the character of the ego is,” in the
words of Freud, “a precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes and that it contains the
history ofthose object-choices” (Ego and Id 36$). Freud proceeds to lend credence to
this supposition by a remarkable amplification of the scope of the ego and of the
unidentifiable objects that contribute to its formation: “when the ego forms its super-
ego out of the id, it may perhaps only be reviving shapes of former egos and be
bringing them to resurrection” (37$).
While Freud’s earlier theories have been known (and, sometimes, reproached)
for their concentration on the individual, it becomes more and more clear—and at
least as early as the writing of Totem and Taboo—that psychoanalysis enables the
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construction of a theory of religion (Moses and Monotheism and The future of an
illusion) and of culture (Civilization and its Discontents and Group Psychology), that
is, a tlieory of both individual and collective history. I do flot here intend to discuss
the stili rampant resistances to psychoanalysis of which Jacques Derrida, among
others, lias spoken at length (Resistances ofPsychoanalysis and “Let us not Forget—
Psychoanalysis”). I have no intention either to conquer the many pockets of
resistances to psychoanalysis, for psychoanalysis is the first to admit that there will
aiways be remains, residues of resistances, and perhaps psychoanalysis itself is
nothing but the history of those resistances, resistances whose confrontation in a
psychoanalytic fashion lias eventually made possible the very evolution of the
technique of psychoanalysis (namely, the technique of Durcharbeiten or working
through). It is flot for nothing that the theory of the ego itself is a theory of remains, a
history of what remains (even there where there are no remainders). Freud insists
that, even while “it is not possible to speak of direct inheritance in the ego,” the ego
nevertheless harbours, under the influence of the inheritable id, “the existences of
countless egos” (Ego and Id 378).
Freud’s description of ego-formation as a function of melancholy
identification and of the ego as a “precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes” already
places the ego within a community of egos. His further description of the formation
of the super-ego on the pyre of the id’ s prohibited desires locates the ego in a history
to which it is nevertheless belated (Ego and Id 376). The ego is thus flot only the
precipitate of its abandoned objects, but also the haunted site of “shapes of former
egos” whose ghosts are resurrected in the very process of the ego’s evolution. The
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gothic air of this description cannot be overstressed; what is important to stress,
however, is the suspicion that the ego might be inhabited flot only by a plethora of
residual objects, but also by a crowd of ghosts it cannot fully account for. The gothic
underworld of the ego is brought to the fore in Derrida’s $pecters ofMarx: “But this
Ego, this living individual would itselfbe inhabited and invaded by its own specter. It
would be constituted by specters ofwhich it becomes the host and which it assembles
in the haunted community ofa single body. Ego=ghost” (133; italics mine).
Perhaps I should now refine the question I asked earlier: “How is it that, when
one is asked to moum, one is in point of fact asked to expel something that is
nevertheless interior to the ego?” Melancholy identification has been so far advanced
as a function of mouming, as a means of giving up the lost object by setting it up
inside the ego through the economies of identification and consequent ego
transformation. Yet given that this operation might also involve the possibility of
“reviving shapes of former egos,” it ultimately reopens the question of mouming.
The reopening of this question is provoked, not by the ego’s own history of
melancholy identification, but by the indirect inheritance to which the ego is
subjected in the process of identitarian identification. The reopening of the question
ofmouming coincides with the resurrection of an object that cannot be located within
the cathectic history of the ego writ large. This object is resurrected in the process of
the ego’s entry into a community of egos characterized by a sharable repertoire of
cathectic history. It is when the resurrected object compels the return to the history of
that object—in order to locate the ego in reference to it—that the melancholic
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identification segues into a melancholic bafflement, and that the wedge is installed
between the identification with and the identification ofthe resurrected object.
In the third chapter of my dissertation, “Stili Harping on her Mother:
Kincaid’s Identific(a)tions and the (Ab)uses ofMnemosyne,” I read Kincaid’s fiction
and non-fiction writing in terms of this interval between the identification with and
the identjfication of the obj ect. For how do we understand a statement such as this t
“My history begins like this: in 1492, Christopher Columbus discovered the New
World”? (Kincaid, “In History” 153) Such a statement implies, in my view, a daim
to a history of loss—really, to the loss of history itself—that remains nevertheless
unlocatable in narrative historiography. The statement invokes a date, a beginning of
a presumably traumatic history, yet, in so doing, it betrays the inability to cope with
the magnitude of what is invoked. Melancholy identification as a function of
mouming pertains to those objects locatable in the cathectic history of the ego, those
objects that the ego lived through their loss; in Kincaid, however, it is often the case
that the objects invoked or claimed are locatable neither in the cathectic history ofthe
ego nor in the wider history of the community of the egos to which the ego belongs.
The demand for the identification of the object insists as long as the identification
with it persists. It is flot that the identification of the object is a prerequisite to the
identification with it, much less that the identification with any given object
presupposes its identification, or its epistemological and ontological transparency.
Would the ïdentjflcation with the unidentifiable object, however, restore it to
identification? One ofKincaid’s essays in A’Iy Garden (Book) is titled “b Name Is to
Possess.” The main argument of the essay is stated in the titie: that knowledge of
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things proceeds by naming them and that naming them is ultimately a means of
possessing them. In Kincaid’s fiction and non-fiction, we are oftentimes presented
with a loss that cannot be repossessed except through the task of naming, but the task
cannot be fulfihled because the ioss exceeds the catachrestic names in which it is
inscribed. In fact, catachrestic designations of the lost object sprawl untidiiy ail over
the place in response to the demand to identify the site of one’s identification. The
main purpose of this chapter is to offer an affective poetics of understanding the
unrepresentability of historical trauma—the history of slavery, which presents itself
throughout Kincaid’s writings as “the wrong,” the crime,” or “what happened”. The
impossibility of articulating quite fully, beyond the maddening tropologic of
catachresis, the object with which one identifies yet of which one can offer no
identification stems, I argue, from the affective temperament of melancholic
identification that subsides it.
In postcolonial writing and particular in Kincaid’s work, to stake a daim for a
lost object is to stake a daim for justice. yet the problem is that the identification of
the lost object hinders, rather than makes possible, the birth ofjustice. Justice, if it is
to corne, has to corne from without and flot from within the history it seeks to
inscribe. This seems the only way of ascertaining that justice is, in the words of
Derrida, “removed from the fatality of vengeance” (Specters 21). Yet how can
narrative (mourning) recuperate and inscribe histoiy at the very moment it attempts
to move beyond its mooring clutches? How do we reconcile the demands for
inscriptive justice, for right-writing the law, with the demands of incalculable
justice—the quasi-messianic justice that belongs to the future-to-come (but certainly
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flot to the history of which it wants to account)? Only when the recuperation and
inscription of history is discontinuous with the presentist “putting on trial” of the
actors in such a history—and only when narrating colonial history is dissociated with
expiation—can we speak of justice as an enabling structure, as a movement beyond
history, that is, as an instance, in Derrida’s lexicon, ofthe “incalculability ofthe gifi”
(23). The narrative inscription of history (as a lost object) has to emerge from a logic
it seeks to surpass. It is at this stage that one can concur with Spivak that “Literature
contains the element of surprising history” (Death ofa Discipiine 55).
Let Us Raise the Threshold of Mourning
Ail work is also the work ofmourning.
—Derrida
Chapter three investigates the possibility of situating melancholic
identification not only at the level of egoic history, but also at the collective level of
history. Kincaid’s daim that her history began in 1492 requires that we flesh out the
narrow horizon of melancholic identifications with Iost object(s) such that it includes
both the particular context of individual losses and the broader historical contexts
which have, after all, originated in those losses. This is ail the more important since
individual losses in Kincaid’s fiction are constantly understood in terms of the vaster
historical perspective in which they are produced. The overture to my third chapter
attempts to show the relevance of freud’s technique of analytic treatment—as
exposed in “Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through” (191 4)—to any theory
of narrative mouming, since narrative mouming and analytic treatment are both
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concemed with the task of tracing back a symptom (of an unlocatable loss) to a
historical past—a task that eventuates, as is the case with freud’s case histories, in
the construction ofthat past.
I deem it theoretically fruitful as well as analytically and critically beneficial
to draw an analogy between the dyad of transference-resistance at work in every
psychoanalytic situation and its proximate analog at work, at variable depths, in
postcolonial narratives. One can, at least provisionally, argue that the open page of
the book-to-be occupies, for the postcolonial writer, the same status as the analyst
occupies in the eyes of the analysand. The transference and inscription of weighted
experiences of colonial legacy are for the postcolonial writer—by virtue of being
fraught with uncertainties, anxieties, scruples, inhibitions, etc.—a task as psychically
taxing as the transference (dictated by the protocols of the analytic situation) of
disquieting memories in the case of the analysand. The analogy is flot immaculate
since the transference-resistance dyad is, in the case of the postcolonial writer,
triangulated by the reader or the addressee while it might remain in the case of the
analysand, buried in the analyst’s files unless when tumed into a case history. What
is important to stress, however, is that the postcolonial writer—by virtue of being the
analysand in relation to the analytic narrative demand—might find himself, as if
naturally, acting in a way not so dissimilar to that of the analysand in the analytic
situation.
Having established the terms of the analogy, I then inquire whether the hurdle
of repetition compulsion so rampant in psychoanalytic treatments is permissible in
(postcolonial) narrative mouming. Freud maintains that “The main instrument.. . for
32
curbing the patient’s compulsion to repeat and for tuming it into a motive for
remembering lies in the handiing of the transference. We render the compulsion
harmless, and indeed usefuÏ by giving it the right to assert itsef in a definite field”
(154; italics mine). On this score, if the narrative rendition and inscription of colonial
legacy is to grow into something serviceable, it has, perhaps, to host the repetition of
insults of colonial history; it has to enact partially the structures ofthat history; it has,
in the words ofHamlet, to speak daggers but to use none.
Perhaps we should understand Kincaid’s narrative acts of aggression,
especially in A Small Place, in this vein, as ways of channelling the anger fomented
by an unreadable histoiy of colonial transgressions. Ah Behdad shows that
postcolonial narratives are, by virtue of their belatedness, “exercises in remembering;
they bring into consciousness the repressed time of the other” (76). This time of the
other can be understood as the unregistered loss of the object of melancholy
identification—history writ large. They attempt, in other words, to bear witness to the
foreclosed scene of imperialism. Bearing witness must then be understood as an
attempt to narrate the impossible, that unlocatable thing to which we will neyer be
able to bear witness, that which is precisely the site of the “collapse of witnessing”
(Don Laub). Bearing witness must therefore start from within the impossibility of
which it speaks and of which it is an effect. Bearing witness is aiways thus—the
impossible, par excellence. It has nothing to do with being on the spot while a
traumatic event breaks out or takes place; it has nothing to do with being a witness to
this and that—bearing witness must aiways corne after the event. It is a function of
telling, of narrating, of reliving and repeating. Narrative mourning is ultimately
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trained on the impossibiiity ofbearing witness to the wedge that colonialism enters in
the psyche ofthe individual between his present and his past.
In the last chapter of my dissertation—”The Ineluctable Modality of
Posthumous Infidelity: The Limits of Narrative Mourning in Kincaid and Derrida”—
I reflect further on the impossibiiity of narrative mouming. More precisely, by
staging a confrontation between Kincaid’s narrative mouming of her brother, My
Brother, and Derrida’s The Work of Mourning, I attempt to point out the ethical
limits of narrative mouming. I explore the ways in which narrative mouming—or
what is called writing in general—following the death of a relative (Kincaid) or a
friend (Derrida) may become the uneasy site of an ethical disquiet. If “writing,” as
Derrida argues in Cinders, “denies and recognizes its debt in a single dash,” in what
way can narrative mouming become possible and impossible? (30)
With Derrida, we reach the point at which we may deliberateiy have to raise
the threshold at which we shouid start to act on Joyce’s command—Go out of
mourning first. It is no longer a question of going out of mouming, but rather a
question of dwelling in mouming. On the one hand, “Ail work,” Derrida contends,
“works at mourning. In and of itseif. Even when it has the power to give birth, even
and especialiy when it plans to bring something to light and let it be seen” (143).
Since the work of mourning is aiready there at work, in every kind of work, not
exempting this one, it becomes the impossible to resolve, less so following the death
of a friend or a relative. On the other hand, in recognizing the limits of narrative, we
do aiso recognize the iimits of the present work, given that “one should flot be able to
say anything about the work of mouming, anything about this subject, since it cannot
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become a theme, only another experience of mouming that cornes to work over the
one who intends to speak. To speak of mouming or of anything else” (143).
With Derrida’s The Work of Mourning we are left to stare blindly into the
awesome face of “impossible mourning” which is said to suspend the mourner
between two impossible choices—two infidelities: (1) to write and therefore to deny
the deceased the right to speak or (2) flot to write and to send the deceased from the
silence of death to the silence of forgetting, the “worse than death,” in Lyotard’s
idiom. We are lefi to wonder whether an ethics of impossible mourning can proffer
us with a modus operandi and whether the practice of impossible mouming is not
phantasmagorical in orientations, that is, whether or not it is amenable to application.
The question is whether the very idea of doing away with therapeutic mouming can
be thinkable, since it tends to affirm, in tum, the inevitability of a discourse on the
impossibility of mouming to devolve—and to be anchored and grounded—in a deep
seated contentment that mourning is possible. Otherwise, how can one ever dream of
mouming the very idea of clinical mouming, the idea of the possibility of mouming?
In order for the very idea of impossible mourning to be possible, the clinical idea of
mourning itself has to remain possible. Does not the idea of an impossible mouming
take for granted the idea of possible mourning? Otherwise, who would be able to
mourn Freud’s theory ofmouming?
In other words, we either have to assume that mouming is impossible—and
abstain from exhorting people to moum the old idea of successful mouming in favour
of an ethically impossible mouming—or we have to concede that mouming is ail
there is, and that the idea of impossible mourning itself is built on, if flot determined
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by the clandestine, thwarted, or unconscious belief that mouming is eventually
possible. While I believe Derrida’s idea of impossible mouming is an attempt to
deconstruct and to perfect the law of mouming—the Jaw of the human—my main
question remains the foilowing: how can we moum this idea of (clinical) mouming?
How can we moum mouming? How can we be bom into impossible mouming? Is
flot there—in the very idea of impossible mouming, aiready located in its very core—
a degree of possible mouming? At the same time, (why, if at ail) should this idea of
possible mouming be understood as a spark of affirmation?
CHAPTE R ONE:
Horizons of Desire, Horizons of Mourning: Joyce’s Dttbliners’
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Eve,y bond is a bond to sorrow.
—James Joyce, “A Painful Case”
Mourning is the horizon ofail desire.
—Henry Staten, Eros in Mourning
In a compelling article, entitled “Dubliners and the Art of Losing,” John
Gordon maps variations on Joyce’s literary appropriation of a strange Irish habit that
consists of converting accidentai absences into engineered subtractions, simple lacks
into suffered losses. But, while Gordon glosses over the more sedimented cultural
twin of such a habit (i.e. the tendency to defuse transhistorical/individual losses into
constitutive or structural absences) and attributes the alieged habit generally to a kind
of hermeneutics broken loose from its historical moorage, I would rather ascribe it to
a fully-ftedged psychic apparatus, set in motion largely by a post-famine cultural
history of successive atrocious iosses. Rather than remapping the literary inscriptions
of such a history—a task accompiished differently by many scholars such as David
Lloyd, Seamus Deane, Declan Kiberd, to mention only a few—my interest in this
chapter, as well as in the next one, branches out into a far more modest direction: to
lay bare, through a close examination of a number of characters from Dubiiners, the
inscriptions of pattems of psychic engagement with ioss flot at the ievel of such a
collective history but at the level of the individual, personai history. There are of
course significant overlaps between the management of loss at the collective and the
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individual levels, namely that working through individual losses linges considerably
on a collective expression of solidarity, such that the examination of the individual
pattems of containing loss might teach us ultimately about the collective ones.
Ihe Dubliners collection is peopled with characters who handie loss quite
differently. The difference lies primarily in the affective response a given loss
generates. In “11e Sisters,” for instance, while Fr. Flynn is deeply aggrieved by the
break of his chalice, the boy narrator seems hardly saddened by the death of Fr. F lyim
himself. Eveline, Mrs. Sinico, and Gretta, on the one hand, and James Duffy and
Gabriel Conroy, on the other, offer a number of interesting variations on such an
antithetical model of affective response to loss. established at the very outset of the
collection. In sum, the difference between these two types of characters lies in
whether or flot a given loss arouses in them, if at ail, the appropriate (i.e.. expected)
emotional response.
Since Freud’s normative bifurcation of the affects generated by loss into
“Mourning and Melancholia” (1917), the tendency has been to pry apart the affect of
mouming from that of melancholia. In freudian terms, mouming, like melancholia,
originates in loss; but while mouming is supposed to liberate the moumer from the
tyranny ofthe lost object, melancholia instantiates nothing but a submission to such a
tyranny. Freud describes the task the work of mourning (Trauerarbeit) performs as
follows: “Reality-testing has shown that the loved object no longer exists, and it
proceeds to demand that ah libido shah be withdrawn from its attachment to that
object” (253). Although this description sounds at prima facie no more than a
temporal mechanical operation of withdrawal and dispiacement of cathexes,
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implicated obviously in a more global system of libidinal circulation and exchange,
Freud cautions us that the path of the work of mourning towards fulfilment might be
easily stalled by the survivor’s unwitting attachment to, or fixation on, the lost love
obj ect.
For Freud, then, it is incumbent upon the survivor of loss (loss of any sort: an
ideal, an object, a thing, or an abstraction, etc.) to consciously proceed by working
through (Durcharbeiten) the libidinal break or disarray that the loss of the love
object resuits in. Such a process of working through is expected to be painful,
energy-consuming, and long or short depending primarily on the survivor’s wiÏÏ to
master the suffered loss. This is ah the more so given that “people,” as Freud rightly
states, “neyer willingly abandon a libidinal position, not even, indeed, when a
substitute is already beckoning to them” (253). However, Freud reassures us that,
“normally, respect for reality gains the day” and when the “piecemeal,” bit by bit
work of mouming is completed, “the ego becomes free and uninbibited again” (253).
In other words, the ego has to resignedly come to the conclusion that it bas no
alternative but to prostrate itself before the irrevocable verdict of reahity, to let itself
be commanded by it in the hope that its libidinal cathexes might eventually be re
oriented toward, and reinvested in, a new love-object.
That hope might, however, be nuanced by a struggie of two ambivalent and
contending forces—”the one seeks to detach the libido from the object, the other to
maintain this position of the libido against the assault”—a struggie that takes place in
the unconscious and whose path to consciousness is, Freud maintains steadfastly,
“blocked.” This struggle coincides with the onset of melanchohia, which Freud
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suspects—at least in “Mouming and Melancholia”—of a pathological disposition.
Seeking to offer primarily a reading that traces the therapoetic inscriptions of
mouming in Dubliners, I will try to carve out my argument in the hinge between the
emergence of eros, object-cathecting, loss, and the onset of melancholia, along with
its vicissitudes—the entropic regressive drive into what Freud deems an infantile
form of narcissism. compounded by the death drives, which can, in tum, be countered
by a tum round into mania—as I shah demonstrate in the next chapter. In this
chapter, by invoking the work of Freud and Henry Staten, I shah try to place the
emphasis on what in a number of characters in Dubliners emerges as a structural
incompetence, a constitutive inability to carry out the double bind of withdrawal and
dispiacement of libido. Such an inability lies at the borderline between
melancholia—including its narcissistic excesses, or recesses—and the strategies of
managing mortal eros in general. In Dubliners, narcissism is only occasionally
presented as a regression (following the loss of an object-libido) into a primary oral
phase à la Freudienne, but takes the form more ofien, as it will become clear in due
course, of a self-regulated, $partan strategy of libidinal investment, exemplarily
implemented by lames Duffy and Gabriel Conroy.
While appropriating concepts from a Ferenczian lexicon, Abraham and Torok
expound—especially, in The Sheli and the KerneÏ—a theory of mouming which
remains generally caught in Freud’s system of affective bifurcation: they associate
“introjection” with successful mouming and “incorporation” with an unsuccessful
mourning or with, what Torok had originally called, “the illness of mourning.” In
other words, introjection, understood as a process of egoic broadening and expansion,
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amounts to freud’s version of an achieved mouming, which is nothing but the
accomplishment of the process of withdrawal and dispiacement of cathexes.
furthermore, although attentive and sensitive to conceptual nuances, Abraham and
Torok’s conceptualization of incorporation as the fantasy of ingesting the lost love
object is by and large very much similar to Freud’s melancholia, understood as the
ambivalent but sustained stmggle in the ego between the forces that want to abandon
the lost love-object and the other forces which, in their identification with the lost
object, want to incorporate it within the ego by devouring it (“Mourning and
Melancholia” 258).
Tempting as it is, this particular system of affective bifurcation is not the
norm in Dubliners. Joyce hardly presents us in this collection with characters who
can exemplify respectively either Freud’s or Abraham and Torok’s conception of
Trauerarbeit or introjection. No significant character in Dubliners can be said to have
effectively reached the affective closure afforded by the work of mouming, not even
the boy of “Araby,” whose sense of shame by the end of the story intensifies, thus
wreaking havoc in his erstwhile self-contained psychic balance.
Imbibing from a Homeric, pre-Platonic culture as well as from a Platonic
Stoic-Christian tradition, Joyce discreetly cloaks Dubliners in the veneer of the two
traditions, both at one and the same time. On the one hand, we are presented with
such characters as fr. flynn, Eveline, Mrs. Sinico, and Gretta who variably fali prey
to the unbridled outbreaks of grief, actuated by the loss of a given object-libido. Such
characters are always viscerally prompted to react to a loss that must have always
taken them by surprise. Their libidinal attachment to the objects of their desire is flot
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only unconditional but also unreserved, unseasoned, and unmonitored. $uch
characters are, to use Henry Staten words, “flot yet sedimented with the strategies of
idealization and transcendence” (22)—those priceless buoys that keep the sufferer of
loss afloat within the otherwise overwhelming storms of grief. On the other hand, we
are presented with such unmoumful and intellectually triumphant characters as James
Duffy and Gabriel Conroy, who are prefigured early in the collection by the boy
narrator of “The Sisters” and the boy-narrator of “Araby”.
In Eros in Mourning (1995), Henry Staten manages successfiilly to isolate, at
least technically, two paradigmatic moments in the Western history of libidinal
investiture. The first moment, which he situates—through a focalized reflection on
the IÏiad, and particularly on Achilles’s controversial relations to Briseis and
Patrokios—in Homeric times, is a moment of illimitable grief. Achilles, Staten
argues, is driven into a maze of endless mouming simply because of his originary
blindness to the mortality of the objects of bis desire. Contrary to Freud, Staten does
not treat mouming simply qua a process or a work of reparation, much less qua a
reaction to loss. Like Derrida (in, for instance, Mémoires for Paul de Man, or in the
recently published collection of éloges, The Work ofMourning), Staten understands,
as I have demonstrated in my introductory chapter, mouming as a dialectic
permeating the very incipient structure of libidinal attachment. “As soon as desire is
something felt by a mortal being for a mortal being,” Staten writes, “eros (as desire
in-general) will aiways be to some degree agitated by the anticipation of loss—an
anticipation that operates even with regard to what is not yet possessed” (xi). Every
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desire is therefore shadowed by the mortaiity of the object of desire, and really by the
ineluctable modality of mouming constitutive ofevery object-relation.
Such an uncompromising state of affairs makes the libidinal adventurer think
twice before squandering his entire libido on a mortal object. Such is flot the case,
Staten shows, with Achilles who loves with a force second only to the force of
mouming that seals his heart once his object-libido is lost. According to Staten,
Platonism, Stoicism, and Christianity have joined forces in the creation and
dissemination of a more salubrious theory of object-relations. Staten sees such a
collaborative project as the second moment in ifie history of the management of
libidinal investment. Attentive to the mortality of ail object-libidos, the fuicrum on
which such a cumulative theory tumed bas ab initio been strategies of ideaiization
and transcendence of mortal objects:
The fundamental terms of classical problematic of eros are
simple.. .one may love mutabie, contingent beings as such, in which
case one is subject to limitless mourning; or one may love such being
as a step on the way to the true, ultimate, and unfailing object of love,
in which case mouming is mastered or at least mitigated by a
movement oftranscendence. (7)
Although Joyce emplots these two socio-economic models of libidinal expenditure
within the texture of Dubliners, he does not seem to show a preference for either;
quite to the contrary, he seems to argue that both models serve eventually only to
foster the paralysis endemic to most Dubliners. More precisely, the transcendence of
mortal eros is inhabited, like Freud’s whole theory of mouming, by a potentially
impossible double-bind, which asks of us not only to conjure but simultaneously to
dispel our Ïove-objects. Yet, conjuration is likely to spili over into an intensified
desire to unite with the lost object (once again and even on the outskirts of time)
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rather than to dispel its spectral presence into forgetfulness. Although the opening
story of Dubliners presents us with an interesting example of the insistence of desire
in the presumably transcendent act of conjuration, I shah focus here, in variable
length, on “Eveline”, “A Painful Case”, and “The Dead”.
Bearing these theoretical concems in mmd, let us assess—by laying bare the
affective behaviour of a selected number of characters—the resonances of such
economies of libidinal investiture in Dubtiners. There is hope that such an
interpretive assessment might foster more discussions of the fttnction of affects, and
ofmouming writ large, in the work ofJoyce, and into the larger scope ofmodemism,
in which the sedimentations of erotic strategies of transcendence loom large, as
Staten himself shows in his chapter on Heart ofDarkness—literaliy, one of the most
notable textual harbingers ofmodemism.
Both Evehine and Gretta have witnessed at different stages in their lives the
inadvertent and powerfiul retum of the phantoms of the past. Eveline was on the
threshold of submitting to the enthralling cail of eros, and she almost eloped with
frank to Buenos Ayres. Such a would-be runaway marnage demands of her to
compromise her home, including ail the familiar objects “from which she had neyer
dreamt of being divided” (37). Moreover, it demands of her to suspend sine die a
hitherto effective vehicle of channeling mortal eros: her identification with Blessed
Margaret Mary Alacoque, whose promises remind her of her own promise to her
mother to keep the family together. from the outset, Eveline is fabled by the
underpinning tensions between the available strategies of transcendence with which
she is domestically equipped and the blandishments of apotheosizing mortal eros
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with frank in his far away home in Buenos Ayres. Given that at the end of the story
Eveline was overridden by the hold of the past and by the strategies of transcendence
burrowing into her whole being, Donald Torchiana was able to conclude that Eveline
“highlights in Joyce’s Dublin a misguided young woman who denies the sacredness
of the heart, largely because of ber devotion to the Order of the Sacred Heart that lies
behind tbepiouspretense oflrish family life” (70; italics mine).
Although, when caught in almost the same situation, Nora Bamacle did
eventually elope with Joyce, I do flot think that what is at stake at the story’s end is
the bankrupt piety of Irish family life, much less Eveline’s denial ofthe sacredness of
the heart. The invisible forces of memory, of legacy, and of promise—which
constitute the fulcrum on which the plot of the story tums—are irreducible to a mere
depreciation of love in favor of a pretentious piety. Indeed, very much like Gretta in
“The Dead,” Eveline is from the very beginning of her tale set within a structure of
conjuration of the past, of old times, of the dead, and of the departed until a street
organ playing prompts her virtually to exhume ber mother, her voice, and her
promise. The trope that is ofien related to such a mental askesis, or exercise, is
known as prosopopoeia. De Man understands prosopopoeia as a dialectic of
personification and reification, in which making the dead speak “implies, by the same
token, that the living are stmck dumb, frozen in their own death” (“Autobiography”
78). The exhumation of the dead, in other words, implodes chiasmatically into the
petrification ofthe living.
Paul de Man’s conceptualization of prosopopoeia as a composite trope
involving not only the personfication ofthe dead but the simultaneous refication of
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the living is conducive to a psychoanalytical reflection on the nature and possibility
of remembering and mouming in the context of Dubliners. founded on a praxis of
remembering, the first move of the trope merges with the logic of cure, mouming,
and survival such that one might be warranted to speak, at least provisionally, of a
therapoetics ofprosopopoeia.2 Yet the trope is, on the other hand, inhabited by the
threat of undennining the very restorative and consolatory task it is called upon to
accomplish. first, I shah explore the psychic and emotional impact of prosopopoeia
on the characters who—lured by its magical conjuration and restitution ofthe dead as
well as by the promise of reuniting with them—fali prey to the trope’s pretension to
cure. and are thus victimized by its fundamental impotency. In this respect, I will try
to articulate the protean affective turmoil in which the performative reach of
prosopopoeia leaves Eveline, Gretta, Gabriel and James Duffy. Whule Eveline and
Gretta are jolted by the prosopopoeic conjuration of the dead, Duffy and Gabriel are
unsettled by an empathic involvement with respectively Mrs. Sinico’s and Gretta’s
tragedies. Second, I shah argue that the prosopopoeic moment of remembering and
mouming overlaps, in the case of Duffy and Gabriel, with the moment of empathy
and epiphany—in short, with their ascendance into maturity. Simultaneously, I shah
pave the way to conclude that the figure of prosopopoeia in Joyce’s stories operates
in such an entropic way as to thwart the fulfihiment flot only of the freudian work of
mouming. but especially of the de Manian prophecy that “the living are struck dumb,
frozen in their own death.” Hence, I contend that “A Painful Case” and “The Dead”
orchestrate with remarkable clarity the impotence of the tropologic which, while
conjuring and decreeing a certain vision ofthe end, leaves the subject (i.e., Duffy and
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Gabriel) held in automourning, suspended in a present without potentiality: past the
end, yet at the same time bereft of it.
* * *
11e opening paragraph of “Eveline” sets in motion a graduai process of
amassing images that figure forth the de Manian moment of prosopopoeic reversai.
The evening that invades the avenue is in fact the figurative harbinger of the
ubiquitous flood of the past which will further subdue the already prostrate head of
Eveline. Bit by bit, Eveline grows from a passive consumer of the odour of dusty
cretonne (“Her head was leaned against the window curtains and in her nostriÏs was
the odour of dusty cretonne,” p. 36) into an active inhaler (“Her time was ruiming out
but she continued to sit by the window, leaning her head against the window curtain,
inhaling the odour of dusty cretonne,” p. 39). By implication, Eveline evolves from a
detached and machinic distillation of past childhood, forgone memories, and departed
friends into a more active and elaborate engagement with the past. The reactivation
of the past gains momentum when Eveline hears a street organ playing. In the very
same manner, Gretta’s already operative conjurative process of her past childhood
romance with Michael Furey (“l’a love to see Gaiway again,” she confides to her
husband pressing him to accept Miss Ivors’ invitation to the Aran Isles, p. 191)
intensifies when she listens to a chance singing of The Lass ofAughrim by Barteli
D’Arcy.
Both the street organ playing and the chance singing of The Lass ofAughrim
act as prosopopoeic motor forces. Once these two arch-conjurations in both stories
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occur, the prosopopoeic dialectic speeds irresistibly toward its destinai reificatory
reversai. By virtue of its retrospective logic, prosopopoeia, as defined by de Man, is
technicaliy conducive to a therapoetic process of remembering and working through
the past. However, in the case of Eveline and Gretta, it is more fitting to say that it
has served mainiy to spectralize both the living and the dead. Eveline is hostage to
rather than host of the ghostly voice that shouts uninteliigibiy within her: “Derevaun
Seraun! Derevaun Seraun” (40). In the same manner, Gretta is marbleized by the
sudden re-emergence of the voice that screams within her that it “did flot want to
live” (221). Hence the incommensurability located at the very heart ofthe “conjure
and-dispel” double bind of ciinicai transcendence announced earlier. Although
attentive to the potential “hypercathecting” operative in every prosopopoeic practice
of conjuration and remembering, Freud nonetheless maintains that that should only
be seen as a step toward the thorough detacbment of libido from the iost object.
“Each single one of the memories and expectations in which the libido is bound to
the object is,” Freud expounds, “brought up and hypercathected, and detachment of
the libido is accomplished in respect to it” (253; italics mine). Yet, hypercathecting
serves, in the context of Dubliners, as the launching pad for the ultimate
prosopopoeic reversal—the petrification ofthe living.
Small wonder then that Eveline and Greffa are reduced to the deathliness of
disembodied presences! Transfixed into motionlessness, Eveline stares blindly, eyes
wide-shut, at Frank rushing beyond the barrier while she “clutch[esj the iron in
frenzy” before she loosens her grip and “set[s] her white face to him, passive, like a
helpless animal,” giving him “no sign of love or farewell or recognition” (Dubliners
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41). Likewise, afier listening to a chance singing ofthe song that Michael furey used
to sing to her during their long walks in the country side, Gretta becomes so divested
of herseif and possessed by Michael’s image that her husband did flot hesitate to drag
her down to the deadness of a “symbol,” a “picture”—an abstraction and an image
(210).
Upon listening to the musical performance by Barteil D’Arcy, Gretta has
become the site of a perturbing and unsettling memory such that Gabriel himself, stili
unable to attend to lier crisis, nails her down to the alleged deadness of a “picture”:
There was grace and mystery in her attitude as if she were a symbol of
something. He asked himself what is a woman standing on the stairs in
the shadow, listening to distant music, a symbol of. If he were a
painter he would paint her in that attitude... Distant Music he would
cail the picture if lie were a painter. (Dubliners 210).
At his stage, Gabriel is unaware of the meaning of such a striking abstraction of his
wife. Yet, what I find striking about this passage is Gabriel’s imaginative
engagement in the very activity native to the dialectic of prosopopoeic reversal—the
act of defacing and disfiguring the living. That Gabriel should abstract Gretta means
at least that Gretta, as a living entity, is possessed by another non-living entity, by an
absent being—by a revenant. This passage then captures a fiilly realized
prosopopoeic dialectic, an achieved prosopopoeia, in which the conferment of face
upon the faceless (Michael) engenders a symmetrical stripping of face from Gretta.
Prosopopoeia then has not only the animating force of de-fictionalizing the faceless,
but also of fictionalizing the living face. But, Gretta is as oblivious to her abstraction
as Gabriel is unaware of its full import. Meanwhile, the reader lias, while giving free
play to this imaginative flight, part and partial of any interpretive enterprise, to bear
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in mmd that prosopopoeia is, as Riffaterre expiains, a fiction that, “Far from inviting
visualization, let alone sensory perception,” presupposes an “animating,” “mock”
force whereupon “no reai personification need take place” (108). We are therefore by
no means suggesting, as wiii be better ciarified later, that Gretta is literally dead,
much iess that Michael is really back from the dead; nor are we suggesting that the
figurai force of prosopopoeia dernands that the animated entity (Michaei furey) be
fictitiousiy embodied by a certain ghostiy revenant, let alone by a certain visible
ghostiy revenant. The retum of the prosopopoeicaliy-animated Other occurs not so
much in narrative space as in narrative tirne, within and through the (de)contracting
consciousness of Gretta. Ihus, this return becomes visible oniy as an effect brought
to bear on the mouming subject: the visibility ofthe invisible Michael correlates with
the invisibility of the visible Gretta, to whom Aunt Julia declares: “—O, good-night,
Gretta, I didn’t see you” (Dubtiners 212). Aithough Michael furey does not reaily
corne back in the manner of the ghost of Harnlet’s father dernanding that lie be
remembered and honoured, he emerges not oniy as an undying flame, a voice whose
words do not die, but aiso as an eye, seen unseen:
I implored of him to go home at once and told him he wouid get his
death in the ram. But he said he did not want to live. I can see his eyes
as well as weÏl! He was standing at the end of the wall where there
was a tree. (Dubliners 221; italics mine)
While Gretta seems, as Sean Latham rightly observes, only to report Michaei’s words
in “the third person.”3 the subtle siippage from the reported speech (in the past tense)
to the present (tense)—”I can see bis eyes as weii as weil!”—and back to the reported
speech impiies that Gretta is virtualiy animated by the force of prosopopoeia, the
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force of fictionalizing a face (note here that I use “eyes” as a synecdoche for “face”)
in the incorporeal air, there “where there was a tree,” there (now and here, there and
then) where no face can be searched for and be found. Who but Hamiet Jr. could
reckon with his father’s ghost? Afier ail, was flot his mother, Gertrude, unabie to see
the ghost whiie it was speaking plainly to her son? Who else but Gretta “can {now]
see {Michael’s] eyes as weli as well!”? Does flot that, after ail, pertain to the
singularity of (her) experience? How can we prove (other than by a certain
anagnorisis of having undergone a similar experience) that no sooner does Gretta
utter the seemingly empty (as empty as it looked for Gabriel himself at the beginning
of Gretta’s testimonial narrative) signifier “Michael” than an unbridled proliferation
of image, face, speech, and “eyes as weli” crop up into prosopopoeic existence—
whose intensity might even exceed the so-calied hard rock of the real? How can we
be privy to such a spontaneous overlap between denotation and imaginative
objectification, and to the singularity of every prosopopoeic summation, of every
experience of conjuration and remembering? How can we accede to the
unostentatious? In short, how can the shattering prosopopoeic experience be shared
and communicated, be sharable and communicable?
That Eveline and Gretta become, to borrow a word from Ulysses, 80 “wrapt”
(rapt/wrapped) infby the past is the outcome not only of the prosopopoeic rupture
they undergo but of their uneconomized libidinal expenditures afier the prosopopoeic
outbreak. The dialectic of prosopopoeic reversai, to which they have submitted,
originates in their active conjuration and hypercathecting of the dead, without which
the reificatory reversai would neyer after ail have taken place. At length, seduced by
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the trope’s magical conjuration and restitution of the dead and by the promise of
reuniting with them, Eveline and Gretta find themselves, while locked in the trope’s
uncompromising logic, unable to undergo the threat of death that, de Man insists,
inhabits prosopopoeia. It follows then that prosopopoeia is actually inhabited by a
fundamental performative impotence that decrees, but fails to fulfihi, the end.
Exposed to the prosopopoeic trap, Eveline and Gretta are suspended in the aridity of
a present without potentiality: marbleized and statuified. Hence, there ïs more to their
tragedies than a “misguided” denial of the sacredness of the heart, as Donald
Torchiana would have us believe.
The affective turmoil that Eveline and Gretta experience is, it bears repeating,
largely precipitated by the malfunction of their systems of libidinal management
following the prosopopoeic resurfacing of their love-objects. Surely, they have
rehearsed their positions in relation to the objects of their libidinal attachments (i.e.,
Eveline is on the threshold of marnage, and Gretta is already married), but they have
variably failed to achieve the affective closure afforded by the Freudian work of
mouming—a closure that would presumably shield them against the incidentai
sparkers (such as distant music) of grief. Yet, to point out to their failure of arniving
at this protective affective closure does not by any means impiy that such a closure is
after ah possible. Mouming presents itself primanily as a demand for affective
closure, yet the demand is hardly dissociable from its negation—desire writ large.
Once loss occurs—nay, once eros is bom—it is already too late to avoid the
overwhelming spiral of desire and mouming. Indeed, eros seems so central to the
emergence of life that the affective chosure of the work of mouming can only be
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painted as nothing less than a rebirth of eros, a beginning of another cycle. Even the
more libidinally economized characters such as James Duffy and Gabriel Conroy
prove, I shah argue, vulnerable to the intractable detours of eros in the route to
fiulfillment, and, by implication, to the latent structure of grief inextricably bound to
it. Although arrayed in more rigorous prophylactic structures of affective foreclosure
aimed at nipping eros in the bud, James Duffy and Gabriel undergo nonetheless, each
on bis own, a prosopopoeic experience that forces them flot only to approximate
empathically Mrs Sinico’s and Gretta’s crises respectively, but especially to
recognise epzhanically their fiindamental loneliness (James Duffy) and ineluctable
rnortahity (Gabriel). They undergo, in other words, what I cail an empiphany: a
transactive dynamics of recognizing the irreducible otherness of eros at the very
moment of its manifestation—a mysteriously tied knot between empathy and
epiphany. b better understand the radical nature of this empiphanic moment, this
moment of merging and generative transformation, let me first shed some light on the
myths and behiefs ofthe former selves ofJames Duffy and Gabriel Conroy.
Before their empiphanic awakening, both Duffy and Gabriel deploy an
ideology of transcendence that, while tentatively alive to the inevitability of affective
ties, is either dehiberately exiled from them (Duffy in relation to Emily), or
murderously overappropriative of their othemess (Gabriel in relation to Gretta).
Although Duffy is not involved in a structure of Platonizing Christianity, he
nonetheless imbues from a Stoic-Platonic tradition that articulates a fundamental
schism between the mortality ofthe flesh and the irnmortality ofthe idea. While this
might corne at the detriment of eros—the driving force of psychic life—I think
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nonetheiess that Duff’s maxim, “Every bond is a bond to sorrow” (112), attests
undoubtediy to the immortality of the idea. This maxim is, in fact, the most profound
statement in Dubliners about the aporetic nature of object-reiations. Many Joycean
scholars were, however, seduced by the irresistible temptation to indict Duffy for
having disdained love. In this regard, Phiiip Herring, for instance, was able to
ascertain—albeit the very titie of his book is Joyce’s Uncertainty Principle—that by
the story’s end, “James Duffy is punished by a deep longing for the love and the
human contact he had eariier prided himself on disdaining” (69; italics mine). Such a
conclusion is, in my view, inadvertent to the serious questions Duffy’s maxim raises.
It, moreover, passes over in silence flot oniy Duffy’ s attempt to rehearse lis libidinal
investments (i.e., his libidinal approach to Emily Sinico and bis simultaneous
suspension of such non-symbolic investiture), but also bis eventual empiphanic
realization that he is lonely. At length, Philip Herring seems to imply that if Duffy
were to reciprocate Emily’s libidinal overtures, he would have been sheltered from
the pain which is nonetheless constitutive, as Duffy rightiy points out, of love.
By cautioning us that every bond is a bond to sorrow, Duffy suspends us
between the demands of eros and the ineluctable modality of mouming, “the horizon
of ail desire,” in the words of Staten (xi). And only through the sublimation of eros
can the expanding horizon of mouming begin to shrink. By means of an exilic
attachment to Emily Sînico, Duffy attempts to avoid both eros and mouming. He
rehearses an economics of libidinal expenditure that would both pre-empt the pangs
of eros and sheiter him from the outbreak of grief. Indeed, Duffy wants to shore up a
life in the hinge between philosophy and music, between friendship and love,
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between libidinal transcendence and libidinal expenditure. Many are the references
that figure forth this attempt to glidingiy mediate between these virtually
incommensurable demands. Although he, for instances, acknowledges the crude
presence of his body, he keeps it in constant check. More importantly, by inscribing
and simultaneously withholding his self in his odd “autobiographical habit”
(Ditbliners 10$), lie paradoxically seeks to take a line of light that enables him to
evade the very activity (i.e., writing) in which lie is involved. Littie wonder then that
he stops at the threshold of wTiting and on the verge of articulation, and ail he
manages to pen down are nothing more tlian disparate sentences on a sheaf of papers.
Ris poetics of libidinal management unfolds on the borderline between the desire to
inscribe his self autobiographically and the symmetrical transcendent imperative to
veil and impersonalize. He thus vacillates between self-exaltation and self
denunciation, between self-love and self-denial, and really between the temptation of
eros and the mortification of mortality and grief native to it.
$uch a poetics, which is sensu stricto a poetics of the threshold, was very
much effective until decimated by an unbridled prosopopoeic outbreak. Like Gabriel,
as I will show in due course, Duffy grows from a practitioner of negative conjuration
ofthe dead Emily into a practitioner ofempathic approximation of her experience. At
one point, he seems, in an obviously freudian aside, to reduce Emily Sinico to pure,
unpunctuated eros—”to one of the wrecks on which civilization has been reared”
(Dubliners 115). And lie feels a particular need for sublimation, and for civilization,
on whose suburbs lie has nevertlieless hitherto lived. At prima facie, he perceives
Emily’s death as veiling a last attempt on her part to wreak vengeance and inflict on
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him the same amount of pain she suffered. But, when he engages in a focalized
conjuration of her memory, flot only does his anger mitigate, but also a proliferation
of “voice” and “hand” pops out into prosopopoeic existence: “She seemed to be near
him in the darkness. At moments lie seerned to feel her voice touch bis ear, her hand
touch his. He stood stili to listen” (117).
In a pioneering study of melancholy and mouming in Dubliners, Earl
Ingersoll daims that at the end of “A Painful Case,” Duffy—when finishing bis
evening meal—caught sight of “A Painful Case” in the paper beside his plate, and is
thus “offered the opportunity to have Emily Sinico for dessert” (88). In other words,
Duffy reacts to the prosopopoeic restitution of Emily by incorporating her within,
thus violating her otherwise inassimilable othemess. The end of the story seems to
me, however, to stress with remarkable clarity an empiphanic moment in which the
empathy with Emily’s loneliness brings Duffy’s gaze to center on bis own loneliness.
This empiphanic structure begins when he “understood how lonely lier life must have
been” (Dubliners 116), and cornes full circle at the very end of the story when lie
“felt that he was alone” (117). This last sentence which certainly betrays the outbreak
of mourning was prepared for by another sentence: “His life would be lonely until,
lie, too, died, ceased to exist, became a memory—if anyone rernembered him” (116).
far ftom cannibalistically incorporating Emily within him, Duffy is again gliding
chiasmatically between an empathic approximation of lier experiefice of loneliness,
and an empiphanic cognizance of bis own ineluctable death, his present loneliness,
and ber infinite alterity. At one point, “he seemed to feel ber voice touch bis ear”
(117): at another, he “could flot feel her near him in the darkness nor ber voice touch
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his ear” (117). Only through a chiasmatics of proximity and distance can we
understand the full surge ofthe dead Mrs Sinico in the expanding and simultaneously
withering world of Duffy. Indeed, at the very end of the story, Emily remains near
and yet far, there beyond, at the crossroads between the transcendence he preaches
and the birth of desire he was wont to abhor.
* * *
Empiphany, being a transactive interchange between an exterior and interior
gaze, does flot violate the experience of the other in the process of approximating it,
no more than the other’s experience itself can be said to violate one’s own. Gabriel’s
empiphanic awakening, for instance, does not only lay bare the emergence of Gretta
as utterly other (afler she has been hitherto tethered within the fabric of specular
identification with him), but also the emergence of empathy flot so much as an
overappropriative knitting machine as a transactive and trans-enriching force. While
Duffy’s story foregrounds his reckoning with the othemess (of Mrs. Sinico, of eros,
ofmouming, etc.) he had always dreaded and thus kept at bay, Gabriel’s brings to the
limelight his recognition of the othemess he had always suppressed. By virtue of
being married, Gabriel’s relation to Grefta is normally animated by the foundational
conjugal promise of mouming. Yet, Gabriel is presented as absorbed in peeling away
every mystifying fog of mortality hanging in the horizon of his mortal bond to Gretta,
and to his relatives. Immersed in the waters of philosophy, associated with a Roman
Stoic and Nietzschean practice of productive forgetting, Gabriel is spurred by a
powerfiil illusion, masquerading as intellectual triumphalism, and thus speeds
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irresistibly toward the limits of his rhetoric. More importantly, Gabriel’s character is
marked by the deliberate eschewal of everything that smacks of grief: “Our path
through life is strewn with many. . .memories: and were we to brood upon them
aiways we could flot find the heart to go on bravely with our work among the living,”
and he adds: “1 will flot linger on the past. I will flot let any gloomy moralising
intrude upon us here to-night” (204).
Gabriel deploys a seductive and palliative rhetoric of persuasion in order not
only to defuse, but ultimately to transcend, if flot occlude, “thoughts of the past, of
youth, of changes, of absent faces” (204). I-lis strategy of managing mortality and
transience is deeply-rooted in the Greek and Roman stoic traditions of philosophy,
namely in that of Epicunis and Lucretius. Stoicism has emphatically cautioned
against unreserved attachments to objects, or persons, or anything mortal, as a
preventive armament against any assault of unbridled mouming in the wake of their
loss. Thus, death is presented as the cessation of being, which, if rationally
compromised at the outset, should foster no unexpected bouts of mourning, nor any
unseasonable lugubrious wails. Indeed, in his famous letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus
goes on, in a combination of both rhetoric and logic, hammering this very idea home:
“Become accustomed to the belief that death is nothing to us.. .It does not.. .concern
either the living or the dead, since for the former it is not, and the latter are no more”
(30-31). The Lucretian argument, following from the Epicurean one, also holds that
death is posthumous nonexistence akin to prenatal nonexistence (this is the core of
the famous Lucretian “symmetry thesis”). Summing up lis cogitation about the
radical wedge that death enters between the living and the dead, Lucretius writes:
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“Death therefore must be thought to concem us much less, if less there can be than
what we sec to be nothing; for a greater dispersion of the mass of matter foiiows afier
death, and no one wakes up, upon whom the chu! cessation of life has once corne”
(131).
In the second of bis Unzeitgemasse Betrachtungen, recentiy rendered by
Richard Gray as Unfashionable Observations (formerly known as Untirnely
Meditations), Nietzsche goes even further than the Stoics and strikes an organic cord
between the necessity of forgetting the dead and the past at large, and the possibility
of productivity, or action: “Ail action requires forgetting” (89); “historicai sensibiiity
makes its servants passive and retrospective” (140). Ultimateiy, Nietzsche reasons
that (historicai) memory and the past, in generai, is sickening, that bis age suffers
from “the historicat sickness” and form “the memory of its chains,” and that the only
antidote to this fatal disease lies in “the art and power to be able toforget” (original
itaiics; 163). This Stoic tradition of philosophy whose effects have rippled through
the ages is appropriated, and ultimately deconstructed, in “The Dead” through the
character of Gabriel. Actually, the empiphanic moment which Gabriel experiences is
but the moment of dispelling the hold such a phiiosophy has had on his thinking—a
thinking that, far from being tempered and particularized by (an) experience (à la
Gretta), is simply indulgent in $toicism, in the pursuance and maintenance of a
rational protective buffer—a sort of cordon sanitaire—between the dead and the
living.
One could safely posit that Gabriel is just not aware that a pseudo-theory of
memory (or, what in the words of Barbie Zelizer amounts to a “remembering to
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forget,” p. 202) wouid not secure an unencumbered present. Aithougli his strategy of
transcendence wouid brook no return to the past, it remains perched on the abyss of a
possible free-floating return ofthe past in the form of a harrowing aix! disembodied
memory. Unlike the retum to memory, which is a deliberate, transformational, and
generative practice of remembering, the retum of memory is but the eruption of
hitherto latent, but unsubdued force. While the retum to memoiy might be described
as mournfi4fihling (i.e., a remembering that works toward the graduai and
compromising fuifihiment and completion of the task of mouming), the retum of
memory is rather mournfihling (i.e., it fuis the hitherto intellectually triumphant
disclaimer of the past with a sudden outbreak of mouming that might eventuahly siide
into a form ofpathological melancholia).
Labouring under the auspices of the Roman-Stoic tradition of libidinal
management, Gabriei’s practice of transcendent forgetting would speed irresistibly
toward its limits, where its vocabulary, concemed with prophylaxis, wouid fahl short,
as Gretta’s case attests to, of precluding the occurrence of a return-of type of
memory, fohlowed by a focahized conjuration, culminating in a prosopopoeic
outbreak. Before that occurs to Gretta, however, Gabriel had enjoyed the psychic
seamlessness of a specular relationship with her (as his “object-cathexis”). No sooner
does he leam that there was “a person long ago” in her hife, then he is beset by fiiry:
“A duhi anger began to gather again at the back of his mmd and the duhl fires of bis
lust began to glow angrily in his veins” (DubÏiners 219). Such anger, not yet ignited
by shame, feeds on the fear of belatedness, on the erotic phobia of having been
preceded to the heart of Gretta by someone else. Surely, there is a certain preemptive
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power that precedence holds over, and exercises upon, belatedness, yet it is flot so
much the loss of this initiatory power—the power to cast long shadows—that has
provoked Gabriel’s anger as it is the loss of the powerful illusion that has hitherto
spurred and nurtured it. Such an illusion is, moreover, predicated upon holding the
other in abeyance, if flot suppressing ber akogether. As Eric L. Santner points out,
“the narcissist loves an object only insofar and as long as he or she can repress the
othemess ofthe object” (3).
Wbile the other for Duffy is a threat to his strategic loneliness, the other for
Gabriel is but an extension ofthe self, invisible as such, and thus harbouring no threat
to his prolonged egoic monologism. Gabriel, in other words, seems to proffer us with
an exemplary mode! of Sândor ferenczi’s dictum that, “In principle, man can only
love himself, if he loves an object he takes it into bis ego” (316). It follows from this
that the narcissist’s egoic monologism and specular reciprocity with the love-object is
shaken at the seams as soon as the object’s othemess is asserted. Gretta’s othemess is
inscribed in her tale of love and loss, and has gradually come into prominence as that
very tale unfolded. It is as if the mark of loss, which is really the stamp of grief, were
the grantor of that hitherto veiled and denied othemess.
Gretta’s insurgent othemess, along with Gabriel’s loss of the illusion of
priority, while proffering us with objective prerequisites for a logical outbreak of
melancholy (i.e., a process whereby the ego engages in containing its narcissistic loss
of self-regard), will nonetheless foment no turbulence at all in Gabriel’s psyche. The
point is that the tbrust of melancholia toward the exterior is immediately countered
by an interior strategy of affectiveforectosure. Although Gabriel is now deeply aware
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of the fracture of his identificatory mirror with Gretta, lie atternpts firmly to elide the
heightened hues of shame that corne to color lis face. The active engagement of
containing the emotionaÏ currents that have swept his ego-narcissism adds to his
conviction—which is at heart an illusion—of mastery over a situation to which he
had nonetheless been forced to submit. Gabriel is stili dreaming of saving face, of
suturing his fissures, and of consoling his ego by sparing it the sharne of admitting
and displaying its festering wounds. Joyce is careful enough to use the word
“instinctively,” which, if translated into psychoanalytic terms, might suggest that
Gabriel is unconsciously defending against the onset of melancholia.
Gabriel manifests the symptoms of what the Mitscherlichs cali the “inability
to moum.” which is in fact a refusai to moum, a refusai to submit to what one is
literally submitted to.4 Precisely, the inability to moum, if we are to hold to the
Mitscherliclis’ confusing concept, bespeaks the disavowal of something (here grief)
that is nonetheless feit in every iota of one’s being. The ego can thus be, as is the case
with Gabriel, at a stage of ernotional turmoil, overwhelmed with grief, anger, and
incipient melancholia, but xviii stiil be categorically unwilling to live out/tbrough its
egoic injuries, and thus folds back into a state of primitive narcissism, believed to be
the only remaining repository of hope, of shelter and protection of the ego. This
strategy of occlusion of shame—an occlusion of what is there, of what insists on
being there, on the face, there for the public eye—coupled with his seif-deceptive
irony and the insurgent vindictive consolatory gestures lie waves to bis shattered ego,
enables Gabriel momentarily to contain the opening of an abysmal interval in his
claustral and specular relationship with Gretta.
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Gabriel’s persistent refusai to evacuate his egoic stronghold is, however, as
Gretta’s liarrowing tale unfolds. met with an immense challenge: to ward off the
massive injury brought down upon his ego by the dawning discovery tliat flot only
was Gretta “great with” Michael, but especially that the latter “died for [herJ”
(Dubliners 220). It is precisely this inimitable legacy that forces on Gabriel a kind of
unconditional surrender. It, in other words, pushes him to give up militating, in a
spate of egoic consolation, against an unknown enemy who is neither within range,
nor of the same calibre. Indeed, it is an enemy who lives in “a grey impalpable
world” (223), and, more importantly, an enemy who had braved death for love: “a
man died for her” (222). This immense legacy, which Gabriel would not even toy
with the idea of measuring himself against, lias hastened the collapse of lis militant
campaign to recapture Gretta within a structure of specular identification: “It hardly
pained him now to think liow poor a part lie, lier husband, had played in her life”
(222). Whatever way lie would tum to console Gretta back again into his ego, it
would liardly prove of any consolation, especially if compared to the monumental
heritage of Michael furey.
Gabriel’s whole being becomes now redefined in relation to this predecessor,
Michael furey. Such a relation which is bom on the wreck of lis ego-syntonic self—
a self formerly wont, in its constant movement to broaden the boundaries of its
domain, to introject its love-objects within—relocates him on the plane of mottai
desire, that is, on the plane of desire as correlative with mouming. As Derrida
belabours the matter at length in Spectres of Marx, being itself shadows forth “a
predestined hospitality” that should neyer shirk tlie task of extending a welcome to
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the enduring, spectral presence-absence of the predecessor, or the dead. To put this
somewhat differently, being cannot be conceived separately from inheriting, and
since inheriting veils the trace of another being in relation to whom we are. then
being is necessarily being in mourning for the being from whom we received our
inheritance, and eventually this mourning extends to the very being who is now
defined/marked by, or identified with the duty/task of inheritance—the inheritor.
Thus, as Derrida succinctly puts it: “like ail inheritors, we are in mourning” (54).
Gabriel’s newly formed alignrnent with his dispossessor/liberator of the
illusion of priority as well as his relocation on the plane of mortai desire and
mourning become more and more evident in his empathic entanglement with the
harrowing memories of Gretta. When Gretta was fast asleep, Gabriel is proffered
with the opportunity to empathically suce into ber experience, and it was flot long
before he reaiized she is infinitely other: “He watched her while she slept as though
he and she had neyer lived together as man and wife” (Dubliners 222). This
alienating sentiment which is now borne into bis mmd for the first time does flot so
much bespeak, as most critical works on the story attest to, the end-resuit of a
hitherto failed marnage, as it so manifestly outiines the premises of marnage itself:
the affirmation of othemess and the commitment to mourning.
Gabriel’s heightened empathy, however, while actuated at the behest of a
newly formed alignment with Gretta (and an a posteriori one with Michael), knows
no sense of proportion: it dilates and spiils over into an a priori process of hetero
mouming:
Poor Aunt Juiia! She. . .would soon be a shade with the shade of
Patrick Morkan and his horse.
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Yes, yes: that would happen very soon.
One by one they were ail becoming shades. (Dubliners 222-23)
Gabriel is so empathicaily stricken by Gretta’s public expression of mouming that he
projects himself into a position in which he wili have to mourn the anticipated deaths
of his aunts, and potentially of everyone lie knows. Gabriel has now attained that
stage of awareness in which he would very likely repeat, afier James Duffy, that
“every bond is a bond to sorrow” (Dubliners 112). In the wake of the empathic
involvement with Gretta’s inconsolable mouming of the loss of her childhood
boyfriend—which is itself a premonitory giimpse ofthe inevitable death of Gabriei’s
relatives and of the task of heteromouming awaiting him—there emerges, more
importantly, the empiphanic prefiguration of a drastic personal narrative of
azitomourning whereby Gabriel lives a priori the devastating loss of his “own
identity”—an identity feit to be inesistibiy “fading out into a grey impalpable world”
(223).
* * *
Gabriel posits his death before it occurs; he lives in the afiermath of what is
yet to corne, that is, in the wake of the event which is flot yet one. 11e lives, more
precisely, in the anticipation of a Ioss (death) whose very occurrence wouid
inevitably coincide with his coliapse as a subject capable of experiencing, or bearing
witness to, it—let alone surviving it. Death presents itseif as that which has not yet
been experienced, and paradoxicaliy as that which must have aiways been (a fact).
Thus the anticipation of death is already inhabited by its very aftermatli. In a
rhetorically-edged article, “fear of Breakdown,” A. W. Winnicott associates (the
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wish for/fear of) death with a persisting infantile “primitive agony” that has not yet
been amenable to experience. Winnicott wants to draw attention to the possibility that
death—as an instance of a breakdown of the system of defence organization—must
have aiways happened near the beginning of every individual’s life, but was flot
experienced, “because the patient was flot there for it to happen to” (92). According
to Winnicott, “it is the death that happened but was flot experienced that is sought”
(93). While this is not the space for infantilizing the (aduit) compulsive pursuit/dread
of death, nor for determining for sure whether or not Gabriel “died in early infancy”
(93), I find Winnicott’s emphasis on the death that “bas already been” (90), albeit
“flot yet experienced” (91), very pertinent to the present discussion. For, that which
“has already been” while “flot yet experienced” is precisely that which is constitutive
ofbeing as such.
Death is what structures being, and cannot therefore be experienced by the
very person who undergoes it. b experience one’s death, one has, as it were, to live
througblpast the end, without the end. Such an experience is quite simply impossible.
What is within the reaims of the possible is a relational experience of death. Ihis
occurs following the loss of others as objects of love, friendship, kinship, or any other
kind of bond. One’s death, insofar as it is a constitutive loss of one’s being, can only
be experienced as a relational loss. Thus the experience ofone’s death commences in
mouming; more precisely, in mouming (for) the other’s death—that is, in
hêteromouming. What instigates Gabriel’s expression of heteromouming is,
moreover, not a relational Ioss which lias befallen him but a relational loss which he
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anticipates. Such anticipation wells up, it bears repeating, out of an empiphanic
involvernent with his wife’s harrowing heteromouming.
What is easier to recognize than analyze, however, is the baffling siippage of
Gabriel from a process of anticipatory heteromouming into a process of
automouming, that is, from a process in which he sees ail his relatives being
transformed one by one into shades to a process in which he sees his soul fast
approaching “that region where dwell the vast hosts ofthe dead” (Dubliners 223). To
be able to see one’s own identity “fading out into a grey impalpable world” is the
impossible par excellence (223). It is much like Hamlet’s impossible pronouncement:
“Horatio, I am dead” (5.2: 151). Here we are obviously faring at the margins of the
phulosophicai logic of non-contradiction, yet there is stili method in such rhetoric.
The point is that one’s ownmost death—the impossible to experience—is
presupposed by the structure that engulfs being such that a heightened awareness of
its inevitability suspends the demarcating lines between its anticipation and its
afiermath. Under one instigator or another, one realizes that one is bom to die, and
acts as if one were already dead, as if the end were at hand. Hence, the “not yet
experienced,” in Winnicott’s words, falis under the shadow of what “has aiready
been,” so much so that one is lefi in limbo—suspended between an end that has
already corne and an end that has flot yet corne, mistaking the one for the other. One
ends up living in an impossible realm—past the end, yet without the end. One, in
other words, submits passively to a state that Jean-Luc Nancy transcribes as—
“life/death”—”a suspension of the continuum of being. a scansion wherein ‘I’
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has/have littie to do” (7). Only under such a condition can one approximate an
experience ofone’s death, an experience ofone’s end.
To be able to pronounce one’s death is to move from a position of relative
affective passivity toward a constitutive loss (yet to be experienced) into an active
affective engagement with its aftermath. One’s own life becomes therefore the
unfolding of a mystifying story of survival, andlor waiting for the arrivai, of death.
Mouming the deaths of others—heteromouming—rouses the underpinning structure
of automouming. Thus every relational loss, however anticipatory, translates
immediately into a constitutive loss, a flash-forward of the ioss of one’s own self.
The retational harks back to the constittttive. The constitutive remains, however, the
reaim ofthe impossible to experience.
In this respect, the sadness that seals Gabriel’s heart at the end ofthe stoiy is
the offshoot flot so much ofthe imminent bereavement hic et ubique ofthe end as of
the immanent bereftness hic et nunc of an end. The litany of iosses—the ones past
(Michael Furey and Patrick Morkan and his horse) and the ones yet-to-come (Aunt
Julia and the rest)—awakens Gabriel to the transitory nature of life, and instiils in
him what Freud cails “a foretaste of mouming” (“On Transience” 306). Yet, what
makes this story theoretically important is that mouming does flot follow, pace
Freud, from the loss of something (here Gabriel’s life) that the survivor (Gabriel as
survivor of bis own death) cannot seamlessly forsake, but rather from the impossible
occurrence here and now of that which is destined to occur—in short, from the
impossibility ofthe resolve, in Beckett’s words, to “finish dying” (Molly 7). Thus, as
Hans-Jost Frey superbiy contends, “What bas failed to happen cannot be made up for.
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Mourning envelops the ernptiness from which nothing more can be expected. One
moums less for what was than for what can no longer happen now” (75). What can
no longer happen now refers—let us flot forget—to the prosopopoeic promise of the
end, which is, as already explained, the second moment of prosopopoeia—the
moment of an achieved prosopopoeia, a fulfihiment of the end. Gabriel only allows
himself to reckon wearily that “The time had corne for him to set out on his journey
westward” (Dubliners 223). But, in fact, he is suspended in the aridity of a present
berefi of potentiality—a present in which lie has, as already pointed out by Nancy,
“littie to do” (7).
Automourning structures one’s relation to a loss (of the unit self, in
WinnicoWs terms) which, though not yet lived througli, pertains to a permanent
preoccupation of the mmd, and is rehearsed endlessly in the imagination. This type of
loss withstands no experiencing: it occurs abrnptly—it interrupts, and leaves no
chance for the subject to experience it posthumously. The subject has therefore no
alternative but to reconcile itself to it a priori, beforehand. Automourning is the
affective apparatus within which such a loss is painted and experienced, as it were,
hypothetically, but no less acutely and tensely. This is ah the more so when
automourning breaks out in response to a relational loss, or in empathy with another
person on his loss.
That Gabriel should have been lured and imrnured into such a Pyrrhically
mature state of nonbecoming attests to the resonant effects of the two affective
experiences with which we have been preoccupied so far: namely, the prosopopoeic
and the empiphanic experiences. Indeed, to do justice to the enormity and cornplexity
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of Gabriel’s suspended-ness (really, suspended-I-ness) in the affect of automourning,
one has to speak of a prosopopo-empiphanic imbrication. Actually, a complex
signifying dialectical chain is started at the behest of the primal prosopopoeic gesture
(extended to the dead but primarily directed in the service of the living): conjuration
empathy-conjuration-epiphany. The reason why “conjuration” is repeated twice in
this nodal chaining of an otherwise dispersed and unmasterable affective inter- and
intra-relations is because right at the very end of the story Gabriel recreates, or lives
vicariously through, the night when Michael Furey ran to Gretta’s window and threw
grave! against it. The recreation, however, is so subtie as to escape the inquiring eye.
What is crucial to us is flot so much the imaginative recreation of the scene as the
lived impact it has on Gabriel. The recreation of this scene in Gabriel’s imagination
goes as follows: “The tears gathered more thickly in his eyes and in the partial
darkness he imagined he saw the form of a young man standing under a dripping
tree.” What is important is that this recreation blurs spontaneously into a
prosopopoeic conjuration whose power and force is such that “A few light taps upon
the pane made him tum to the window” (Dubliners 223). The fact is that Gabriel is SO
absorbed and enthralled by the fictional conjuration of Michael furey that the unes of
demarcation between his imaginative engrossment and reality (narrative reality)
collapse at the seams, and the “few light taps upon the pane” are immediately
confused with Michael’s gravel against the window. Thus, it requires no further
argument to stress how the imaginative recreation spills over into a prosopopoeic
entanglement whose effect is hallucinatoiy in that it unsettles the distinction between
the modality ofthe visible and the modality ofthe feelable.
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Hallucination ensues from the empathie entanglement with the prosopopoeic
tidal motion. In other words, hallucination is another name for the empathic
revelation of the other in his perspicuous alterity. Empathy wields the force and
effect, without which prosopopoeia becomes an opprobrious and hackneyed
tropological ritual. In the context of this story, prosopopoeia does flot, pace de Man,
so much confer a voice and a face upon an absent entity—here Michael furey—as
confer a feelable presence upon an otherwise irredeemably absent entity. This
presence is not, moreover, exteriorized and staged, that is, made literally available in
the world of the text, but is anchored in an insurgent structure of empathy. And
empathy, insofar as it is a transferential process aimed at approximating the
experience of the other, secures the passage to the merged experience of ernpiphany:
the recognition ofthe other at the very moment ofhis revelation.
The dialectic of prosopopoeia acts as the motor force that produces
empiphany. In other words, through conjuration and peripeteia, the prosopopoeic
generates both the revelation and recognition of the othemess of Gretta, and
ultimately the gathering, rather than alienating, othemess of the dead. Through
prosopopoeia, the topography of the dead becomes the “milieu” in which both the
living and the dead tread. Prosopopoeia, briefty put, survives as an impact, an effect,
which has the ment of an electric enlightenment, of empiphanic radiance. As the
structure of the story attests to, prosopopoeia is flot only the vessel, the barge, or the
isthmus, that “gathers together” the river of the living and the river of the dead, but
also the trope of maturity, of surviving dialectic.
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On the other hand, the latent threat that inhabits prosopopoeia is flot so mucli
the alleged congealment of the living in their own death, as denying them sine die
such a constitutive ending. Prosopopoeia awakens one to the ineluctability of death,
to the promise of the end, ail the while it censures the fulfillment of the end. Ibis is
precisely the theoretical reservation that the story registers about the performative
reach of the trope. While it magnificently plots the logic of the tropological within its
structure such that death bous down, in the words of de Man, to “a linguistic
predicament” (“Autobiography” $1), the story reminds in the final analysis that the
tropological—however illuminating and enriching—is far from offering a shelter, a
cure, or even the very end (of death) that it so preciously treasures.
The strength of prosopopoeia as a trope, its performative reach on the
consciousness of the survivor, is paradoxically the locus of its frailty, of its
impossibility: it gathers us to the end and paradoxically sets us apart from it. Perhaps
prosopopoeia is ultimately, and quite oxymoronically, the force that gathers us apart
with the end. Indeed, the end of the story in which everylhing, including “the living
and the dead,” is levelled out by the snow such that every place looks like the next is
expressive of an unfathomable sadness not, however, over the approach of the end,
but precisely over its intractable recessiveness. The narrative insistence on the end is
flot so much a signal ofthe end as it is a mark of its baffling absence. At the end of
the story, Gabriel. along with the reader, finds himself held in the afiermath of death,
past it, yet always without it. $uch a prosopopoeic scenario is enveloped by
automourning, the affective fragmentary state in which one feels, in the words of
Hans-Jost Frey, “that everything is over except the feeling that it is over.” In other
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words, while everything seems to glide chiasmically and irresistibiy towards the
end—”falling faintly through the universe and faintly faliing, like the descent of their
last end” (Dubliners 224)—there can be “no end in sight anymore” (Frey 76). The
end is far from being fulfihied: it is only emblematically communicated in the veneer
of the white snow. Automouming is precisely the inability to find the end, or as
Naricy would have it, “a suspension in the continuum ofbeing” (2002: 7). The danger
of automouming is that it, in the words of Hans-Jost frey, “exposes one to the harsh
light of an ineluctable present without potentiality” (75). It is against the backdrop of
such eventuality/fatality that the strategies of transcendence and idealization of
mortal eros were afier ail conceived and implemented.
* * *
Henry Staten argues that “what motivates the classicai project of
transcendence of mourning is the fear not of loss of object but of loss of self’ (xii).
This is to say that the death of the other is, if anyrthing, a memento mon. What the
classical project of transcendence wants to transcend is this fear of self-loss—this
very automouming that Gabriel arrives at so laboriously. I contend, however, that it
is precisely this fear of self-loss that in tum compiicates the very idea of
transcendence itself, since this fear is expressive of an emergent desire that, in the
words of Staten, “wouid cut the knot of revulsion from organic being that fuels the
drive to transcendence” (108). This is the desire to be moumed. This is the desire that
has, curiously enough, awakened James Duffy from a transcendent into a desiring
form of loneliness. Loneliness is first presented in “A Painful Case” as a deliberate
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abstinence from libidinal attachments, in concert with his alibi for breaking up with
Emily Sinico (i.e., every bond is a bond to sorrow): “lie heard the strange impersonal
voice which he recognized as his own, insisting on the soul’s incurable loneliness.
We cannot give ourselves, it said: we are our own” (Dubliners 111). By the end of
the story, however, we are confronted, much to the neglect of generations of Joycean
scholars, by loneliness as a symptom of crisis, and more particularly as a desire for
libidinal investment.
As I have argued, Duffy has gone through a prosopopoeic experience that has
eventually sud into an empiplianic apprehension of lis own anomalous loneliness.
Such a transformationally generative experience has, in addition, lefi Duffy
truncated, defenceless in front of the anticipatory self-loss to be parried: “His life
would be lonely too until lie, too, died, ceased to exist, became a memory—fanyone
rernembered him” (Dubliners 116; italics mine). Beneath this elegiac anticipation of
his “ownmost” death—this structure of autornourning we earlier associated with
Gabriel—we can easily discem a deeper concem about what might be called
following Adomo, Lyotard. and Derrida, “the worse tIan death”: “the extinction of
the very name tliat forbids mouming” (Work ofliourning 11). While Mrs. Sinico had
ceased to exist, she “had,” nonetheless, as Duffr himself admits, “become a memory”
(Dubliners 116). It remains, however, to be proven whether lie, when dead, would
ascend to such a stage, where he would be remembered as a name reverberating in
the ear of the other, and inciting him!her to grieve. James Duffi is horrified by the
prospect that his own death might coincide with the absolute finitude (i.e., death) of
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the infinite (i.e., memory), that is, with the very extinction of lis name, of his
memory, as a carrier of grief, and as a marker of both death and survival.
Mouming is, at least in psychoanalysis, the emotional response to the gap the
loss of the other leaves in the ego of the survivor. At the end of “A Painful Case,”
mouming had broken on Duffy like an unbridled tidal wave, stymieing the
prosopopoeic channels that had heretofore reunited him with Mrs. Sinico: “He began
to doubt the reality ofwhat memory told him. . .He could not feel her near him in the
darkness nor her voice touch his ear” (Dubliners 117). The final feeling of loneliness
welling up inside him must be understood in tandem with the aperture the loss of
Mrs. Sinico had suddenly created in his ego. That Duffy feels bereft and lonely
attests not only to his entry into a process of auto-mouming, but also to the success of
eros in having sustained the cathectic ties to Mrs. Sinico despite Duffy’s will-to
secession. The fissure in the ego which is occasioned by the sudden loss of Mrs.
Sinico and which foments automouming can be sutured, according to Freud, only by
means of severing the libidinal ties once and for ah with Mrs. Sinico and initiating a
new alliance with a new love object. Such is what is psychoanalytically known as a
successful mouming—a mourning that aiways takes place at the expense of the other
whose gaps corne to be filled by, as it were, another other. Although the ethical issues
involved here (and which I discuss in the fourth chapter) bulk large, what is
important for us to realize is that the affective gap opened by the loss of a love-object
will neyer be fully filled by the compensation that a new love object might be able to
offer. Afier ah, while married to Gabriel, Gretta has not fully worked through the
void lefi in her ego by Michael Furey’s sudden disappearance. The same apphies to
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Duffy in relation to Mrs. Sinico whose very name, encrypted in the droning of the
train engine, forbids the affective closure of mouming, as defined by Freud. While
Mrs. Sinico’s memory then would live as long as someone like him heard and
remembered her name, Mr. Duffy is abhorred by the prospect that, once dead,
nobody would be there to remember him!his name. Such a scenario would 5e for sure
“the worse than death” par excellence.
Rather than as an expression of an inability to find the end à la Gabriel,
Duffy’s narrative of automouming unfolds as a heart-wrenching piigrimage on the
outskirts of memory, on the possibility of surviving death, of being transformed—as
humbly as Mrs. Sinico—into a memory. This is precisely the point at which
“loneliness” as a strategy of transcending libidinal attachments is displaced by the
desire to transcend death itse1f that is, Duffy’s desire to “bond” with an other, to
exteriorize his automouming, and ultimately to implicate that other in it. The
consuming loneliness he feels at the end of the story is flot to be seen as “the most
obvious way for him to go back to bis old habits” (Baccolini 154), but as a
cognizance of an “inner maw,” of a “void” inside (Knapp 45), and of the rebirth,
rather than the demise, ofthe desire for othemess.
Pouring out from an unfathomable anxiety generated by the looming threat of
extinction, automouming is at heart a plea for otomourning, a suent cail destined to
fail on the keen ear of the other who would thenceforth have the duty/responsibility
to honour it. Mouming, as in Freud, “us a kind of betrayal, the second killing of the
(lost) object” (iek 658)—the first Seing the natural death, and the second would
coincide with the passing over of such a death, such a silence, into a more lethal
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silence, a silence in which no memory would be housed, nor any signs of grieving
heard. It is from within this fluid emotional continuum of mouming the loss of Mrs.
Sinico that Duffy plunges into autornouming before he emerges on the plane of
desire consumed by the passion for othemess, and by the search for a form of life
afier death. This desire, however, does not dare to speak its narne, and takes up
refuge in silence: silently it wants to extract a promise, to contract the other and
commission him to remember his name, to hear-say his name, and to moum sine die.
Since the veracity of autobiography, according to Derrida’s reading of
Nietzsche in The Ear ofthe Other, is archly dependent on the support and assistance,
and ultimately the compliance of the other to whom the signature of what is written is
entrusted, it is flot hard to see almost the sarne procedure taking place in relation to
one’s death, and especially, in relation to one’s own mouming, the autornouming that
must have always been in place since the emergence of life. And given that,
according to Derrida, the “proper name” is “the name of someone dead, or of a living
someone whom it can do without” (53), everything seems to hinge on the survival of
the proper name. One survives as a name entrusted to the (ear of the) other. This is
precisely the way Mrs. $inico’s survival is inscribed at the end of “A Painfiul Case”:
through the keen ear of James Duffy who was able to hear the “laborious droning of
the train engine reiterating the syllables” of E-mi-ly Si-ni-co’s name. It cornes as no
surprise, then, that Eveline and Gretta were both hurled into the abyss of sorrow
when hearing in two different chance musical performances the encryptions of the
names oftheir lost love objects.
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That his life might drifi towards the end without the assurance that he would
be remembered afterwards (“if anyone remembered him,” p. 116), and that his death
might neither open a gap (in the ego of a love-object) nor his name forbid the closure
of that gap must have forced on Duffy not only the empiphanic recognition of his
ovin loneliness, but potentially the desire to transcend death by embracing, flot
loathing, mortal eros, that is, by seeking to silently and secretly ensconce his name in
the landscape of an other’s memory. By virtue ofbeing both the harbinger of absence
(deathltranscendence) and presence (lifeleros), the proper name might be indeed the
only thinkable time-space in which transcendent eros and mortal eros are “locked,” in
the words of Henry Staten, “in an unbreakable embrace” (xiii).
CHAPTER TWO:
The Vicissitudes of Melancholia in Freud and Joyce
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But what breaks the hoÏd ofgrief except the cultivation of the
aggression that grief holds at bay against the means by which
it is held at bay?
—Judith Butler, The Psychic Lfe ofFower
While the short stories that constitute Dubliners present us, as we have seen
in the previous chapter, with a wide variety of characters who have variably
experienced the pangs of loss, “The Sisters” and “A Painful Case” are unique
nonetheless in their exposition of a sequential trajectory that ranges from attacbment,
loss, melancholia through to mania or suicide. If Joyce intuitively inscribed through
the character of fr. flynn in “The Sisters” an interactive relationship between loss,
melancholia and mania and through the character of Emily Sinico in “A Painful
Case” a similar interactive relationship between loss, melancholia and suicide,
Sigmund Freud would attempt to psychoanalytically articulate the psychic rationale
behind the regression of some melancholics into mania and the adoption by some
others of a more lethal une of light—suicide.
This chapter seeks to expose the striking parallels between the literary
inscriptions of the tum from melancholia to mania or from melancholia to suicide in
Joyce’s stories, and the freudian psychoanalytic exposition of the vicissitudes of
melancholia: its ultimate defusion into mania or involution into suicide. Not only will
the reconstruction of Freud’s struggie with the subject of melancholia, ever since his
first explicit report entitled “Mouming and Melancholia” (1917), enable us to better
grasp the dynamic of melancholia in relation to other psychic forces, but will also
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throw some light on the yet to be unravelled mystery of both Fr. Flynn’s mania and
Emily Sinico’s sudden suicide.
Me]ancholia and its Vicissitudes
Before we can square the literary inscription of melancholia in Joyce’s two
stories with the psychoanalyticai arguments, analyses, and proposais offered by
Freud, we have to retum again to freud’s essay, “Mouming and Meianchoiia.” We
have now, however, to trace and eiucidate freud’s concept of melaricholia in relation
to its originary cognate—the concept of mourning. In “Mourning and Melancholia,”
Freud distinguishes mouming from meianchoiia, ail the whiie attributing both of
them to a common origin: ioss. Freud contends that although both affects originate in
(a reaction to) loss, they diverge in their ways of dealing with it. Whule mouming is a
normai affect that is accompiished once ail object-cathexes are withdrawn from the
lost object and displaced onto a new object, meiancholia originates in an unfaitering
fixation on the lost object, and cuiminates in a regressive process of incorporating, if
flot devouring, the lost other—a process which might eventually enact a primary
narcissism, and which Freud suspects of a pathological disposition.
Whereas in mourning the lost object is integrated, in accordance with the
commands of the reaiity principle, into the texture of the psyche, in meianchoiia the
object is engraved within the psyche, and the cathectic ties with it are intensified
rather than reiaxed. It becomes ciear that melancholia enacts nothing less than a
vicissitude of normai mouming, and that Freud is perhaps justified in suspecting it of
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a pathological disposition. Yet, whiie Freud had neyer fully accounted for the waning
ofthe affect ofmelancholia after the passage ofa certain period oftime, he seems to
contend that the resolution of mouming caimot take place without the passage
through melancholia. “Seuing up the object inside the ego,” Freud suggests in The
Ego and the Id (1923), “makes it easier for the object to be given up or renders that
process possible” (368). Thus, melancholia becomes here the condition of possibility
of mouming. This is one of the most puzzling conclusions that could be drawn from a
reading of “Mouming and Melancholia” in tandem with The Ego and the Id—a
conclusion on which Freud does not, unfortunately, linger. As I explain in my
introductory cliapter, this moumful turn of melancholia cannot be clearly accounted
for since it is deeply rooted in a more ambiguous and unlocatable event—the
dissolution of the Oedipus complex. What is important for us to bear in mmd,
however, is that melancholia is at the horizon of ail possible mouming. This is to say,
by implication, that whenever mouming fails, it is either that the melancholic
introjection of the object lias been suspended sine die or denied altogether by the
forces, namely the super-ego, that override the ego. In either case, the lost object is,
as I said above, engraved rather than integrated in the psyche. Such is loosely the
affective state (known in Freudian parlance as melancholia) whose mutation, rather
than resolution, into other neighbouring pathological forms like mania and suicide
has relentlessly gamered Freud’s analytical acumen. Being, at least provisionally, a
vicissitude of normal mouming, melancholia generates, as it were, its own
vicissitudes.
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Already in “Mouming and Melancholia,” Freud aliudes to the outbreak within
melancholia of what he would later baptize as the “death drive,” the drive that resuits
in the “overcoming of the instinct which compels every living thing to ding to life”
(254). While during the phase of libidinal approach and attachment, the ego picks up
an object, it proceeds, once the loss ofthat object occurs, to set it up within (the ego)
such that it provokes the anger of the critical agency operative in the ego itself (i.e.
super-ego). The act of relocating the lost object within the ego—which Freud loosely
cails “identification,” “incorporation,” or “introjection”—seems, no matter how
imperative it potentially is for the accomplishment of the work of mourning, to be at
the origin of whatever misfortune that would later befail the whole organism. It is,
afier ail, allegedly suspected of being at the origin of the “cleavage between the
critical activity of the ego and the ego as altered by identification” (“Mouming and
Melancholia” 257-58).
In The Ego and the Id, Freud elucidates how this act of incorporation of the
lost object within the ego occurs: the ego fraudulentiy “assumes the features of [the
lost] object” (ET 369) and forces itselfupon the id as its (lost/regained) love-object in
such a manner as to hijack and introvert the outward emittance of the id’s entire
libido. $uch an illicit undertaking by the ego, while being “the sole condition under
which the id can give up its objects” (Ego and the Id 368), is of grave consequences:
it tosses the whole organism on the verge of a lethal conflict between the ego and the
critical agency (or, the super-ego)——-a conflict in which the super-ego might resort to
drive the ego into its own death “if the latter does not fend off its tyrant in time by the
change round into mania” (394).
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While the loss of a given object-libido is inevitable, survival in the aftermath
hinges undoubtedly on the psychic wherewithal of the individual organism of each
moumer. In Beyond the Fleasure Principle (1920), Freud makes it patently clear that
the more a living organism is stimulated into affective attachments, the more it
becomes capable of both dealing with (libidinal) stimuli and shielding itself against
their loss once they are hyper-cathected. In Freud’s parlance, an individual system
that is highly cathected implies, by the same token, that it is highly effective flot only
in moderating and managing the inflowing stimuli, but also in subduing the intrusive
(libidinal) stimuli by converting them into what Freud calis, afier Breuer, “quiescent
cathexis” (“Mouming and Melancholia” 29$). In this regard, Freud postulates that “a
system which is itselfhighly cathected is capable oftaking up an additional stream of
fresh inflowing energy and of converting it into quiescent cathexis, that is, of binding
it psychically” (Beyond the Fleasure Frinciple 302). Following these insightful
remarks, one might conclude that melancholia strikes harder in individuals whose
affective systems are lowly cathected. “The higher the system’s own quiescent
cathexis,” as Freud points out, “the greater seems to be its ‘binding’ force;
conversely, therefore, the lower its cathexis, the less capacity will it have for taking
up inflowing energy and the more violent must be the consequences of such a breach
in the protective shield against stimuli” (302).
Shielding against inflowing libidinal stimuli proceeds by hosting any libidinal
cathexes before. as it were, lulling them to sleep. This is, however, neither the
affective strategy of Fr. Flynn whose attachment to the priesthood prompts him to
transcend any stimulus that smacks of eros, nor is it, for that mafter, the pragmatic
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strategy of Emily Sinico who was doomed “to sing to empty benches” (Dubliners
109) afier having been cold-heartedly excluded from her husband’s “gallery of
pleasures” (110). Actually, by virtue ofmultiplying and diversifying his love-objects,
lier husband managed to reduce her to the level of a “quiescent cathexis,” an
ineffectual element in the gallery of his inflowing stimuli and outflowing libidinal
affacliments. Consequently, while her husband accumulated the psychic resources
whereby he would keep abat within the potential storms that her death might
provoke, she was flot exposed to as much cathectic stimuli and libidinal exchange as
would enable her to fend off the effects on her mmd of the inimical stimuli that
would stem from the break of lier illicit romance with James Duffi.
Both Fr. f lynn and Emily Sinico are, by virtue of their low systems of
cathexes, incapable of hosting new inflowing stimuli, let alone the strong and
unpleasurable stimuli which might force themselves easily through their frail
protective shields, tlius producing, as Freud goes on to surmise (Beyond the Pleasure
PrinczpÏe 303), grave impacts on their mental organs. While some stimuli, like the
blandisliments of eros, provoke pleasure, some others, say the loss of an object
libido, provoke pain, mouming, or melancholia whose vicissitudinal thrust toward
death—unless twisted along the round path of mania—culminates in suicide. While
the former scenario pertains, I shah argue, to Fr. Flynn whose melancholy sadness
and seif-incriminating guilt following the loss of his holy vase have pressed him
toward death until he took the circuitous route of mania, the latter pertains to Emily
Sinico whose affective system is so lowly cathected that it lethally fell apart
fohlowing the break of her amorous affair with James Duffy. In sum, “Owing to their
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low cathexis those systems are flot,” to adopt Freud’s own words, “in a good position
for binding the inflowing amounts of excitation and the consequences of the breach
in the protective shieid follow ail the more easily” (303).
Fr. Flynn’s Melancholia—A Change round into Mania
Bearing the above theoretical concems in mmd, let us probe more closely the
affective conditions of Fr. F lynn and Emily Sinico afler the crises of loss that have
beset both of them. Seeking to offer primarily a reading that traces the narrative
inscriptions of melancholia in the two DubÏiners’s stories, I will try to carve out my
argument in the hinge between object-cathecting, loss, and the onset of melancholia
and its vicissitudes. Preciseiy, by invoking the work of Freud, I will try to place the
emphasis on what emerges. especially in the case of Fr. Flynn and Emily Sinico, as a
structural incompetence, a constitutive inability to bind the mobile cathexes that
threaten to dislodge their defensive systems altogether.
In Beyond the PÏeasure Princzple, Freud insists that the “Protection against
stimuli is an almost more important function than reception of stimuli” (299; original
italics). By virtue of being a priest, Fr. Flynn is himself already entrenched in a
strategy of protection and forearmament against inflowing libidinal stimuli. As Henry
Staten has shown in Eros in Mourning, Christianity, much like Platonism and
Stoicism, among others, is predicated on an ideology of sublimation and
transcendence of mortal eros. Transcendence is a mode of coming to terms with the
temporal presence of a loved object flawed by mortality, that is, by the solid absence
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building in the horizon of its immediate presence. Transcendence is, in Staten’s
words, “a matter of leaming how to extract one’s libidinal substance from the mortal
or losable objects in which it could be trapped” (5). In this respect, Fr. f lynn, is, as is
potentially the case with any priest, involved in the askesis or praxis of foreclosure or
desexualization of every inflowing or ouflowing libidinal stimulus.
Invested in the Platonic-Stoic-Christian strategies of idealization and
transcendence, which exhort him to flip eros at the very moment of its inception, fr.
Flynn has neither been able to host any inflowing stimulus nor to foster a system of
high cathexis, that is, a system which would enable him to convert efficiently, and by
virtue of constant exposure, any mobile cathexis into a quiescent one. Yet, while he
denies himself, following the commandments of the priesthood, any libidinal
attachment, Fr. Flynn lavishes his desexualized libido on the ladder oftranscendence,
or the imago of priesthood—the chalice. And while lie is armored against libidinal
attachments by the chalice (which condenses metonymically bis life-task: the
commitment to the priesthood), he is flot armored against the possible break of that
very chalice. fr. flynn had neyer painted the loss of his chalice such that he was
hurled into the abyss of infinite sorrow at the moment of its loss.
When long before his death Fr. Flynn had reiterated to the boy-narrator that
he was “flot long for this world” (Dubliners 9; original italics), he was certainly
spurred by the consoling idea of a better life in the hereafter. In the wake of the loss
of his chalice, however, such an aspiration came to be undercut by a sweeping sense
of disappointment, frustration, and hopelessness as if such a loss liad brought in its
trail the closure of the horizon the chalice first stretched open. In other words, the
8$
conciliatory narrative of automouming that fr. Fiynn was wont to share with the boy
gave way, following the breaking of the chalice, to a lethal narrative of melancholy
sadness whose “deadly work” (9) had a bearing on the well-being of his whole
mental organism. Here, whiie I agree with Donaid Y. Torchiana that Fr. Flynn died a
natural death, that neither paresis nor syphilis—but the breaking of the chalice—was
at the origin of his crisis, I nonetheless disagree, as wili become clear in due course,
with his conclusion that there was actually nothing wrong with fr. Flynn (29). The
inability to accompiish the ritualistic task of mouming is precisely, I shah argue,
what is wrong with Fr. f lynn. Such inability, compounded with his total surrender to
self-manufactured guilt, has eventually factored out the role of the life instincts. 0f
course, I am flot here suggesting that the task of mouming qua mouming can be
fulfihled; rather, I am exploring the degrees of its fulfilment, or, more preciseiy, the
extent to which one can acquire the psychic wherewithai required for its fulfilment or
the psychic wherewithal required in defence against its excesses.
While fr. flynn must have compromised his mortality by lis devotion to the
priesthood and, by implication, by his aspiration to a life-to-come, the breaking of the
chalice has proven too overwhelming to brook any compromise. As his sister, Eliza,
informs us in a very emphatic manner, it is the breaking of the chalice that
instantiated a tuming point in Fr. flynn’s erstwhile effective strategy of idealization
and transcendence: “It was that chalice he broke... Ihat was the beginning of it. 0f
course, they say it was ail right, that it contained nothing, I mean. But stili. . . .They
say it was the boy’s fault. But, poor James was nervous” (Dubliners 17; italics mine).
“The Sisters,” presents us thus with a controversial breaking of a chaiice (and
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implicitly of its consecration), which, though reparable, is perceived by Fr. Flynn as a
grave blunder, for which he has to suffer interminable grief
As a sign of commitment to the priesthood, the chalice belongs normally to a
system of symbolic exchange and reparation: unless it has become unserviceable, it
can be—as the text of the story itself implies—repaired, regilded, and eventually
reconsecrated without complications. But as a singular and ideal object—ideal in
satisfying, that is, the needs of sublimated sexual instincts—the chalice cannot
probably be placed within an economic system of circulation and exchange of
objects-cathexes. Since Eliza establishes a firm connection between the breaking of
the chalice and the onset offr. flynn’s crisis, I am inclined to think that the chalice is
an ideal object that condenses the economy of priesthood (i.e., Fr f lynn’s Iife-task),
and as such its loss pertains to the uncompromisable par excellence. As Freud
intimates in “Mouming and Melancholia,” the loss of an ideal object is hardly
amenable to the conciliatory work of mouming. What muddy the waters are the
associative and connotative implications such a loss conjures up. Such implications
are not dissociable from the sedimentations of the socio-religious networks of
inhibitions or from the neiglibouring fountainheads of guilt that architecture the
psyche. In this regard, I will show how Fr. flynn’s hermeneutic uncertainty, for
instance, over whether he had committed a sin when he broke the chalice lias served
to intensify his sense of having committed it, and has thus down-spouted as guilt.
This phenomenon (whïch, following psychiatry, one might easily call a guilt
complex) is not at all restricted to F r. F lynn but extends to many other Dubliners such
as Eveline, Mrs. $inico, as well as Gretta, and shows with a remarkable clarity how
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sornething untruthfiil and in excess of reaiity, something that contains de facto no
guilt at ail, cornes to burden the mmd of its creator, and at length to put his/her
psychological makeup in total disarray.
This seems to me one of the strong aspects of paralysis in Ditbliners. feeding
primarily on a persisting sense of guilt, this paralysis translates as a self-ordained
punishment, a warranty to self-indictment. In psychoanalytic terms, this paralysis
might be understood as the upshot of the inacceptance of loss, and especially of the
conversion of loss into absence. In this respect, the loss of the chalice is flot perceived
by Fr. flynn as a ioss that can be adequately addressed by the various tecimiques of
reparation the church (as also exemplified by father O’Rourke) makes available, but
as a Ioss that brooks no reparation. and that cornes ultirnately to lay bare bis, as it
were, originary sinfuiness. The loss of the chalice translates as a loss of the
priesthood, which is subsequently converted into an absence of the good. an absence
ofhope: “There was no hope for him this tirne” (D 9).
Dominick LaCapra has recently cautioned against the rampancy of psychic
apparatuses that tend unwittingly to convert suffered losses into constitutive
absences. “When loss,” LaCapra points out, “is converted into (or encrypted in an
indiscriminately generalized rhetoric of) absence, one faces the impasse of endless
melancholy, impossible mourning, and interminable aporia in which any process of
working through the past and its historical losses is foreclosed or prematurely
aborted” (69$). Joyce multiplies the adjectives that attest not only to fr. Flynn’s
guilt-stricken conscience, but also to his envelopment in an overail discourse of
absence: fr. Flyim is described as “too scrupulous aiways,” “crossed,”
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“disappointed,” and “nervous” (Dubliners 17). The fact that Fr. Flynn’s description
of the “duties of the priest towards the Eucharist and towards the confessional” struck
the boy as so grave that he “wondered how anybody had ever the courage to
undertake them” (13) bears witness to the presence in fr. flynn’s mmd of aspects of
what LaCapra cails an “ail-or-nothing” tendency—a tendency that hardly tolerates
the role of intermediary or transitional processes such as those afforded by the work
ofmouming (717). Evidentially. Fr. Flynn’s mmd is structured in such a mariner as to
hardly paint any possible reparation for a given transgression (here, the breaking of
the chalice) ofhis duties towards the Eucharist.
The perception of the loss of the chalice as an instance of the absence of hope
forecloses prematurely any potential prospect for recovery. It thus coincides with the
onset of melancholia—an affective process whereby the ego tries to refurbish its
habitat and take control of a runaway psychic apparatus. As demonstrated earlier, the
ego lias no choice but to counterfeit the lost object so as to re-channel the id’s
outward emittance of (desexualized) libido—an action which cornes to further excite
the anger of an already furious super-ego.
According to Freud, the foots of the super-ego or ego-ideal strike deep in the
Oedipus complex and relate to the ego’s primal identification with the parents.
Moreover, the super-ego, Freud intimates, stands as well for the social and moral
agencies whose influences and effects are infused in the child’s mmd during the early
years of his development. In this regard, what is puzzling about Fr. Flynn’s alleged
sin of breaking the chalice is that, whule belittled by the ecclesiastical authorities (that
is, by those who partially stand for Freud’s “super-ego”). it is stubbomly rnaintained
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by fr. Flynn himself Even if we see Fr. Flynn, from a now common Foucaultian
perspective, as an extensive agent of the brokered socio-religious structures that have
informed his psychic makeup, we cannot fail to note the excesses of his auto-
surveillance and the ways in which his tum against his ego override the ostentatious
expectations of the visible ecclesiastical authorities by which such a tum (against his
ego) is enabled in the first place. In other words, Fr flynn has reacted inverseÏy to the
socio-religious attempts (that the likes of father O’Rouke have undertaken) to
detoxify him from the exorbitant sense of guilt with which his
consciousness/conscience is suffused. Such attempts served, as a matter of fact, only
to produce in him an exacerbation of his illness, as if the need for illness had gained
the upper hand. He exhibits what Freud technically refers to in The Ego and the Id as
a “negative therapeutic reaction” (390). fr. Flynn is his own “harsh taskmaster”
(393).
Through fr. Flynn, Joyce seems to me to illustrate a crisis in the Christian
strategies of transcendence of mortal eros. By virtue of being a priest, Fr. Flynn is
undoubtedly entitled to emit only a desexualized form oferos. His bond to the chalice
is a means to an “etemal reward,” as the boy’ s Aunt put it (Dubliners 16). Yet
transcendent as it is, this strategy is vuinerable to the disturbances instantiated by the
break and loss of the symbolic ladder of transcendence: the chalice. Once disturbed,
the bond between the priest and his chalice—a bond that makes possible the economy
of erotic transcendence—brings the priest into an impasse, and huris him back into
the abyss of grief which he first attempted to bypass through distanciation and
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mystery no one can answer, flot even you” (202). This space can be called, for want
of a catachresis, the space of identificance.
CHAPTER FOUR:
The Ineluctable Modality of “Posthumous Infidelity”:
The Limits of Narrative Mourning in Kincaid and Derrida
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I became a writer out of desperation, so when I first heard my brother
was dying I was familiar with the act of saving myseif: I would write
about him. I would write about his dying. When I was young, younger
than I am now, I started to write about my own life and I came to sec
that this act saved my life. When I heard about my brother’s illness
and his dying, I knew, instinctively, that to understand it, or to make
an attempt at understanding his dying, and flot to die with him, I
would write about it.
—Jamaica Kincaid, My Brother
[Wjhat I thought impossible, indecent, and unjustifiable, what long
ago and more or less secretly and resolutely I had promised myseif
neyer to do tout of a concem for rigor or fidelity, if you will, and
because it is in this case too serious), was to write following the death,
flot afier, flot long after the death by returning to it, but just following
the death, upon or on the occasion ofthe death, at the commemorative
gatherings and tributes, in the writings “in memory” of those who
while living would have been my friends, stiil present enough to me
that some “declaration,” indeed some analysis or “study,” would seem
at that moment completely unbearable.
—Jacque Derrida, The Work ofMourning
The main purpose of this chapter is to reflect on the incommensurable ethico
therapeutic stakes involved in narrative mouming by staging, as the juxtaposed
epigraphs make patently clear, a confrontation between the distinct writerly impulses
of Kincaid and Derrida. In an age in which the number of memoirs, testimonies and
autobiographies published has tripled from the 1 940s to the 1 990s, James Atlas might
afier all be warranted to declare: “The Age of Literary Memoir is Now” (Gilmore 1-
2). While this might be the case, flot every memoir that is (or has been) written
intenogates its own foundational assumptions, including the very activity of writing
in which it is involved and of which it is an effect. While it miglit serve my purposes
well to conjecture right away that we write (following a lived-experience of loss,
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death, trauma, dispiacement, exile, etc.) in order to moum—a point I will discuss in
due course—it is more iogisticai to say, by way of an introduction, that we write in
the name ofjustice, for the sake ofjustice.
I have no intention here to use the word ‘justice” in the legalistic or
universalistic tradition from Kant to Rawis (i.e., distributive justice), in which there is
always the lingering potentiaiity that the rights of a group of peopie or of one single
person might readily be compromised in order for the system of justice to operate.
Moreover, it is veiy much beyond the scope of this dissertation to pursue the veracity
of certain controversiai memoirs, and muil over, for instance, the scandai that L
Rigoberta Menchz: An Indian Woman in Guatemala lias created; nor is it my purpose
to bring into my discussion here memoirs of civil wars, of genocides, of holocaust
survivors, of exiles, etc., although the secondary material I draw upon is inflected by
just such discussions. This is flot to say of course that what I propose here cannot be
brought to bear on the more historical and collective narratives of witnessing and
remembrance. I choose to start, however, at the level of what Freud calis “family
romance,” even while perfectly aware that the drama of family relations in Kincaid,
for instance, is but an allegory for life under the duress of colonial rule. I believe that
a grassroots reflection on narrative mouming within the intimate space of the family
(and friends) is sufficiently complex to offer theoretical insights into the more
inchoate narratives that bear witness to collective or/and transiocal scenes of
victimization and suffering in a post-coloniai and global context.
My speculation on the notion ofjustice in tandem with the dyad of mouming
and writing stems primarily from Derrida’s essay, “Force of Law,” in which he
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contenUs that, unlike Iaw, justice is an indeconstructible concept. In other words,
while the law—or, to be more precise, the text of the law—is aiways marked by a
fringe of open texture that warrants its future rewriting and perfectibility, justice is
that for the sake of which the deconstruction of the law is undertaken in the first
place (Gana, “Beyond the Pale”). In other words, ffie urgency to improve the iaw, to
deconstruct it, is aiways carried out in the service of ensuring justice, of tending more
towards justice, of being more just (“A Discussion with J.D.”). While justice remains
the overriding concept—that in the name of which we deconstruct, both law and
justice are in point of fact indissociable in the sense that the perpetual transformation
of the law is necessarily predicated upon the contingency of justice. It is in this
spacing, in this interstitiai disjuncture between the law and the demand for its change
(a change of which a more just idea of justice is the motor force) that the concept of
justice can be seen as inherently aporetic, as urgently insistent yet aiways inadequate
to the case at hand—ail the more so when what is at stake are, in H.L.A. Hart’s
parlance, “hard” or “penumbra” cases, cases for which we have no precedent, as
opposed to “core” or “easy” cases, for which a precedent exists. This makes it, in
tum, ail the more urgent to reiterate that, flot only must we insure (that) justice
(prevail), we should also perennially raise the threshold of justice by intuiting or
discerning the latencies of injustice in every presentist manifestation or application of
justice. Since the demand for justice is infinite, the justness ofjustice must constitute
in the final analysis no less than a daim to justice, or perhaps worse, a pretension to
justice. The thirst for justice necessitates perhaps the deliberate endorsement of a
cynically objectivist attitude of a sort that holds that every present justice is but a
175
future injustice. These futuristic leanings should constitute neither utopic portais nor
dystopic evacuations ofjustice but open invitations to the theatre of infinite rehearsal,
as Wilson Harris puts it.
It is from within this theatre that I intend to explore the interrogation marks—
nameiy, the ethical pressures for an ever perfectible concept ofjustice—that cluster
thick and fast around the question of narrative mouming, of writing oneseif to
mouming following the death of a relative (Kincaid) or a ifiend (Derrida). In the
absence of a constitution, of a body of laws that would regulate the relations between
the living and the dead, such a relation, such a case, if we are warranted to construct
it as a case of law and justice, registers a vacuum in what Freud wouid cail the
forward tbrust of civilization. It is a universal lacuna that presents itself with an
abiding insistence afler every single death, pressuring the moumer to invent lis own
laws of relationality with the dead. In the absence of precedent, and, really, because
there will neyer be one just enough to be emulated, every narrative mourning must
therefore engage its thematics in the process of exploring and formulating its
axiomatics.
The necessity of reflecting on the rifles that must govem our relations with the
dead originates primarily in the contention that death—far from being an end—is
precisely an interruption. In this respect, I build my theoretical assumptions on Hans
Jost Frey’s largely aphoristic writings in his fairly genre-unspecific book titled
Interruptions (Unterbrechungen). For Frey, to the extent that one survives it, death
does flot constitute an end, only a break or an interruption of that (i.e., a relation)
which can no longer be completed, and must therefore live on as mouming:
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What stops in such a way that one loses it while it cornes to an end is
not completed. If it had been completed it would be. What stops
without having been completed can no longer become what it would
have liked to, could have or should have become. The hope of
completion ends with the end. The end of hope survives as mouming.
(75; original italics)
The interruption that is death ushers us into an infinite relationship with the dead. The
relationship is infinite because, since it broke off due to death, it can no longer find
the end, the finitude of which death is normally the harbinger. The end becomes that
which is infinitely lefi behind, that which is irreversibly missed, and that in relation
to which we are irrecoverably belated. Philosophically, mourning is the modality
under which that which stops—in such a way that it can no longer be finished—
survives.
$uch a modality would, if translated into psychoanalytic language, bespeak
what Freud conceptualizes as melancholia, as the failure to bum the bridges with the
lost love-object. For Freud, mouming, it bears repeating, is only a temporal and
phenomenological process of re-establishing the mastery of the conscious afler the
dizzying rupture introduced by the loss of a love-object. In other words, mouming is
the reparative work that airns to suture the affective fissure opened up by the loss of
the object-cathexis. Psychoanalytically, as well as ritualistically, then, mouming is
the modality under which that which stops in such a way that it is lost is buried. $uch
a ritualistic, literal, and affective burial (in the sense of the withdrawal and
redistribution of libidinal energies in accordance with the commandrnents of reality
and with the economy of libidinal management) ofthe lost object leaves in its wake a
lot of interrogation marks, a lot of ethical worries. Pre-eminent among these worries
has to do precisely with the responsibility for the other which Derrida, following
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Levinas, locates at the very heart of justice, and at the very heart of any de rigueur
philosophical engagement.
Derrida does flot hesitate to reject and stigmatize this therapeutically-driven
mouming in favour of a more ethically-nuanced, a more heteropathically
interpellated, and a more spatially-enduring conceptualization of mouming. If
mourning is the law that govems psychoanalysis and ensures its validity, it is also the
law that undercuts any hope for a more just renegotiation of our relations with the
dead. Any ego-syntonic and -consolatory investment in mouming is, in terms of the
de-ontological ethics of Levinas, nothing but a betrayal of the other, that in the face
of whom one stands humbly, now and forever. If Levinas’s ethics is a joumey
beyond being, an ethics of the otherwise than being, it is also, as Derrida’s
appropriations make it clear, an ethics beyond the egology of cure which Freud’s
mouming institutionalizes. Psychoanalysis, labouring under the auspices of analytical
couch therapy, seems in the hands of deconstruction to speed irresistibly towards its
limits where its vocabulary, concemed with the pursuance of recovery, fails short of
meeting the exigencies of the ethics of alterity. Ethically, mouming is the modality
under which that which stops—in such a way that it leaves us while it lives on in
us—is preserved in its infinite transcendence.
As my two epigraphs make clear, in what follows I shah engage writing as an
exempÏum of mouming. I have no intention here to establish writing or narrative as
the paradigm for mouming. For, for those who write themseÏves to mourning, it
seems impossible to do otherwise; for those who do flot, it seems impossible to do so.
That writing is a work at mouming means also that writing is a work in mouming.
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11e written text, what I here would like to conceptualize as narrative mourning, must
therefore constitute a symptom of mouming even though it is the process whereby
that symptom is faced, and perhaps overcome. One of the major characteristics of
narrative mouming is that it tends incessantly to slip away from the theme of
mouming into the affective structure of mourning from within which the attempt to
grasp that theme is made in the first place. The narrative reflection on mouming is so
entangled in the cobwebs of mouming that it cannot escape becoming hostage to its
inflections. In other words, we witness in these texts a surprising confluence between
theme and symptom. Narrative mouming is the symptom of that of which it is the
theme.
To the extent that mouming is the law, to the extent that writing is the law of
that law, justice is what these concentric circles of law, or mise en abîme of laws, are
destined for; justice is what they are answerable to. To the extent that justice is that in
the name of which we deconstruct the law, I propose to deconstruct the mode of
deployment or application of these laws in the narratives of mourning produced by
Kincaid and Derrida. Such operation—deconstruction—will have made clear the
limits of narratives of mouming, namely the inadequate or disproportionate nature of
those narratives vis-à-vis the infinite responsibility for the other in the name of whose
justice they are produced. Narrative mouming is inscribed, in my view, in a space it
cannot ftilly accommodate and has therefore to be done and not done, both and at the
same time. For, can narrative desire carry within it, intrinsically so, the obliterating
desire for silence? Narrative mouming begins, I shah argue, where its limits will have
been reached.
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Mourning Becomes Case History
As a rule intermediate Ïinks have died out and are known to us only
through reconstruction.
—freud, Civilization and its Discontents
While Kincaid’s fiction is strongly autobiographical, her 1997 My Brother on
the AIDS-related death of her brother is memoir proper. This memoir cornes to bear
witness to her brother’s contraction of 111V and his steady, albeit deferred, sinking
into death. Writing it, Kincaid has faced a lot of challenges and risked too rnuch such
that it is hard (for us as much as it is for her now) to adjudicate fully whether this is a
literary triumph, a petty seUlement of family rnatters, a raid on colonial history, or
perhaps an ethical failure altogether. Perhaps to say that this memoir is all of these at
once and none of them specifically might be the strongest possible approximation of
a just characterization. I will explain what I mean by all these as I move on, but I will
be rnostly interested in the space of this chapter in the ethical issues that this rnemoir
raises—or fails to raise and therefore to fulfili. While I do flot purport or intend to
lead a legalistic inquiry into the validity and veracity of Kincaid’ s factual congeries, I
nonetheless think that a reflection on the ethical stakes involved in writing afler the
death of the other is incumbent upon any critical work. Wither the responsibility for
the other in the act of moumfulfillingly writing his memoir?
Before I address this question, a nurnber of observations are in order. Let me
stress at the outset that My Brother can be seen as testimonial to Kincaid’s brother’s
life and death only insofar as it is subject to the laws of historiographical and
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analytical construction. As Hayden White made patentiy clear in Tropics of
Discourse, writing stories (in the case of Kincaid, this is readily the story of her
brother) involves necessarily a measure of “emplotment,” which I understand in
terms of the writer’s iiberty to select, foreground or background, and refract the
events of what might have, objectively speaking, constituted a chronicie. Simpiy put,
Kincaid’s memoir must be first understood as a narrative construction whose form
and design is inseparable from its substance (for more on this, see White and
Brooks). Having said that, I do flot intend to perform here a formai analysis of its
structure—however unavoidable that might be—but I do find its form and content
bearing a number of striking resemblances to the form and content of Freud’ s case
histories. While it might, of course, be said to Jack the manifestly psychoanaiytic
outiook of Freud’s case histories, the scientific language ofMy Brother and its many
detours into the pharmacologicai discourse of AIDS makes the aforementioned
difference with Freud’ s case histories more of an echo than a difference.
I find it particuiarly worth expioring that Kincaid, whose protagonist in Lucy
is referred to as “Dr. Freud,” dwelis on childhood memories in her very attempt to
“understand” the death of her brother. As such, this memoir, this otherwise than
memoir (i.e. case history), cannot escape the ioop of construction and reconstruction
ofthe past in order to exploit its latencies in the service ofilluminating (the trajectory
leading to) the present, or in the service of accomplishing the difficult task of
mourning. Kincaid’s grappiing with the chiidhood history of her brother reminds us,
then, of Freud’s case histories, and of Freud’s attempt to analyticaily arrive at the
point—the primal scene (Urszene)—at which the patient’s adult illness might have
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started. Freud’s work on the Wolf Man case history, “From the History of an
Infantile Neurosis” (1918), relies heavily on the presupposition of a primal scene, a
coitus a tergo of some sort, and on the technique of construction as a means of
acceding to that primal scene. But it was flot until years later, with the publication of
“Constructions in Analysis” (1937), that Freud addresses what might be called the
construction principle in psychoanalysis:
The analyst has neither experienced nor repressed any of the material
under consideration; his task cannot be to remember anything. What
then is his task? Ris task is to make out what has been forgotten from
the traces which it has lefi behind or, more accurately, to construct
it. .Ris work of construction, or, if it is preferred, of reconstruction,
resembles to a great extent an archaeologist’s excavation of some
dwelling-place that has been destroyed and buried or of some aricient
edifice. (258-57; original italics)
While the analyst might resemble an archaeologist in his reliance on the traces of the
past, his constructions stand, in my view, at least two removes from those of the
archaeologist, not only in the sense that the analyst posits a primal scene before
having it, but also in the sense that his constructions rely, if we are to disregard the
infinite supplementing which they receive, on traces that are themselves ofientimes
more of constructions than verifiable memories. In “$creen Memories” (1925), Freud
insists that childhood memories cannot be traced back to an accurate past, but are
formed at the moment they are remembered:
It may indeed be questioned whether we have any memories at ail
from our childhood: memories relating to our childhood may be ail
that we possess. Our childhood memories show us our earliest years
flot as they were but as they appeared at the later periods when the
memories were aroused. In these periods of arousal, the childhood
memories did not, as people are accustomed to say, emerge; they were
formed at that time. And a number of motives, with no concem for
historical accuracy, had a part in forming them, as well as in the
selection ofthe memories themselves. (322; original italics).
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0f course, we are accustomed to Freud’ s painstaking nuancing, to his almost
impulsive hesitations, both of which combine to create a whiff of mystery that Freud
would thereof feel the urge and urgency of demystifying, whether by means of
supplementing his earlier theories or by branching out into new directions altogether.
Freud’s disquietudes about the interpretive conclusions of his analyses—and about
the necessity of ever perfecting and rectifying those conclusions—derive from the
unbridgeable gap between the conditions of seriality and supplementarity of his
theories and his aspirations to brand on psychoanalysis the stamp of scientificity. In
writing his case histories, for instance, Freud was constantly overwhelmed and
distressed by the literary outlook of his otherwise scientific treaties (see Phillips). 0f
course, while such a worry would flot (be expected) normally to weigh too much on
the activity of an imaginative writer like Kincaid, it nonetheless, and quite
surprisingly, ripples throughout the whole narrative, as if to register stealthily yet
steadily a daim to scientificity—a daim to justice.’
An attentive reader would flot fail to note Kincaid’s adamant attempt to
establish a certain logic (flot exactly a scientific logic â la freudienne, with a clear
cut conceptual framework, but a logic none the less) that will enable her to
understand analyticaÏly her brother’s plague with AIDS and his subsequent death. In
this respect, the attentive reader will flot overlook Kincaid’s constant re-tum to and
reflection on two defining events in her brother’s infantile history: the first refers to
the episode with the “army of red ants” and the second to the episode of her
“brother’s hardened stool.” The first episode will refer us to her mother who planted
183
the okra trees, the safe haven of the red ants; the second will refer us to Kincaid
herseif who—when left by her mother in charge of her brother Devon, then two years
old—immerses herseif in reading and negiects to change his soiied and hardened
diaper. The red ants are harbingers of bad omen; they attacked her brother when he
was less than a day old: “Tliey crawled up some okra trees that she [i.e. lier motherJ
had planted too near the bouse and. . . went from the okra trees through a window onto
the bed in which lie [i.e. her brother] and my mother lay” (12). In drawing our
attention to this episode, Kincaid wants to understand whether it somewhat presaged
his present aftack by 111V, “whether it liad any meaning that some smali red things
had almost kiiled him from the outside shortly afier he was bom and that now some
small things were killing him from the inside,” and whether, one might add, her
mother might be found guilty for her brother’s AIDS-related death. Kincaid then
adds: “I don’t believe it has any meaning, this is something a mmd like mine would
think about” (6).
This episode might flot, of course, have any immediate bearing on her
brother’s attack by 111V, yet the fact that it is the kind of memory that her mother
would have wanted to thrust into obiivion suggests that—within the human activity
of sense-making, namely the urge with which meanings are sought, and the urgency
with which they insist—the episode with the red ants registers her mother’s
responsibility for the fatality of AIDS toward which her brother was destined afier he
was attacked by the army of red ants. After ail, it was her mother who pianted the
okra trees, which then served as a miiitary base from which the red ants mounted
their attack on the less than a-day-oid Devon Drew, Kincaid’s youngest brother.
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Guilt-stricken, her mother “tore up the okra trees, roots and ail, and threw them
away” (12). Her mother becomes ail the more responsible for her brother’ s fate if we
remember that in “Girl,” the shortest story from At the Bottom ofthe River, she is the
one who wams her daughter flot to grow okra trees near the bouse: “this is how you
grow okra—far from the bouse, because okra tree harbors red ants” (4).While this
episode might flot, in the final analysis, be taken as a prolepsis for her brother’s
attack by HIV, it is nonetheless thinkable since testimony qua testimony speaks, as
Derrida goes on to argue in Monolingualism of the Other, precisely to the
unbeiievable. “for one can testfy only to the unbelievable [...] to what must be
believed ail the same, whether believable or flot” (20; original itaiics).
Whether or flot Kincaid’s dramatization here of a “hermeneutics of suspicion”
and of a poetics of “free association”—in the service of weaving a master narrative, a
relation of causality that must have determined her brother’s life from the
beginning—is illuminating or mystifying is no more important than the calculation of
whether or flot Kincaid herseif had had a hand in the tragic unfoiding of such a
narrative, of whether or flot she could be found guiity for the negiigence of her two
year-old brother when her mother lefi him in her charge. This is the second central
event in her brother’s infantile history which Kincaid discusses toward the end ofher
memoir, as if to imply in a sigh of resignation that ail her repressive energies have by
then been depleted. This episode relates how Jamaica—then caiied Eiaine—was ieft
in charge of her younger brother, and how she soon became too absorbed in reading
stolen books to be abie to notice and, then, change her brother’s soiled diaper. As a
resuit of this utter neglect, the deposit of stool, which soiied her brother’s diaper,
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“had hardened and taken the shape of a measure of weight [signifying a pound]”
(130). Reflecting on the significance of this episode and trying to retrospectively
connect it, in a Forsterian gesture, to (the unfolding of) her family’s future, Kincaid
writes:
And in it, this picture ofmy brother’s hardened stool, a memory, a
moment of my own life is frozen; for his diaper sagged with a weight
that was flot gold but its opposite, a weight whose value would flot
bring us good fortune, a weight that only emphasized our family’s
despair: our fortunes, our prospects were flot more than the contents of
my brother’ s diaper, and the contents were oniy shit. (131)
Perhaps it is flot surprising in the least that the handmaiden of Mnemosyne (Kincaid
is out of favour in her family because of the insatiable maw of her memory: “Do you
remember?” is the sphinx-like riddle that any one—who wants to have access to the
island she built unto herseif—has to crack) can recollect and inscribe this
“rememory,” yet the glitteringly masochistic, scandalously lucid, and grotesquely
revolting prose of this confession verges on a poetics of seif-exposure, of precisely
luxuriating in or enjoying the exposure of one’s symptoms (as in Freud, Lacan and
iek). Perhaps, whoever succumbs to the cruelty of memory, to its pounding
weight—and to the shattering vocation of sense-making, and to the hermeneutic task
of constructing and reconstnicting on the shores of logic a sense of a life that is no
more—has necessarily to develop a taste for enjoying his or her symptoms, for only
then can the symptom, that which is necessarily humiliating, be “remade,” as Kincaid
herseif suggests, “into art” (108).
The case-history logic of Freud is all the more important here for a very
specific reason (for which Freud would have, perhaps, worried only in the case of the
failure of counter-transference, which would open, more conflrmedly, the floodgates
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of interminable analysis, as is the case with his most notorious patient, the Wolf
Man2): Kincaid wants to establish, directly or indirectly, the extent to which she
participated in or contributed to her brother’s and, by extension, to her family’s later
misfortune. I am flot suggesting here that Kincaid is responsible—through sheer
neglect—for sowing the seeds of a structure of bad lot for her brother and for her
family, no more than am I suggesting that the nature of the confessional is stnictured
by the avowal of guilt and the demand for expatiation, and that guilt must have
aiways insinuated itself into the calculating structure of the confessional. One might
contemplate, as Derrida does in The Work ofMourning, whether the confession and
the parallel expatiation of guilt (afier the death of the other to whom such confession
should be made in the first place) is not an opportunistic calculation that leaves the
in an ethically weak position.3 When Kincaid writes that “a memory,
moment of my own life is frozen” in the episode of her brother’s hardened stool, one
cannot simply slough off the latencies of guilt that mn through the very fabric of this
heart-wrenching image; nor would one want to ftee the narrative of My Brother
completely, as $arah Brophy seems to do, from a “compensatory guilt” in which it is
nevertheless bathed (Brophy 267). Contrary to what Brophy would have us believe,
the fact that Kincaid did not take care of her brother then and for more than twenty
years afier (since her self-willed exile, Kincaid had not gone back to Antigua until
she heard about her brother’s illness, that is, after an interval of 20 years) serves to
foment the sense of guilt of which narrative is not only a symptom but also an effect
and, potentially, an expatiatory force.
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Moreover, flot only is the hardened stool episode at the origin of her
thenceforth troubled relationship with her mother, it is also the episode at the origin
of the multiplication and dissemination of guilt: her mother bas responded to her
neglect of her brother by gathering ail her books and setting them to fire, thus
traumatising her in the process:
What I felt when this happened, the exact moment of the burning of
my books, what I feit after this happened, the buming of my books,
immediately after it happened, shortly afier it happened, long after it
happened, I do flot know, I cannot now remember. In fact, I did flot
even remember that it happened at ail, it had no place in the many
horrible events that I could recite to friends, or the many horrible
events that shaped and gave life to the thing I was to become, a writer.
(134)
The fluid and dizzying repetitions bear witness to Kincaid’s reliving of this infantile
trauma again and again. It is aiways the iaw in trauma (Freud, Camth, Laub) that one
does flot attend to it while living through it: no wonder, then, that Kincaid did not
even remember whether it had actually happened. This is flot a case in which
memories emerge, but one in which, as in Freud’s “Screen Memories,” they are
formed and iived through for the first time at the moment they seem to emerge anew.
Perhaps Kincaid’ s suggestive image of “a frozen moment” is a more or less adequate
description of an otherwise unmappable traumatic experience. It is aiways the law in
trauma that repetition is first time—that the traumatic situation does flot allow the
subject caught in it to step outside it in order to bear witness or testify to it; what
cannot be experienced as it happens has recourse to the vaporous vault of the Zeitios,
the timeless, and is therefore destined, in a fleeting moment, to break on the
seamlessness of consciousness in such a mariner that it is experienced for the first
time, given that the very first time could flot have been remembered and located in
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the past. Not that one cannot experience trauma, but that one cannot live through it
and at the same time step out of it in order to arrest it under the gaze of reflection.
The peculiarity of a traumatic experience is, in the words of Caruth, that “it
simultaneously defies and demands our witness” (Unclaimed Experience 5). The eye
of the victim cannot, in other words, be interpellated by the
(inscriptional/transcriptional) eye of the witness, unless belatedly and afier a period
oflatency (Freud Moses and Monotheism). In the same manner, Kincaid’s adolescent
traumatic experience—the buming of her books—could flot have offered itself
immediately, at the time of its occurrence, to the indexical repartition of
consciousness, but must have flifted by it or slipped through it into the maw of
forgetting—or, more accurately, into “1 ‘oubli de reserve” (Ricœur 650). Writing it
now, re-living through it now afier a long latency period, is thus the modality under
which Kincaid not only bears witness to it, but also experiences and works through it
for the first time.4 “The historical power of the trauma is not just that the experience
is repeated afier its forgeffing, but that it is only in and through its inherent forgetting
that it isfirst experienced at ail” (Caruth 17; italics mine).
As we read on her brother’s memoir, we cannot fail to feel Kincaid’s
relentless insertion of her own autobiography into her brother’ s biography. The
victimization of her brother, for which she is partly responsible, is juxtaposed
dialectically to her subsequent victimization, for which her mother is responsible. She
is a victim, no more than her brother; her mother is responsible, no more than her.
The narrative is, however, structured in such a way as to map the martyrdom of her
brother into her own martyrdom. It is as if Kincaid is more worried about her auto-
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topography, about her subject-positioning vis-à-vis her brother, rather than about her
responsibility for writing her brother’s biography. Thus, while Sarah Brophy
contends that My Brother is “written out of the interruption of the autobiographical I”
and “through self-annihilation” (274), I suggest the reverse position: that the memoir
stages rather than represses the interpellative resurgences of the “autobiographical I.”
In other words, what starts of as a biographical narrative becomes exceedingly the
scene of recurrent siides into autobiography. Given that toward the end of the
narrative the slide into autobiography becomes ubiquitous, it is perhaps more
accurate to suggest that My Brother is an autobiographical narrative written in the
veneer of the biographical. Whether liminally located at the threshold of the
autobiographical or under the shadow of the biographical, or vice versa, narrative
mouming reaches its limits the moment it clears its inscriptional space of possibility.
This is not a matter of praising or blaming Kincaid for what she cannot help
doing: writing her self into (her brother’s) life. It becomes, however, a matter of
ethical concem as soon as we start to get the sense that Kincaid is writing out of an
egotropological concem, a concem for troping her recovery, a concem for writing as
a trope of survivance or survival. My Brother is, one might think, about Kincaid’s
unwifting or willing location in a narrative that is nevertheless explicitly addressed to
the other—My Brother. It is my intention in what follows to continue to register more
ethical reservations on this voluntary or involuntary encroachment of the
autobiographical on a scene of writing arcffly set in motion by the biographical. My
aim is not so much to mark the limits at which writing must stop or be abandoned as
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to show how those limits, which must have aiways been trespassed as soon as writing
began, are deait with, if at ail, throughout narrative.
An “imperfect compromise between two idioms”:
Narrative Mourning Under Ethical Scrutiny
Ifyou understand the other you have neyer encountered him.
—Hans-Jost Frey
On leaming about her brother’s terminable illness and dying, Kincaid decided right
away to write about it. 0f course, such an undertaking is a privileged one: Kincaid
indefatigably reminds us that her brother cannot write, let alone write like Kincaid
herseif In her most recent novel about her father, Mr. Potter, her protagonist revels
in the knowledge that she alone, of ail of Mr. Potter’s daughters, can read and write.
The seductive rhetoric that perrneates Kincaid’s fiction is that, in accepting to write
about those who cannot write (here, I am flot necessarily suggesting that Kincaid can
be said to have adopted the role of “the native informant”—the vantage point from
which Spivak, for instance, has ofien argued, and quite persuasively, for that matter),
it is as if Kincaid had stoically and resignediy accepted to carry a burden, a weighty
vocation that she was not particulariy happy to carry. In her early fiction (Annie John
and Lucy), we ofien corne across references and allusions to a formless weighty
substance she carnes within her—a substance she can neither intake nor forsake.
Regardless of whether it is a burden, a duty, or an asset, writing, Kincaid
insists, is for her a matter of life and death. In an interview with Moira Ferguson, she
goes as far as to assert, “I had to write or I wouid have died” (176). Indeed, were one
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to cite every published interview conducted by several scholars (such as Moira
ferguson, Seiwyn R. Cudjoe, Frank Birbalsingh, and Brad Goldfarb, to name only a
few) with Jamaica Kincaid over the years, chances are one would find variations
(sometimes, within the same interview) on a now typically Kincaidian formula:
writing=life. Writing is here understood in a very loose sense, but that is flot the
purpose of my argument: I am only concemed with writerly mouming (of which My
Brother is of course an exemplum). While most writing is more or less undergirded
by a structure of mouming, writing after the death of a relative, as is the case with
Kincaid here, must be mouming proper. Kincaid does it instinctively, as if it were a
matter of doing what cornes naturally.
In My Brother, writing amounts to nothing less than an Aladdin-like magical
lamp that would instantaneously concretize recovery-promises. Arrayed in the
armour of writing, Kincaid sees herself a much more competent person at handling
grief than, for instance, her husband: “My husband is sorneone I love.. .1 would rather
bad things or unpleasant things happen to me. . .then I don’t have to worry about him.
And then again, I believe that I am better at handiing bad things than he” (100, italics
mine). While in her most recent novel, Mr. Fotter, writing is presented as a catalytic
refrain—”I can read and I can write”—in a song of jubilation and intellectual
triumphalism, in My Brother, it is mostly understood as a prophylactic recipe for self
preservation, much like the special obeah baths she used to take when young or the
“little black sachet filled with things” she used to wear under her shirt (Cudjoe 407).
It cornes as no surprise that Kincaid made the following statement when she
heard about her brother’s illness: “When I heard about rny brother’s illness and his
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dying, I knew, instinctively, that to understand it, or to make an aftempt at
understanding his dying, and flot to die with him, I would write about it” (My Brother
196, italics mine). The italicised words of this quote indicate the interrelated nodes of
the following discussion on the ethical demerits of Kincaid’s most endeared
practice—writing—in the afiermath of her brother’s death. The adverb
“instinctively” implies that writing is but a behavioural praxeme in league with other
instincts of conduct and seif-preservation. Likewise, “to understand” and “flot to die
with him” are two convergent courses of action subsumable under the modality of
seif-preservative instincts, except that, while “to understand” conveys a will to
hermeneutic mastery, “flot to die with him” implies a will to repression, the
repression ofthe death instincts writ large.
That writing following the death of her brother is perceived as an instinctive
response to such an event means that mouming presents itselfto Kincaid as a demand
for writing. To say that mouming presents itself as a demand for writing is not,
however, to say that writing satisfies that demand. In other words, the satisfaction of
the demand for writing is not necessarily accompanied by the fuffihiment of the
demand for mouming. In My Brother, however, because the demand for mouming
and the demand for writing converge on the pages of the book, it is normally hard to
speculate on whether writing marks the persistence of an impossible mouming
beyond the closure of the book or whether writing testifies to the fulfiilment of the
work of mouming in the very instance of confronting it on the page. We do not here
need to make another detour into trauma studies or into the plethora of
psychoanalytic theories that insist on the coterminous relation between writing and
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mourning, for Kincaid argues with great conviction that writing, following the death
of her brother, allows her to accomplisli just that. How does writing which presents
itseif as a response to the demand for mouming satisfy mouming?
The ciassical—and, one must add, as timeiy as ever—conceptualization of
mourning can be found in Freud’s epochal essay, “Mouming and Melancholia”
(1917). Since the reader must by now have grown familiar with Freud’s main
argument in that essay, it is unnecessary to recapitulate it here, except to branch out
into a fresh direction which suggests that mouming is a hermeneutic enterprise. Freud
insists that, while in melancholia the road to the conscious is blocked, in mouming it
is opened up thanks to the moumer’s dwelling in and hearkening to the principle of
reality. The moumer, who is to succeed in accompiishing the task of mouming, must
convert the overwhelming unconscious memories—that voiuntariiy or involuntariiy
pull him into the deep recesses of the unconscious—into consciousness. The
mourner can of course count on psychoanalytic assistance; otherwise, he lias to
unpack the iibrary of his memories book by book, re-reading and re-interpreting them
again and again before—in a definitively parting moment—shredding them. Freud
cails this a process of hypercathecting and decathecting or, in my view, of reading,
interpreting and de-parting. We are here in a hermeneutic situation, in which the
work of interpretation segues unnoticeably into a seamless conversion of the
unconscious into the conscious and thereof into the graduai accomplisbment of the
task of mouming.
Writing can supplement this hermeneutic enterprise by staging its workings
and orchestrating its temporal intensities and processive moments. When Kincaid
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draws the connection between writing and understanding, between understanding and
mouming, and between mouming and suiwival, she is, perhaps intuitively, alluding to
this complex hermeneutic and psychoanalytic machine that knits together these
otherwise different demands. Since in Kristeva’s axiom “when meaning shatters, life
no longer matters” (Black Sun 6), it is flot for nothing that Kincaid insists on
establishing meaning, on extracting the meaning of her brother’ s life by seffing
herseif the “instinctive” task of writing (on) it. The search for meaning, for
understanding what happened to lier (and to lier family) afler the death of lier brother
is indissociable, it bears repeating, from the search for the affective closure of
mouming. The closure would flot take place unless the relationship with the dead
relative is severed. And in order for the work of severance to be effective, it lias to be
founded on a massive work of remembering and working througli. Since writing can
bear the burden of the clearly “incompossible” (to use a Derridean neologism—a
blending of incompatibility and impossibility) demands of the work of remembrance
and the work of severance—the work of hypercathecting and subsequent
decathecting—it is understandable why Kincaid instinctively seeks shelter in the sofi
baim ofwords.
Writing, we realize bit by bit, is mapped (in the manner Harold Bloom argues
in A Map ofMisreading) into Kincaid’s system of defence mechanisms and becomes
thus more of an instinct, as Kincaid herseif is wont to say, than a function of
competence and high leaming. Indeed, in lier interview with Ferguson, Kincaid
reiterates that she is flot from a literary caste or class, tliat she is not interested in
writing as an exercise of class, only in writing as an urgent form of self-rescue and
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survival (Ferguson 171). Yet the therapoetic urgency with which the demand for
mouming (a demand that immediately translates as a demand for writing) presents
itself is comparable only to the ethical urgency with which the demand for alterity (a
demand that immediately translates as a demand for sustaining, flot severing,
relations with the other) demands that the demand for mouming be annulled. There is
no getting round the phenomenological fact that death introduces a dreadfully
asymmetrical power relation between the moumer and the deceased. Whether one
should “let the dead bury the dead” or whether one should bury them by oneseif, the
accomplishment ofthe task ofmouming is also the buming ofthe Iast bridge that can
otherwise make possible an infinite relation with the dead.5 Mouming is the second
burial.
Through its expansive presentist and seif-preservative concems, through its
inscription of an emergence from the shadow of the object (biography) onto the
threshold of the subject (autobiography), and through its hermeneutic search for
semantic and affective closure, My Brother can be suspected of actuating the second
burial of its main protagonist in whose name it is written. The primal gesture of an
ethics of mouming would start by leffing the dead speak, by conferring a voice and a
face on him, that is, by a prosopopoeic embrace—a citational immersion. Kincaid is,
however, too threatened by the reificatory implications (“not to die with him”) of the
prosopopoeic conferral of voice that she hardly cites her brother; when she does, she
puts his words between quotation marks and also between brackets, as if they were
“the okra trees” in relation to the house of fiction, to the salubrious and artistic
narrative Kincaid weaves.
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It is flot that Devon does flot, much less cannot, speak, but that his language is
unintelligible to Kincaid herseif. In Monotingualism of the Other and “Force of
Law,” Derrida insists that the hospitability of justice requires that we speak to the
other in bis language. Yet Kincaid is too uncannily alienated from the language of the
Island to be able to reproduce or understand it, let alone address herseif in it. In this
respect, most critics have expressed their dissatisfaction with the ways in which
Kincaid fails to reproduce the language of the people of the island (Bemard 130). In
the context of our discussion of an the ethics of mouming, this failure has a bearing
on the question of justice, however persuasively it might be condoned on artistic or
historical grounds, namely that Kincaid associates the uncouth language of the Island
with the language of humiliation and colonial legacy. This is certainly not a question
ofwhether the subaltem can or cannot speak but one ofwhether we are able to attend
to what he says, whether we are able to re-produce what he says. Having said that the
question is also, I think, riven with incommensurable considerations, whether artistic,
political or individual, and can neither be reduced to the opaqueness of the subaltern
or to the transparency of the “native informant” but remains archly subject to the
exigencies or adhocracies ofthe act ofwriting.
Kincaid’s whole project of writing the memoir is to understand the death of
her brother, to confer a sense of wholeness and establish relations of causality
between his death and his (infantile) history, yet what is there to “understand” if
Kincaid insists on and on that she cannot understand the language of her brother, the
language she used to speak, the language of humiliation? Unless the hermeneutic will
to understanding is understood as a will to mastery, a will to (semantic and affective)
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closure—and by implication as a fear of the unmasterable, a fear of the latent
reificatory threat of any prosopopoeic ethical embrace, and a fear that translates
ultimately as a will to repression (“and flot to die with him”), a will to mouming;
unless thus understood, the will to understanding, to which My Brother testifies, is
only a demand; it demands fulfilment but it cannot grant it. But, when the demand for
mouming translates, in an almost automated way, as is the case with Kincaid, as a
demand for writing, how can we be sure that the demand for mouming is flot satisfied
in the process of writing? How can we be sure that the demand for writing is flot
subtended by the work of severance rather than of connectivity? Or can the demand
for understanding—that which is a demand for writing—thwart the demand for
mouming? Can writing defend against the fulfiulment of mouming in the sake of
maintaining the relation to the deceased or the queer subaltem, as is the case with
Kincaid’s brother? Can writing institute silence while breaking it? These are some of
the questions that will preoccupy us as we head toward a discussion of Derrida’s
narratives of mouming.
We can now begin to grasp the manner in which narrative mouming must be
inhabited by the guilt of which it is an effect. for what is to write onesefto mourning
if it is not fundamentally to write oneseif to forgetting? b write oneseif to mourning
means to dispose of the other in the service of the disposition to writing; the other no
longer lives in me but is purged out of me into writing; the other is displaced from the
interior of the moumer into the exteriority of the text: flot only is its intimacy
travestied but so also is its desire to be mourned—that desire to which two (or more)
loyers must have aiways contracted each other (or themselves). Wither such a
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contract in the act of writing? Does writing annul the contract to mouming (by
fulfihling mouming) or reinforce it by maintaining the relationality of mouming? Are
not libidinal and cathectic contracts aiways secret and brooldng thus no public
disclosure? This is the aporia: to contract oneseif to mouming is one thing; to
accomplish mouming is quite another thing altogether. Respecting the contract
implies devoting oneseif to a life task of mouming. Yet, the logic of mouming itself,
its phenomenologics, demands the cooperation and empathy of a secondary
witness—it demands a homeopathic public expression. For Freud, the Mitscherlichs,
Santner, among others, mouming is a public performance, a socio-cultural ritual. It is,
in other words, the exteriorization of mouming that is thought to make possible the
interior refiirbishing of the psyche. $uch expression, however, will amount to nothing
less than the reneging of the secret contract to interminable mouming.
In Mourning Lies my Redemption: Derrida and the Scene of Mourning
I believe that the activities of thought have another vocation:
that ofbearing witness to dfferends.
—Jean-François Lyotard, Political Writings
While the question of mouming ripples throughout Derrida’s oeuvre, it is
only in The Work of Mourning that it becomes at the center of his reflections. I say
“reflection” because it is in the nature of reflection flot to know a priori the object of
its reflection; I say “reflection,” also, because it is in the nature of reflection not to
stop at the provisional knowledge it might reach about the object of its reflection; and
I say “reflection,” finally, because it is in the nature of reflection to renew, if flot
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repeat, its work whenever the demand for more reflection presents itself, as it surely
does following the singular plural death of a friend. “Reflection,” Lyotard intones,
“requires that you watch out for occurrences, that you don’t already know what’s
happening. It leaves open the question: Is it happening?” (Dfferend xv, original
italics). Since The Work ofMourning consists of a collection of writings that range
from letters of condolences and memorial essays, to eulogies and funeral orations—
which Derrida wrote over almost two decades on a pantheon of french and American
intellectuals in the event of their death(s)—it is better understood as a series of
reflections that raises the question of mouming at the moment of working through
it—it reflects (on) the question. Yet this body of writings reflects (on) the question of
mouming in the negative (of its occurrence), as if by sidestepping or overstepping
and occluding its internai workings, ah the while refuting the existence of a
metalanguage of mourning.
What is at stake in The Work ofMourning is the search for an ever-fresh and
singular idiom whereby to bear witness to the singular death of each of the deceased
friends, including Roland Barthes, Michel foucault, Louis Althusser, Gilles Deleuze,
and Jean-François Lyotard, to name a few. Derrida wants to steer clear of the clinical
and psychoanalytic understanding of this question, and ultimately to dispel the hold
such an understanding—promoted in, or disguised under, the name of cure—has
corne to cast over the ethics of the work of mourning. Indeed, to the initiator of the
discourse of psychoanalysis as well as to his disciples, Derrida raises a fttndamental
question that seeks ultimately to redefine the notion, or motto, of “successful
mourning.” For Derrida, if the so-called successfiil mourning means the piecemeal
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libidinal withdrawal and reinvestment of cathexes from one object to another (Freud)
or the total introjection and assimilation of the other within (Abraham and Torok),
then mourning has necessarily to fail, for failure alone can be apt enough to bear the
name of its success.
Mourning is here carved out and elaborated in such a way as to become a
deconstructive lexeme, in a league with such other concepts as dffe’rance and
supplementarity. Thus, in mouming (of) Louis Marin, Derrida asserts that “whoever
thus works at the work ofmouming leams the impossible—and that [sic] mourning is
interminable. Inconsolable. Irreconcilable” (143; original italics). And he goes on to
hammer home this unseuling ethical contention:
You will also understand, for this is the law, the law of mouming, and
the law of the Iaw, aiways in mouming, that it would have to fail in
order to succeed. In order to succeed, it would well have tofail, to fail
well. It would well have to fail, for this is what has to be so, in failing
well. That is what would have to be. And while it is aiways promised,
it will neyer be assured. (144; original italics).
Derrida tries to find, at the crossroads of philosophy and ethics, answers to the
question of mouming—a question which is in fact more of a paradox that asks of us,
on the one hand, to moum sine die and cautions us, on the other hand, that no mafter
how rigorously we persevere in our work of mouming, we will flot be able to obviate
the ineluctable modality of infidelity. Granted that mouming is indeed
interminable—and that the ethics of alterity must resist its seductive affective seal in
the service of opening or keeping open the wound of connectivity to the deceased,
even at the risk of narcissistic mortifications—whence the infidelity?
The championing of a kind of infinite mourning seems to follow ftom the
recognition, the resilient acceptance, of the other’s infinite alterity, of the other’s
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irreducible difference, as much as of his or her indigestibility. Ciearly, what is at
issue here is the degree to which one must incorporate the other within: although
Derrida doesn’t say it, one can safely conjecture that the degree of interiorization of
the other inside us has to be in proportion to the degree to which his difference and
alterity are respected. “The one who looks at us in us—and for whom we are—is no
longer; he is completeiy other, infinitely other, as he has aiways been, and death has
more than ever entrusted him, given him over, distanced him in this infinite alterity”
(161).
Thus, incorporation, or the degree of incorporation to which Derrida
concedes, does not encourage the assimilation and appropriation of the other under
the ali-enguffing me, but strives respectfully to ailow the other his infinite alterity and
ineducible contrapuntaiity, both of which are operative in the act of interiorization
itself, in the very geometry and dissymmetry of the gaze, and in the very conjuration
of the name of the dead. Already in every act of appropriation, of assimilation, of
interiorization and mastery, there is a kemel, a nucieus, a grain of resistance, a
contrapuntal element that aims at demastering, or at resisting the tendency to
homogenize, or the penchant for devouring, the dead. The other remains, therefore,
near and yet far, immanent and yet infinitely transcendent, inside and yet outside,
within and yet beyond, “Far away in us” (161)—”within us but.. .not ours” (44). In
our destinai unity with the other, we remain, Derrida provocatively contends,
“Together apart” (224).
To submit to the laws of mouming, as popuiarized by psychoanalysis, is
tantamount to diaiectizing a death that Roland Barthes caiied “undialectical” (47).
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Spouing a thought-provoking phrase—”it n ‘y aura pas de deuil”—by Lyotard,
Derrida goes on exploring and disentangling ail its threads and ramifications, only to
conclude more emphaticaily than Lyotard, more laconicaiiy but no iess teilingiy, “No
mouming, period” (218). Taking on yet another phrase about the fear of “the worse
than death” in Lyotard—a phrase which Lyotard himself had previously spotted in
Adomo—Derrida seems to propound that what is worse than death is precisely the
suggestion that death cornes to put an unsurpassable end to any kind of
communication, dialogue, with the dead: what is worse than death, to be more
specific, is the tendency to translate the finitude that death instantiates into the
finitude of the infinite. Death ushers us into infinity, and from a finite reiationship
with the other we move into an infinite relationship with him, a relationship watched
over by interiorization and infinite transcendence; what is worse than death then is
the impossibility of such a readjustment, of such a renegotiation in terms of the in
finite; precisely, what is worse than death is the possibility of successfully
accomplishing the task of mourning, the possibiiity of forgetting, or burying, the
name of the dead once and for ah. “In the case of ‘Auschwitz’ [what isJ ‘worse than
death,’. . . is the extinction of the very name that forbids mouming, given that this
murder of the name constitutes the very meaning of the order ‘die,’ or ‘that he die,’
or even ‘that I die” (237). In order to preclude such a fatality—the end of the
infinite—mouming has to continue, and the illusion of a point at which it has to be
successfully accomplished has to be banished into the sanctuary of the unethical and
the unfaithfiil.
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for Derrida, the work of mouming is already at work as soon as friendship
begins, if flot earlier, and the interruption of death shouid by no means grind it to a
hait: “When friendship begins before ffiendship, it touches upon death, indeed, it is
born in mourning” (123, italics mine). friendship is structured, from the outset, by a
degree of a priori mourning, a degree of interiorization, which must have coincided,
before the last death, with every previous nomination, with every instance in which
the name of the friend is uftered—the name which does not oniy conjure the singular
death of the friend whose name is called, but also multiplies it infinitely every time it
is uttered, making it “singular plural”: mourning wiil have begun as soon as the
“interiority (of the other in me, in you, in us) had already begun its work. With the
first nomination, it preceded death as another death wouid have done. The name
alone makes possible the pluraiity of deaths” (46).
Yet, notwithstanding this altruistic attitude and unsparing ioyalty to the
deceased friend, Derrida is stili depressingly uncomfortable with the potentially
travestying implications of any attempt (whether in speech, or writing) to reckon with
the deceased, any attempt to recognize and acknowledge our debt to them since any
such aftempt will necessarily have been bom in an unbearable and tasteiess act of
infidelity. When it comes to determining our reiationship, our bond, to the deceased,
the daunting question for Derrida is: “How to leave him alone without abandoning
him?” (225). This question bespeaks the intransigent paradox of mouming: whatever
way you choose to go in order to remain faithfijl to the departed friend, you would
have to perch on the edge of a vast, seemingly bottomless abyss, where the siippage
into infidelity is almost ineluctable.
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The danger that Derrida is afraid of in performing these acts of mourning, and
in attempting to recognize the particular debt he owes to every singular person he
moums, is that such a recognition of debt may ultimately threaten to annihilate and
neutralize the debt, and ultimately lift it by purporting or pretending, as it were, to
have paid it back in the very act of naming, counting, enumerating, and taking stock
of it. Furthermore, to achowiedge the debt in the pursuance of forgiveness is an
even more travestying act; for, from whom (if flot from the “without power” but flot
“without force”) are we asking forgiveness when we ask forgiveness from the dead,
and in so doing, aren’t we just lured by the thought, which belies an illusion, that
expatiation will follow, and aren’t we in the final analysis more concemed about the
me that lias survived the deatli of the other rather than the we, the lie in me?
We are thus, in front of ah these rhetorical questions, lured into a tangled
jungle of difficulties and aporias, which weigh heavily on the conscience of the
faithflil (friend). In tlie face of this ineluctable infidelity that the act of
acknowledging one’s debt to the deceased has corne overwhelmingly to imply, there
rernain only shimmers of redernption—a redemption that the wistful consciousness
cannot completely eam even through sacrifice. These narratives of mourning are, one
can begin to recognize gradually, haunted by the trauma of their bifth, by the trauma
of their writing—a trauma they face, measure themselves against and, to a certain
extent, obviate through a constant and indefatigable reassuring promise that they are
flot written yet, that they cannot be written now, and that they will be written in the
future. Throughout these eulogies, time and again, Derrida insists that he does not
have “the heart to relate stories or to deliver a eulogy,” and that “there would be too
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much to say and [itJ is not the right time” (114). Thus, the act of writing, of
reckoning, and of inconsolable mouming, whose flip side is a potential infidelity, has
to be done and flot done, and thwarted at the same time it is desired—infinitely
rehearsed. To write, or flot to write—only in foiling one infidelity against the other,
can one redeem, albeit slightly, the ineluctabie “posthumous infidelity” to which
every moumer is heir. This action of writing and not writing—of fulfihling and
renewing the promise of writing—has to be rehearsed, it bears repeating, on the stage
of interminable mouming. Writing neither fuifihis nor undermines mouming but re
stores it into etemity.
Reflecting (on) the inevitabie infidelities inherent in any work of mouming
(here, it is the mouming ofRoland Barthes that is in question), Derrida writes:
Two infidelities, an impossible choice: on the one hand, not to say
anything that cornes back to oneself, to one’s own voice, to remain
silent, or at the very least to let oneselfbe accompanied or preceded in
counterpoint by the friend’s voice. Thus, out of zealous devotion or
gratitude, out of approbation as well, to be content with just quoting,
with just accompanying that which more or iess directly cornes back
or retums to the other, to let him speak, to efface oneself in front of
and to foliow bis speech, and to do so right in front of him. But this
excess of fideiity would end up saying and exchanging nothing. It
returns to death. It points to death, sending death back to death. On the
other hand, by avoiding ail quotation, ail identification, all
rapprochements even, so that what is addressed to or spoken of
Roland Barthes truly comes from the other, from the living friend, one
risks making hirn disappear again, as if one could add more death to
death and thus indecently pluralize it. We are left then with having to
do and not do both at once, with having to correct one infideiity by the
other. (45)
Following the death of the other, one is inevitabiy left to court one of these two
infidelities: either to wTite on (i.e. cite from, repeat the words of and confess one’s
guiit to) the other—and therefore “disfigure,” “wound,” or “reduce”—or to rernain
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silent and therefore “put to sleep,” or “kili” the other for the millionth time. One finds
him- or lier-self either on the threshold of the former or under the shadow of the latter
and has therefore to play the one against the other, in the hope that one might
ultimately correct one through the other. Such hope must be sought in the face of its
impossibility; it must be sought in the Lyotardian uncertainty of the Is ït happening?
Ultimately, the imperative to moum translates as an irreparative performative.
There is no getting round these two infidelities, this “double wound” (44),
which the death of the other pressures us into committing. Whule for Kincaid writing
following the death of her brother is more or less a question ofmouming, in the name
of which a plethora of rescue tropes are deployed, for Derrida writing is more of a
question about mourning rather than a question ofmourning; it is, more accurately, a
question addressed to mouming, to its economy and discontinuous temporality. One
can here build on Lyotard’s reflections on the ability to speak and the inability to
speak in the service of reaching generic statements about the differences between
Kincaid’s and Derrida’s narratives ofmouming. Not to moum is part ofthe ability to
moum since ability, according to Lyotard, “is a possibility and a possibility implies
something and its opposite” (Dfferend 10). To be unable to moum is flot, however,
the same as to be able flot to moum. The former can be seen as a deprivation and the
latter as a negation. To be unable to moum is, by the same token, flot the saine as to
be unable flot to moum. The former is, of course, a deprivation, but the latter can be
seen as an instinctive impulse ofthe order of “I can’t help mouming!” While Kincaid
is unable not to mourn, Derrida is able flot to moum.
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Derrida wants to slip through the intransigencies of the $cylla of writing and
the Charybdis of flot writing following the death of a friend; he thus ambivalently
tries to take a une of flight that paradoxically enables him to evade the very activity
(i.e. duty) he is engaged in. Derrida stops at the threshold of writing and on the verge
of articulation; ail he manages to pen down is, as it were, nothing more than the
promise of a retum to writing, or so he wants to have us believe. Since writing
amounts to insulting the other as much as the voluntary forbearance from writing
threatens to kil! him for the second time, writing can only emanate from a space in
which the writing subject is at a loss to write, held into the promise:
To go on speaking ofthis ail alone, afier the death ofthe other, to
sketch out the least conjecture or risk the least interpretation, feels to
me like an endless insuit or wound—and yet also a duty, a duty
toward him. Yet I will flot be able to carry it out, at least flot right
here. Aiways the promise ofretum. (55).
That writing is a promise implies that mouming is also a promise: after ail, it is only
following the death of the other that a number of interrogations begin to cluster thick
around the pertinence of writing as a mode of mouming. Only by asking the question
about mouming can one decide whether or flot to dwell in it, whether or flot the
narrative mode vehicles the ethica! concerns ofthe mouming subject.
Narrative must question its foundational presuppositions; it must give
utterance to its narrative meta-narrative; that is, it must question its own practice. As
Derrida insists, we deconstruct in order to achieve justice; we deconstruct the law—
that is we improve it in order to guarantee justice. $o to improve the law is precisely
to deconstruct etemally. What miglit that law be in relation to the death of the other?
It is nothing but the law of mouming which, according to Derrida, lias been since
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Freud unjust, allowing thus an unethical privileging of the survivor over the
deceased. b ensure justice, it is incumbent upon the living to deconstruct and perfect
the law of relationality—the law of mourning—that gathers them together with the
dead. The law ofmouming, as a law ofrelationality, emerges therefore in the spacing
between the promise (of mouming) that urges us to tend ever so pressingly toward
justice and the deconstmctible figures of possibility that are meant to continually
flesh out the promise. That the law of mouming is a deconstructible figure of
relationality with the dead implies, by the same token, that narrative—whose
subsumption under the law of mouming cannot be overstressed—is also a
deconstructible figure of relationality.
Narrative is the law of the law. It is govemed by the law of mouming—that
which is the law of relationality. To the extent that narrative functions under the
jurisdiction of mouming, it cannot escape the affective reftactivity that permeates
mouming. In this respect, narrative can be deconstructed in terms of the affective
inroads it opens up in view of an ever perfectible, ever just, relation with the dead. To
be able to see, for instance, the ways in which narrative carnes the potential ofpaying
back a debt at the very moment of registering or acknowledging it does not so much
despair us as entice us to demand the impossible. To the extent that the demand for
the impossible opens up horizons of the possible, it is far from being a mere utopian
whistling. b the extent that the deconstruction of narrative generates enthusiasm
about new idioms—new ways of expression and new ways of relating to those who
remain captives in our idioms—it is a laudable task.
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Narrative mouming is the field of force in which the asymmetry between the
living and the dead is played out in the idiom of the former. It is therefore, in
Lyotard’s idiom, a “case of differend” precisely because “the ‘regulation’ of the
conflict that opposes [or gathers] them [the living and the dead] is done in the idiom
of one of the parties [the living] while the wrong suffered by the other [the dead] is
flot signified in that idiom” (The Dfferend 9). In this respect, can Devon Drew lodge
a complaint—a cri de coeur that would bear witness to what Douglas Crimp, for
instance, cails “the terrible vulnerability” or “frailty” of being human (200), of which
the stark fact that AIDS has claimed the lives of the best and most accomplished
intellectuals of our times is testimony? More precisely, can he lodge this very cri de
coeur in his sister’s narrative (of his life and death), and can that cri survive the
refractive idiom of his sister? Even if Kincaid’s narrative speaks to this cri, it cannot
justly echo/repeat it. This cri must finally mark the limits of the narrative’s
imaginative inventiveness. While it must be phrased, this cri caimot find utterance.
To inscribe it is to mis-take its insistence for an appeal-to-framedness, an appeal-to
phrasedness. Not to inscribe it is to mn the risk of thrusting it into oblivion. Narrative
mouming is bom in the spacing or interval between the mouming duties (Derrida) or
mouming urgencies (Kincaid) incumbent upon the mourner and the continually
deconstmctible and perfectible laws of mouming. This narrative does well to
recognize and bear witness to the differends that regulate it. But that this narrative
must be bedeviled by the taint of posthumous infidelity is no more lamentable a fact
than the insatiable search for a better justice.
NOTES
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INTRODUCTION: Tbe Scope of Mourning
I perceive of theoretical and critical writing in very experiential and exploratory
terms, for what one writes does flot emerge from the back of one’s mmd, as if it were
stored and then recovered, even though that is perhaps exactly what happens, but
feels as if it were lived, formed and thought on the spot, in the space of the moment
in which one is caught, with no foreknowledge or forethought. In Remarks on Marx,
Foucault provides a more articulate description of what I am alluding at here: “If I
had to write a book to communicate what I have already thouglit, I’d neyer have the
courage to begin it. I write precisely because I don’t know yet what to think about a
subject that attracts my interest” (27).
2 for a comprehensive and sharp introduction to “object relations theory,” see Jay R.
Greenberg and Stephen A. Mitcheli: Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory.
In “Thoughts on War and Death,” Freud speaks of “the tendency to exciude death
from our calculations in life”—a tendency that “brings in its train many other
renunciations and exclusions” (79). In Being and Time, Martin Heidegger shows how
death, the fundamental question of Being, is defused and forgotten by Dasein’s
withdrawal into the “idle talk” (Gerede) of the “they”—the “Self of everydayness”
(296). Joyce’s attempt in “Rades” to recreate the graveyard scene from Hamtet can
be seen as an admixture of a harsh reminder of the reality—and a severe critique of
the banaliry—of death in a world that has become, in the wake of the Great War, no
longer cognizant of let alone beholden to, either aspect.
L
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While mourning remains mostly an enigma in ail of freud’s writings, it will have
become clear nonetheless that Freud was more ofien than not disinclined to believe in
the very possibility of mourning. In fact, mourning seems to be possible only in the
realm of literature and theatre, for “There alone,” Freud argues,
the condition can be fulfiuled which makes it possible for us to
reconcile ourseives with death: nameiy, that behind ail the vicissitudes
of life we should stiil be abie to preserve a life intact. For it is really
too sad that in life it shouid be as it is in chess, where one faise move
may force us to resign the game, but with the difference that we can
start no second game, no retum-match. In the reaim of fiction we find
the plurality of lives which we need. We die with the hero with whom
we have identified ourselves; yet we survive him, and are ready to die
again just as safely with another hero. (“Thoughts on War and Death”
79)
At a later stage of this dissertation, I will ask whether the staging of death and
mouming in narrative fiction can heip bridge the gap between the intransigence ofthe
experience ofreaiity and the benevoience ofthe experience of fiction.
While inspired by and indebted to Lacan, my reflections on the question of desire
are deiiberately stripped of Lacan’s lexicon, not only because Lacan’s conceptual
armature is ostensibiy opaque, but aiso because it threatens to hijack the forward
thrust of the argument of this dissertation into endiess explanatory forays of Lacan’ s
“Phallophanies,” or linguistic epiphanies—a task for which there is unfortunately no
ample space here. The reader might be relieved, however, to find out that it is stiil
possible to speak about desire, flot Desire, after Lacan without necessariiy having to
use such formulations as “Other/other,” “object in desire,” “object a” (l’objet petit a)
or even Lacan’s triadic conception of Desire: the spiit between demand (demande)
C and need of which the voracious veracity, as I cali it, of Desire is an effect. By and
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large, I draw on Lacan’s most common texts in English translations, especially on
Écrit: A $election, The four fundamental Concepts ofPsychoanaÏysis, as well as on
Lacan’s essay on Hamiet, “Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamiet.” A
reading of these texts makes it clear to me that Lacan’s conception of Desire is
indissociable from a constant graveyard whistling, a relentless retrogressive pushing
toward a lost or prenatal immortality. In bis essay on Hamiet, for instance—afier
having demonstrated, quite cogently, how Hamiet is uninterruptedly suspended in the
(time and desire of) Other—he concludes that an object in desire becomes an object
of desire only when it can no longer be possessed. Referring to the graveyard scene
and to the burial of Ophelia—Hamlet’s no longer possible love-object—Lacan
contends that “Only insofar as the object of Hamlet’s desire lias become an
impossible object can it become the object of bis desire” (36). Emerging and
reemerging in the unbridgeable spiit between demand and need, desire is a constant
siide along the metonymic chain of signifiers. Since the object of desire remains
lacking along the chain of signifiers, it can be named and embraced only when it is
irrecoverably lost to the signifying system. In this sense, mouming becomes more of
a linguistic interruption than a relational predicament: “The Work ofmouming is first
of ail performed to satisfy the disorder that is produced by the inadequacy of
signifying elements to cope with the hole that bas been created in existence, for it is
tbe system of signifiers in their totality which is impeached by the least instance of
mouming” (3$). for a critique of Lacan’s conception of mouming, see Dominick
LaCapra, “Trauma, absence, Loss,” and Alessia Ricciardi’s The Ends oJMourning;
for a focused conception of desire as a relentless descent into the immortal world ofC
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the non-object—that is, the world of Yorick’s skull, the world of the “contentless
particularity of the seif-that-is-nothing,” see $taten’s “The Bride Stripped Bare, or
Lacan avec Plato”; for a more contextual framing of Lacan’s reconstruction of
Freud’ s notion of drive (Trieb) and instinct (Instinkt) in terms of the triad of Desire,
demand and need, see Ellie Ragland-Sullivan, Jacques Lacan and the Philosophy of
Psychoanalysis.
6 In Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, Freud explains two
psychologically distinct emotional ties that a little boy can develop: “a
straightforward sexual object-cathexis towards bis mother and an identification with
his father which takes him as his model” (134). Only when these two types ofties are
confounded does the oedipal struggie arise. The sexual rivalry over the mother
destabilizes the boy’s mimetic identification with the father, since it is crisscrossed
with the prohibition of incest. It is noteworthy here that identification is from the
outset the playground of a number of ambivalent emotions: love for the mother
(which is coupled with the interdiction of having her) and love for the father (coupled
with the interdiction of having him) that slips into hatred as soon as the father
becomes an obstacle in the way of the boy’s desire for the mother. This will prove
helpful when we move on to a discussion of the melancholic upsurge in which the
identification with a lost object is coloured by hatred. By and large, Freud’s Oedipus
complex remains a problem that post-Freudians from Lacan to Butler have not ceased
to interrogate. Were my focus the question of sexual identity, I would discuss the
implications of Freud’s theory in relation to homosexuality and to what Freud cails,
C in The Ego and the Id, “constitutional bisexuality” (371). For me the question is not,
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as Butier formulates it, of “melancholy gender,” but one of melancholy
subj ectivity—that is, of mouruful subj ectivity, as I shah demonstrate in chapter three.
While Freud distinguishes between the “identification with the father” (in
which “one’s father is what one would like to be”) and “the choice ofthe father as an
object” (in which one’s father is “what one wouid like to have”), he avows flot to be
able “to give a clear metapsychological representation of the distinction” (135).
Because the dissolution of the Oedipus compiex cannot be witnessed, and because
normative heterosexuaiity is not a given, sexual identity remains largely unaccounted
for and therefore open to endless heterodox constructions. How is it that an originally
blind libidinal identification becomes sexuaily bound and discriminative? How is it
that identification is at the beginning and at the end of the Oedipus complex? While
Freud chose to adopt the heterosexual and “more normal” (Ego and Id 371) version
ofthe Oedipus complex, Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen is nevertheless riglit to point out the
two scandais in which this complex resulted: (1) “flot that there is infantile sexuaiity
and that the chiid harbors incestuous and patricidal desires but that access to genitai
heterosexuality is flot a foregone conclusion” and (2) that “the first ‘emotional ties’
with others,” which are not oriented along unes of sexuai difference, “are
additionally shot tbrough with a hate and violence that are ah the more essentiai in
that they are confounded with love” (271).
In “Mourning and Melancholia,” Freud had already contrasted melancholia—
inconciusively so—to mouming, arguing that, whule the former resuits in affective
closure, the latter acts hike an “open wound” in which egoic consolation and flights
C into infantile forms of narcissism occur simuhaneously with the chidings of the super
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agent in the ego (to be conceptualized later, in The Ego and the Id, as the “super
ego”)—an agent that does not condone the ego’s identification with and
interiorization ofthe lost object, that is, the setting up ofthe lost object in the ego for
the sake of calming the id’s unquenched desire. Melancholia, however, as
constmcted in The Ego and the Id, is not an interminable process, but is the very
condition of the fulfihiment of the work of mouming itself. In other words,
melancholia has become subsumable under mouming. What is common in most
theoretical or critical work that discusses or applies Freud’s theories ofmouming and
melancholia is that the discussion of the former affect is only an excuse to dwell,
much as Freud himself does in “Mouming and Melancholia,” on the latter one. In
melancholia, the shadow of the object is said to fali upon the ego; by the same token,
in most critical discussions of mourning and melancholia, it is rather ironie that the
shadow of melancholia falis on mouming. In this respect, a recent collection of
essays, titled Loss. The Politics of Mourning, perpetuates this tendency to overlook
Freud’s later reconceptualization of melancholia in terms of mouming. In the context
ofthis dissertation, melancholia is discussed from within the horizon ofmouming.
8 In “The Apocalyptic Imagination and the Inability to Moum,” Martin Jay had
conceptualized the “inability to moum” as the affective instance in which a love
object is flot completely lost and cannot therefore be completely mourned:
[T]he continued presence in what we might cal! the real world of the object whose
apparent Ioss we cannot mourn.. . in the case of the collective ‘loss’ of mother
surrogates such as the earth. . . There ïs no reality testing that permits us to let go thelibidinal investment we seem to have in an object that has notfully disappeared.[that] is stiil around to nurture us. (97; italics mine)
(
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CHAPIER ONE: Horizons of Desire, Horizons of Mourning: Joyce’s Dubtiners
1 This chapter is a slightly different version of an article of the same titie I published
in Études Irlandaises. I also draw on “The Poetics of Mouming: the Tropologic of
Prosopopoeia in Joyce’s ‘The Dead’,” in which I treat prosopopoeia as the structuring
frame ofthe plot of “The Dead.”
2 In the context ofthis dissertation, I have no intention to trench on debates that have
to do with the topography of prosopopoeia in relation to other tropes. Rather, I seek
to explore the analytical potential (textual and psychic) of de Man’s
conceptualization of prosopopoeia, and at the same time I try to pinpoint its
applicative limits. I, for instance, do not argue why personification and reification
should be subsumed under prosopopoeia. Such an argument is already inherent in de
Man’s definition of prosopopoeia, which is the very definition that this chapter
attempts to nuance. For a study of the controversies and debates surrounding the
taxonomy of tropes, see James Paxson’s, The Poetics 0fPersonfication.
Sean Latham, A personal letter, 16 April 2002. Latham writes, “Gretta’s evocation
of Michael Furey does not, afier ail, give voice to the dead young man. His words,
instead, are only reported in the third person, and they do flot resuit in the death of
Gretta and Gabriel.” I contend that the voice of Michael, while not allowed
unmediated presence, is the voice that, in the words of Derrida, “already haunts any
said real or present voice” (Memoirs 26). Indeed, Gretta moves from an unwitting
proclivity to embrace the dead (lier visceral insistence that her liusband accept Miss
Ivors’ invitation to the Aran Isles is evidence of that) to what Eric $avoy calis, in a
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compelling article on the “necro-fihial” configuration in Nathaniel Hawthome, “a
will-to-prosopopoeia” (“Necro-fihia” 46$). Besides, what is advanced in this
chapter—as will become clearer through the concept of “automouming”—is flot the
literai death of Gretta and Gabriel through a prosopopoeic reversai, but preciseiy,
pace de Man, the very impossibility of such a death (by trope). The force/injustice of
prosopopoeia resides in its suspension of being in the middle of the end, right at the
end which is not yet one.
I appropriate the concept of “the inabiiity to moum” from Alexander and
Margarette Mitscherlich’s classic, The Inability to Mourn. Frinctles of Collective
Behavior. As used by the Mitscheriichs, “the inability to moum” is not at ail
analogous with what the Freud of “Mourning and Melancholia” would have
diagnosed as the onset of melancholia. On the contrary, “the inability to moum”
marks for the Mitscherlichs the very instance in which a melancholic affect, however
overwhelming, is frustrated. The affect is, in other words, calied for by the situation
but is—lest it shouid resuit in narcissistic mortifications—called off by the
individual’s system of defences. In this sense, the inability to moum should flot be
understood as the expression of an unbroken attachment to a lost love-object (Freud),
but rather as the deliberate and sustained burning of bridges with things past (the
Mitscherlichs). In the context of this chapter, I use the inability to moum in its
freudian sense in relation to Gretta, but I adhere to the Mitscherlichsian
appropriation of the term in relation to Gabriel.
CHAPTER THREE: Stili Harping on ber Mother: Kincaid’s
Identiflc(a)fions and the (Ab)uses of Mnemosyne
In the formulation of this question, I am indebted to Shane Weller whose article,
“Nothing to 3e $aid: On the Inexpressible in Modem Philosophy and Literature,”
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disentangles, in a compellingly lucid manner, the ramifications of the following
question: “Who (or what) would speak were there nothing to be said?” (91).
2 In the second of lis Unfashionable Observations, Nietzsche avers, as we have seen
in the first chapter, that “Ail action requires forgetting” ($9), that “historical
sensibiÏity makes its servants passive and retrospective, and [thatJ those who have
corne down with the historical fever become active only in those moments of
forgetfiilness when this historical sensibility is absent” (140). Presumabiy the past
draws attention to itself and thus whoever is drawn to it might eventually “lose the
narne of action” by giving in to “the pale cast of thought” (Hamiet 82). Not only that.
The past is flot so much at the service of life as it is at its disservice, flot 50 much
fruitful as it is troublesome and, flot so much necessary for life as it is parasiticai on
it. By and large, Nietzsche surmises that one can readiiy live happily in bestial
oblivion rather than perish rniserably in the voracious shrine of memory: “it is
possible to live almost without memory, indeed, to live happily, as the animais show
us; but without forgeffing, it is utterly impossible to live at ail” ($9). Ultimately,
Nietzsche reasons that (historical) memory and the past, in general, is sickening, that
his age suffers from “the historical sickness” and from “the memory of its chains,”
and that the only antidote to this fatal disease lies in “the art and power to be able to
forget” (163, original italics). By and large, although Nietzsche and Freud putatively
agree that forgetting, regardless of whether it is re-creative or repetitive, facilitates
the passage to action, they diverge sharply on the diagnosis, on the treatment, and on
the location itseif of the illness. And while Nietzsche prescribes forgetting as a
curative pill to an otherwise overwhelmingly paralyzing and unhealthy remembering,
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Freud prescribes the outright and direct opposite—remembering—as a therapeutic
measure against neurotic and regressive forgetting.
In “Present Pasts: Media, Politics, Amnesia,” Andreas Huyssen suggests that “we
now need productive remembering more than productive forgetting;” consequently,
Nietzsche’s second Untimety Meditation “may be as untimely as ever” (37).
Variations around the Freudian theme of curative remembering can be found in
several recent studies of the Holocaust, apartheid, or even in the ail the more
flourishing and free-floating field ofpost-colonialism. Taking Freud as their starting
point, some of these studies (LaCapraJCanith) carry on within the same freudian
framework while others wish explicitly to depart from the therapeutics of
remembering toward either a survival-based approach (LIoydJ Rinaldo Walcott), or a
strategic and pedagogically-minded one (Simon). On further inspection, it is worth
noting that Nietzsche himself remains—in contradistinction with his own theoretical
brew of productive forgetting, and somewhat to Freud’ s credit—ambivalent rather
than decided about the absolute relevance of forgetting. In the “Foreword” to the
second of lis Unfashionable Observations, Nietzsche confesses: “I have sought to
depict a feeling that has often tormented me; I am taking my revenge on it by
exposing ii’ to public scrutiny” (85, itaiics mine). Here we can sense a tension
between what Nietzsche calls for and what he actually practices. He seems to be
Nietzschean only in theory, but exceedingly Freudian in practice. Throughout the
essay, he cails for a productive forgetting, yet the whole enterprise is announced as a
revenge on a feeling that proceeds by/from remembering, re-collecting and
articulating the “feeling” in a quasi-Freudian talk-cure. Therefore, Nietzsche’s
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declared intentionlmotivation debunks his theory, and attests to the necessity of
remembrance as cure.
4Reading Simon, Rosenberg and Eppert, one gets the impression that remembering is
an entirely volitional activity in which a retum ofmemory is scarcely distinguishable
from a retum to memory. Indeed, the writers use “of’/”to” loosely, as the following
excerpt from their text might illustrate: “Implicated in this remembrance [as a
difflcult return] is a leaming to live with loss, a leaming to leam with a return of a
memory that inevitably instantiates loss and thus bears no ultimate consolation, a
leaming to live with a disquieting remembrance. On these terms, the memorial
impulse to turn to and return traumatic history is an assignment (original itaÏics), flot
simply a mafter of choice” (4, italics mine). Clearly, what this deliberate assignment
does flot allow for is an enlightening distinction between the volitional returns to
memory, and the free-floating and hardly controllable returns ofmemory. Memories
of the ‘return of category take on a life of their own, and become, potentially,
actantial agents capable of destabilizing, disrupting and inflicting, at will, the
individual as much as the collective.
Instead of seeing repetition as an effect of repression as the Freud of up-to Beyond
the Pleasure Principte does, Deleuze pushes Freud’s stiil hesitant findings to an
edge: repression is an effect of repetition, and flot the contrary. In other words,
repetition is no longer an unconscious enactment of the repressed and forgotten, but,
rather, a quite self-conscious reproduction of the yet-to be repressed once it has been
repeated. Thus, repetition becomes catalytic for repression, while repression remains
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the ineluctable aftermath for repetition (to go on repeating itself). In a word,
repression in the Deleuzian sense is called upon only to clean the Augean stable of
repetition. for an elaborate examination of this conjecture as well as for a move
beyond cyclical repetition toward a horizontal and quasi-labyrinthine conception of
repetition—of the same as much as of the different—see Gilles Deleuze, Difference
and Repetition (96-122). Now wonder, then, that the concept of repetition discussed
herein should flot be confused with the Nietzschean doctrine of “Etemal Retum”
scattered through his writings, especially Thus Spake Zarathustra and The Gay
Science. If one can speak of a compulsion to repeat the (gruesome) same from a
Freudian perspective, one might speak of a will to repeat the dfferent (i.e. the
potentially better, too) from a Nietzschean point of view. As Deleuze elaborately
demonstrates in lis Nietzsche et la Philosophie, etemal recurrence is—in very
condensed terms—more of a selective theory of becoming and affirmation of being
through transmutation, will to power and active force than a regressive and passive
harking back and reiteration of the same operating under a reagent force—a force
that might haul one to the abyss. In this respect, one might find Nietzsche to have
been anticipated by Kierkegaard. for, throughout his book Repetition, Kierkegaard
hungers and despairs for the repetition of selected existential experiences, and sees
the real challenge ahead of modem philosophy as residing in the will to repeat rather
than in the will to recollect as the Greeks might have thought. But, while selection of
the experiences to be repeated remains for Kierkegaard the starting point from which
repetition will proceed, for Nietzsche, cognizant of Darwin, selection becomes the
driving force, and the will to repeat is ultimately a will toward transvaÏuation and
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transmutation (Nietzsche et La Philosophie 81; Repetition 125-231). Almost the same
account ofNietzsche can be found in a compact way in Foucault’s essay, “Nietzsche,
Genealogy, History.” foucault coins the term “counter-memory” to oppose “the
endlessly repeated play of dominations” (150)—a practice that Donald Bouchard
rightly characterizes, in bis “Preface” to Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, as
that of “vigilant repetitions” (9). It is worth-noting, in conclusion, that Heidegger
elects, in a quasi-Kierkegaardian spirit, repetition (WiederhoÏung) as the vehicle for
entertaining an authentic relationship with the past. Loosely speaking, repetition
becomes, for Heidegger, flot only a liberator of the pastness of the past but also a
potentially liberating force of Dasein from the clutches offorgeMness—the mode of
an inauthentic relationship with the past—perpetrated and perpetuated by the “they”
in their vulgar and “everyday” mode of existence. (See Being and Time, especially
paragraphs 67 and 74).
6 Here I am alluding to Jameson’s succinct remark (which is itself an allusion to
Deleuze and Guaffari, Anti-Oedius) that, “When a psychic structure is objectively
determined by economic and political relationships, it cannot be dealt with by means
of purely psychological therapies; yet it equally cannot be dealt with by means of
purely objective transformations of the economic and political situation itself, since
the habits remain and exercise a baleful and crippling residual effect” (“Third-World
Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism” 76).
“‘They want a piece of land to build their shrine,’ said Uchendu to bis peers when
they consulted among themselves. ‘We shall give them a piece of land.’ He paused
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and there was a murmur of surprise and disagreement. ‘Let us give them a portion of
the Evil forest. They boast about victory over death. Let us give them a battlefield
in which to show their victory.’ They laughed and agreed, and sent for the
missionaries, whom they had asked to leave them for a while so that they might
‘whisper together.’ They offered them as much of the Evil Forest as they care to
take. And to their greatest amazement the missionaries thanked them and burst into
song” (107).
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“On the Irremovable Strangeness of Being Different,” although Bhabha addresses
Fanon’s strategic conceptualization of violence in the reparative project of
decolonization, he exaggerates the so-called “proximity” at the heart ofthe otherwise
“irremovable strangeness” of difference between colonizer and colonized. While it is
arguably tme, as Edward $aid has neyer ceased to reiterate (now, from a different
topological space, perhaps—ftom beyond the grave, as it were) that the histories of
the colonizer and colonized overlap and their territories intertwine—lending thus
credence to what Bhabha cails the “historical relationality, the interstitial in-between
that defines and divides them into antagonistic subjects”—it is not theoretically
serviceable to water down or attenuate the historical ferocity of the encounter, about
which the fanonian text is nevertheless explicit. “The anxious struggie for the
historical consciousness of freedom that eschews transcendence—or a higher unity—
derives from violence,” Bhabha contends, “an ethics that takes responsibility for the
other in the transformation of the ‘thing” (3$; italics mine). While Fanon gives up,
as Sartre himself observes, on the Other, on Europe, and on its models of
development and progress, Bhabha sees in the violence with which Fanon wants to
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foot out the colonizer an “ethics that takes responsibility for the other.” We should
flot perhaps ask how defamiliarizing and alienating of, and how defamiliarized and
alienated with, the fanonian text s interpretation is, but whether it is flot in
fact, in Umberto Eco’s lexicon, an overinterpretation. Most probably so, for although
Fanon’s text derives its power and force from the rhetorical web into which it is
weaved, I do flot think that the core of fanon’ s argument can be hammered in such a
way as to daim, as Bhabha does, that the fanonian text gestures toward a move
beyond ontology toward an ethics à la Levinas.
Bhabha’ s text betrays a twisted form of resistance to Fanon’ s vindication of
violence. One cannot fail to note that at the core of the admiration the postcolonial
critic has for fanon is in fact an embarrassment at the fact that Fanon furnishes him
or her with a position he or she cannot live up to unless in a twisted manner, as
Bhabha largely does. Afier citing excerpts from page 295 and specifically fanon’s
heavily metaphoric sentence—”You must therefore weigh as heavily as you can upon
the body of your torturer in order that bis soul, lost in some byway, may finally find
once more [its universal dimension]”—Bhabha asks, “Is this plot of proximity a
vindication of violence?,” and disclaims, “I do not believe so” (39). In Bhabha’s
citation, the phrase “its universal dimension,” which I added between brackets, is
omitted in order for him to resolve forcefully the anxiety that fanon’s text leaves
unresolved into the Levinasian reassuring oasis: “This is a freedom that does flot
demand universaiframes or syncbronous knowledges but that will allow the silence
to inscribe the raveling and unraveling between the psychic body and its political
weight” (39; italics mine). Bhabha weighs heavily the body of Levinas on that of
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Fanon in order for him to gesture toward an ethics without transcendence (in
Levinas’s more idiosyncratic terms, this would be what he calis “excendence,” a
transcendence of transcendence, but Bhabha does flot adopt the term), which is, in
my view, a far cry from the Fanonian text. When fanon explicitly asserts that “The
colonized man finds his fteedom in and through violence” ($6), do we gain anything
by isolating phrases and sentences marked by a fringe of open texture in order to
contend that Fanon does not vindicate violence? Is it flot far more beneficial to work
through fanon’s vindication of violence rather than disavow it?
On the other hand, postcolonial critics who reckon with fanon’s vindication
of violence seem to me too distracted by the scandalizing nature of fanon’s thesis to
retum to fanon’s text and clarify its internai tensions. In this respect, Robert J. C.
Young devotes, in his ambitious introduction to postcolonialism, Postcolonialism,
most of his intervention on fanon to discussing the polemics—whether inimical
(Hannah Arendt) or sympathetic (Serequeberhan; $artre)—surrounding fanon’s
thesis. The few instances in which Young touches on the abstract dimension of
fanon’s theory could have benefited from a more undistracted textual analysis.
“There are no more disputes and no longer any insignificant details which entail the
death of a man. There are no longer explosive outburst of rage because my wife’s
forehead or her left shoulder were seen by my neighbor. The national conflict seems
to have canaiized ail anger, and nationalized ail affective or emotional movements”
(Fanon 306).
C
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10 Rather than “blaming the victims”—a tendency in postcolonial rhetoric of which
V.S. Naipaul is the most notorlous example ami Edward Said the most notable
critic—Kincaid iodges, by way of blaming the victors, a complaint against the British
colonialists whose bad political conduct was absorbed and reproduced by the newly
liberated Antiguans:
Have you ever wondered to yourseif why it is that ail people like me
seem to have learned from you is how to imprison and murder each
other, how to govem badly, and how to take the wealth of our country
and place it in Swiss bank accounts? Have you ever wondered why it
is that ail we seem to have leamed from you is how to corrupt our
societies and to 5e tyrants? You will have to accept that this is mostly
your fault. Let me just show you how you looked to us. You came.
You took things that were flot yours, and you did not even, for
appearances’ sake, ask first. (34-35)
While Kincaid seems to puncture, or perhaps accentuate, the gravity of the scenario
(whereby Antiguans mime or compulsively reproduce colonial behavior) by a
prickiing irony, a dramatic relief of sorts, Suzanne Gauch complains that ah Kincaid
seems to be interested in is a retroactive request for a mere ritual of politeness,
effecting thus a “startling reduction of racism [and ail colonial indignitiesJ to a
question of bad manners” (913). While A Small Place was flot accepted for
publication in the New Yorker because of its “distorted anger” (see, for instance,
Simmons, Jarnaica Kincaid 136), Gauch unexpectedly retrieves an underpinning, if
not anger-management, strain in Kincaid toward dissolving weighty questions of
racism into banal occurrences or mere aspects ofeverydayness.
Suzanne Gauch might be right in cautioning us that Kincaid’s analogy tbreatens
eventually to dissolve the weighty probiems of race and colonialism into a discourse
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of mannerism. But it is impossible, if not irresponsible, to understand Kincaid
literally. I think this is an instance of what Spivak means by arguing toward a
readerly competence that would enable us “to leam to dis-figure the undecidable
figure into a responsible literality, again and again” (Death ofa Disczline 72; italics
mine). “Literality,” in Spivak’s sense, should flot be understood literally, in the sense
of “literalness,” but in the sense of contingently unbuilding the logic of the
undecidable in order to grasp it. Nor should we understand Kincaid’s account ofwhat
happened in terms of impoliteness as a mere dilution of the otherwise grave
consequences of colonialism. Perhaps Ihab Hassan’s concept of “indetermanence”—
a combination of indeterminacy and immanence—is valuable here since Spivak’s
“responsible literality” does not refer to a meaning that will have been there, waiting
at the arrivai, but to a meaning that has to be forged and arrived at “again and again,”
perfecting in the process both the literality and the responsibility to/for it. Elsewhere,
I have suggested that “indeterminacy cannot be by any means dffe’ranced sine die; it
is in the final analysis as contingent as the cal! for determinacy itself. Determinacy
and indeterminacy codetermine each other; hardly does the one cease to inhabit the
other” (“Beyond the Pale” 325). Kincaid’s constant approximation of what happened
is a theme that ripp!es throughout lier writing, generating competing reports that tend
ever so closely toward the whatness of what happened but remain disproportionate to
‘t.
‘2j articulates with remarkable clarity the correlation between the hermeneutic
task of sensemaking and the discontinuous but integrative process of mourning:
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The rupture of the slave trade, then the experience of slavery,
introduces between blind belief and clear consciousness a gap that we
have neyer finished fihling. The absence of representation, of echo, of
any sign, makes this emptiness forever yawn under our feet. Along
with our realization of the process of exploitation (along with any
action we take), we must articulate the unexpressed while moving
beyond it” (201; italics mine).
I will come back, in the conclusion to this dissertation, to the “beyond” of mouming
to which Glissant gestures at; suffices it to point out for the moment that is ofientimes
easier said than done. Is it flot a trait of reflection—as well as of understanding, of
memory, and of thought, in general—to become entangled in the cobwebs of the
object of its reflection? Glissant’s remark, of course, sends back to my introduction
and to Joyce’s categorical imperative—”Get out of mouming first”—and refuels the
question whether mourning is prerequisite to understanding, correlative to
understanding or anterior to it! Must flot all of these—like creation day—happen ah
at once?
13
“Should it be an idea” is, in my view, an inter-textual allusion to Conrad’s Heart of
Darkness, in which the “idea” that Conrad evokes remains—despite the adjectival
prolixity and articulateness with which he exposes it—shrouded in mystery:
The conquest of the earth, which mostly means the taking it away
from those who have a different complexion or slightly flatter noses
than ourselves, is not a pretty thing when you look into it too much.
What redeems it is an idea. An idea at the back of it, flot a sentimental
pretence but an idea; and an unselfish beflef in ffie idea—something
you can set up, and bow down before, and offer a sacrifice to... (10;
italics mine).
No one who has read and been marked by this passage has failed to be impressed and
mystified by Conrad’s recondite belabouring ofthe “idea.” One is, in particular, very(
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struck by the unsettiing inscription of this idea in terms of its characteristics—or,
shah I say charatachrestics?—that is, in terms of the narrative of negative dialectics
into which Conrad moulds it: an idea, flot a sentimental pretence; an unselfish belief
in the idea, flot an idea as such; an unselfish belief but one that can nevertheless be
set up—unselfish but by design; unselfish but you should bow clown before it;
unselfish but to which you should offer sacrifice. The play of negative dialectics
follows its course unsettiing any henneneutic closure but opening the doors to new
interpretive entrepreneurship.
It is impossible here to do justice to Conrad’s rhetorical moves, or to deal
with the plethora of hesitant but stihl accumulating and proliferating interpretations
that this passage alone has provoked, but I would like to suggest, for my purposes in
this chapter, that the idea that undergirds the conquest of the earth is nothing but the
sense that one can either get away with it or be redeemed of it by virtue of having
believed in the idea of redemption itself. At the horizon of the conquest of the
earth—and of the necessary sinking into inhumanity that correlates with it and of
which Sartre, Fanon, and Memmi, among others, have spoken prolifically—there is
the horizon of redemption. This interpretation of the “idea” seems to me very much
in tune with Kincaid’s own thinking. In A Small Place, for instance, she argues that
“People who think about these things [i.e. heaven!hell; rewardlpunishment] believe
that every bad deed, even every bad thought, carnes with it its own retribution. So do
you see the queer thing about people hike me? Sometimes we hoÏd your retribution”
(27; italics mine). Elsewhere, I have studied a recurrent feature of legal texts—the
fringe of open texture—in terms of what I then called a poetics ofocclosure, a kind
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of see-saw chiasmatic flutter between a textual and intrinsic strain toward ciosure and
an extrinsic, somewhat overiordiy, interdiction or occlusion of closure (sec “Beyond
the Pale” 326). It has not occurred to me until now that such a poetic strategy could
be a function of infficting mouming on those who committed the crimes of
colonialism—or on their current descendants, flot in the sense of filiation but
affiliation. Poetic occlosure is at the core of the narrative structure of the Kincaidian
text, especially in A SmalÏ Place; its flinction is to open up the other to mouming and
to guiit, and to deny him the sense of closure and the promise of redemption
correlative with the wiiling sensation of grief that the reader might have
entertainedlassumed at the outset of the act of reading.
14 Most of Kincaid’s critics agree on the ambivalent daughter-mother relationship in
Kincaid’s work. This ambivalence is, most critics also unanimously agree, a staging
of Kincaid’s haunting indebtedness to her mother and her unfinished revoit against
her; it is, in other words, the staging in fiction of the stirring into awareness of a love
hatred relationship between Kincaid and her mother before and afier her self-wiiled
exile in the United States. I wili discuss the specific twist of this reiationship in The
Autobiography ofMy Mother; for more on its representation in earlier novels, sec,
among others, Alison Donnell’s “When Daughter’s Defy: Jamaica Kincaid’s
Fiction”, Diane Simmons Jamaica Kincaid and Moira Ferguson’s Jamaica Kincaid:
Where the Land Meets the Body.
CHAPTER FOUR: The Ineluctable Modatity of Posthumous Infidelity:
The Limits of Narrative Mourning in Kincaid and Derrida
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1 Since her arrivai to the United States in the late sixties, Kincaid must have been
sensitive to the stakes involved in ransacking family history and in exposing famiiy
secrets by puffing them to the use (and, ailegedly, the abuse) of her art. Indeed, her
family did flot tarry to inveigh against her early pieces such that the then called
“Elaine Poiler Richardson” had to change her naine into “Jamaica Kincaid” and to
break ties with her family for more than twenty years. Meanwhile, Kincaid lias flot
abstained from writing (about) her family. In an interview with Brad Goldfarb, she
intimates that My Brother is the most honest rendition of family affairs: “I’ve only
ever written about my family, and I’ve neyer written about them so frankly as I have
in this book.” My aim is to engage the ethical stakes involved in writing about family
matters, especially that sucli a form of writing is triumphantly celebrated by Kincaid
herseif as a form of seif-redemption and seif-rescue. Writing becomes a trope of
rescue to an otherwise runaway and endangered life. While this kind of approach to
writing has been taken for granted by a number of feminists since Heien Cixous’s
feminist manifesto, “The Laugh of the Medusa,” its ethical problematics remain
largely unaccounted for.
2 for an account of the failure of counter-transference and the potential
interminability of analysis, see freud’s “Analysis Terminable and Interminable.” for
an account of freud’s obsessive returns to the WoIf Man case history, see The Wof
Man’s Magie Word: A Cryptonymy by Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, as well as
the memoirs of the Wolf Man himself, collected in Muriel Gardiner’ s The WoJMan
bythe Wolf-Man.
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Kincaid is flot unaware of the expatiatory flmction of narrative. Indeed in The
Autobiography ofliy Mother, she contends that
to describe your own transgressions is to forgive yourself for
them; to confess your bad deeds is also at once to forgive yourself,
and so silence becomes the only form ofself-punisbment: to live
forever locked up in an iron cage made of your own silence, and
then, from time to time, to have this silence broken by a
designated crier, someone who repeats over and over, in broken or
complete sentences, a list ofthe violations, the bad deeds
committed. (60)
Silence becomes here the conditio sine qua non of self-punishment for wrongdoing.
Breaking the silence is flot only tantamount to opening up a space for performing
mouming and expatiation, but also for the repetition of the transgressions again and
again, much as we have seen in our analysis of the figure of the “open wound” in the
previous chapter.
In her interview with Brad Goldfarb, Kincaid points out that, while it was her
mother who had precisely stirred the book buming episode into her consciousness
again, she had flot realized its magnitude and tormenting effects until she began
writing about.
Yeah. It’s a brutal scene, isn’t it? You know, I’d completely
forgotten that incident, and then something she said around the
time ofmy brother’s death made me remember it. But it must have
been a source of enormous shame that made me suppress it, and
when I remembered it and began to write about it, I found it very
painful. But I wanted to write it.
In “Traumatic Departures,” the third chapter of UncÏaimed Experience, Caruth
suggests that the traumatic experience is devastating, not at the moment of its
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occurrence, but precisely at the moment of “wakingfrom it,” that is, at the moment of
realizing that one has survived it “without knowing it.” It is at this stage, this “waking
into consciousness,” Caruth goes on to add, that reliving the experience of trauma
becomes an “attempt to daim one ‘s own survivaL. .to assume one’s survivai as one’s
own” (64; original italics). Kincaid’s decision to write about an experience that is flot
only traumatic but also shameful might therefore be understood as an affirmative
decision—a daim to/of survivance or survivai.
I almost feel that ones sources of humiliation should be immediately
put on public display so they lose their power. Yes, it’s a humiliating
thing to admit, for me to acknowledge. And it’s flot that I care about
people knowing it or flot knowing it, but more for me to acimowiedge
this thing in my life: that the person who brought me into the world
had at one point almost extinguished my life. Those books were my
life. I don’t mean to overdramatize it, but it really did feel like an
attempt at murder. My books were the only thing that connected me to
a world apart from the cesspooi I was in, and then they were just
ashes. It felt murderous.
I find Kincaid’s writerly impulse/logic here strikingly similar to what Kristeva had
recently described—in reference to Freud, Sartre, Aragon, and Barthes—as
“revolutionary writing,” that is, writing which crystallizes the retrospective and
introspective retum to the timeless (Z ‘hors-temps/Zeitios) through the transferential
experience of remembering. Oniy through a difficuit retum to the ZeitÏos, Kristeva
argues, can psychic revoit be performed. 0f course, Kristeva’s project is to
rediscover a sense of revoit and a culture of revoit, for that maller, through the
transferential experience of both writing and psychoanalysis (see Intimate Revoit and
Sense and Non-Sense ofRevoit).
C
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I find confirmation for this view of “mouming as a mode of coimectivity” with the
deceased other in Ramone Soto-Crespo’s article, “Death and the Diaspora Writer:
Hybridity and Mouming in the Work of Jamaica Kincaid.” Soto-Crespo insists on
“depathologizing” mouming so as to open it up to the vistas of “cross-cultural
connections” and of “hybridity” that the diasporic writer like Kincaid is said to
initiate. According to $oto-Crespo, “The hybridity of mouming enables Kincaid to
relive these connections [with her brother, with her bumed books, as well as with her
“small place”] because by mouming lier brother she moums also a larger cultural
condition” (370). In the fleshing out of his own concept of “hybrid mourning” to the
history of colonialism, Soto-Crespo finds himself overtly involved in the specific
tensions, delays, tactics, politics, and lacunae that jeopardize the otherwise
connective force of mouming. A good deal of what passes for mouming in Soto
Crespo’s reading of Kincaid does fail under the heading of melancholia and is within
a hair’s breadth of morphing into tension, renunciation or suspension of connection.
While tending to dilute the affective forcefield of mouming—and to strip mourning
of its psychological, if not pathological residues—in the service of a politics of
connectivity, Soto-Crespo nonetheless imports a useful concept to postcolonial
studies, a field that is terribly “Seeking new connections between things” (Ngugi wa
Thiongo).
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